{"title":"Vision, body and interpretation in medical imaging diagnostics","authors":"Renzhen Chen, Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis","doi":"10.1007/s11019-024-10200-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-024-10200-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article explores the profound impact of visualism and visual perception in the context of medical imaging diagnostics. It emphasizes the intricate interplay among vision, embodiment, subjectivity, language, and historicity within the realm of medical science and technology, with a specific focus on image consciousness. The study delves into the role of subjectivity in perception, facilitating the communication of opacity and historicity to the perceiving individual. Additionally, it scrutinizes the image interpretation process, drawing parallels to text interpretation and highlighting the influence of personal biases and individuality in medical practice. By revisiting Husserl’s conceptualization of “image consciousness” and introducing the notion of “image theme”, the paper seeks to establish a theoretical framework for making sense of images within the context of technological interpretation. A key objective is to enhance the phenomenology of technology through a systematic analysis of medical imaging diagnosis, contributing to an expanded epistemological foundation for medical practice. The article recognizes that the construction of medical knowledge incorporates subjective elements, especially within a historical context. The interpretation of images involves both instrumental and expert interpretation, with human subjectivity playing a crucial role. The article asserts that human creativity and conscious engagement are indispensable in interpreting all medical images.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":"238 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140571850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Ethical Obligation for Research During Public Health Emergencies: Insights From the COVID-19 Pandemic.","authors":"Mariana Barosa, Euzebiusz Jamrozik, Vinay Prasad","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10184-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10184-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In times of crises, public health leaders may claim that trials of public health interventions are unethical. One reason for this claim can be that equipoise-i.e. a situation of uncertainty and/or disagreement among experts about the evidence regarding an intervention-has been disturbed by a change of collective expert views. Some might claim that equipoise is disturbed if the majority of experts believe that emergency public health interventions are likely to be more beneficial than harmful. However, such beliefs are not always justified: where high quality research has not been conducted, there is often considerable residual uncertainty about whether interventions offer net benefits. In this essay we argue that high-quality research, namely by means of well-designed randomized trials, is ethically obligatory before, during, and after implementing policies in public health emergencies (PHEs). We contend that this standard applies to both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions, and we elaborate an account of equipoise that captures key features of debates in the recent pandemic. We build our case by analyzing research strategies employed during the COVID-19 pandemic regarding drugs, vaccines, and non-pharmaceutical interventions; and by providing responses to possible objections. Finally, we propose a public health policy reform: whenever a policy implemented during a PHE is not grounded in high-quality evidence that expected benefits outweigh harms, there should be a planned approach to generate high-quality evidence, with review of emerging data at preset time points. These preset timepoints guarantee that policymakers pause to review emerging evidence and consider ceasing ineffective or even harmful policies, thereby improving transparency and accountability, as well as permitting the redirection of resources to more effective or beneficial interventions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"49-70"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10904511/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139049553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emerging perspectives in the shared decision making debate.","authors":"Bert Gordijn, Henk Ten Have","doi":"10.1007/s11019-024-10196-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-024-10196-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"1-2"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139730686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Precision medicine and the problem of structural injustice.","authors":"Sara Green, Barbara Prainsack, Maya Sabatello","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10173-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10173-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"133"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10904447/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10088237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How do roles impact suicidal agents' obligations?","authors":"Suzanne E Dowie","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10177-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10177-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this paper, I assess the role responsibility argument that claims suicidal agents have obligations to specific people not to kill themselves due to their roles. Since the plausibility of the role responsibility argument is clearest in the parent-child relationship, I assess parental obligations. I defend a view that says that normative roles, such as those of a parent, are contractual and voluntary. I then suggest that the normative parameters for some roles preclude permissible suicide because the role-related contract includes a promise to provide continuing care and emotional support. I propose that as we have established criteria for morally acceptable reasons for cancelling, voiding, or amending a contract, we can apply these to the role responsibility argument to establish grounds for releasing a parent from his role-related and contractual obligations. Failure to fulfil one's contractual roles may not be blameworthy, depending upon the circumstances. I propose the factors determining culpability in failure to fulfil one's role-related obligations are: intention, voluntariness, diminished responsibility, mental capacity, and foreseeability.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"15-30"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10904411/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41239841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paula Boddington, Andy Northcott, Katie Featherstone
{"title":"Personhood as projection: the value of multiple conceptions of personhood for understanding the dehumanisation of people living with dementia.","authors":"Paula Boddington, Andy Northcott, Katie Featherstone","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10187-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10187-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We examine the concept of personhood in relation to people living with dementia and implications for the humanity of care, drawing on a body of ethnographic work. Much debate has searched for an adequate account of the person for these purposes. Broad contrasts can be made between accounts focusing on cognition and mental faculties, and accounts focusing on embodied and relational aspects of the person. Some have suggested the concept of the person is critical for good care; others suggest the vexed debates mean that the concept should be abandoned. We argue instead that the competing accounts illuminate the very tensions in personhood which are manifest for all of us, but especially for people living with dementia, and argue that our account has explanatory power in shedding light on how precisely dehumanisation and constraints on agency may arise for people living with dementia, and for staff, within an institutional context.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"93-106"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138832299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From a critique of the principle of autonomy to an ethic of heteronomy.","authors":"Florian Martinet-Kosinski","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10185-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10185-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Etymologically, autonomy is the ability to give oneself rules and follow them. It is an important principle of medical ethics, which can sometimes raise some tensions in the care relationship. We propose a new definition of ethics, the ethics of heteronomy: a self-normative, discursive and responsible autonomy. Autonomy cannot be considered without the responsibility each person must have towards others. In the care relationship, autonomy would be more the ability of each person to reach out to others than the ability to decide alone. The care relationship must be seen as an accompaniment of equals where each person allows the other to be rephrased. Autonomy would then no longer be absolute but relative to each situation. Being autonomous would become an ability for adaptation of the patient-doctor pair. The accompaniment allows the birth of a relationship of trust, giving the patient and the doctor the ability to touch and let themselves be touched, thus making each one progress in this reciprocal dialectic. The care relationship becomes the possibility of considering autonomy as a collective and not as an individual notion only. Paradoxically, by promoting the autonomy of the patient-doctor pair, they both develop their own autonomy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"71-80"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139425736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The duty of care and the right to be cared for: is there a duty to treat the unvaccinated?","authors":"Zohar Lederman, Shalom Corcos","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10186-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10186-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Vaccine hesitancy or refusal has been one of the major obstacles to herd immunity against Covid-19 in high-income countries and one of the causes for the emergence of variants. The refusal of people who are eligible for vaccination to receive vaccination creates an ethical dilemma between the duty of healthcare professionals (HCPs) to care for patients and their right to be taken care of. This paper argues for an extended social contract between patients and society wherein vaccination against Covid-19 is conceived as essential for the protection of the right of healthcare providers to be taken care of. Thus, a duty of care is only valid when those who can receive vaccination actually receive it. Whenever that is not the case, the continuing functioning of HCPs can only be perceived as supererogatory and not obligatory.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"81-91"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10904556/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139098860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An analysis of different concepts of \"identity\" in the heritable genome editing debate.","authors":"Ying-Qi Liaw","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10189-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10189-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Human heritable genome editing (HHGE) involves editing the genes of human gametes and/or early human embryos. Whilst 'identity' is a key concept underpinning the current HHGE debate, there is a lack of inclusive analysis on different concepts of 'identity' which renders the overall debate confusing at times. This paper first contributes to reviewing the existing literature by consolidating how 'identity' has been discussed in the HHGE debate. Essentially, the discussion will reveal an ontological and empirical understanding of identity when different types of identity are involved. Here, I discuss genetic, numerical, qualitative and narrative and how each of them is relevant in the HHGE context. Secondly, given the different types of identity, the paper explores how we could navigate these different interpretations of identity in a way that promotes an inclusive and informed discussion between primary stakeholders and the general public in the HHGE debate. Here, I argue for and refine a multi-faceted concept of identity as a suitable framework for discussing the ethical and societal implications of HHGE because it not only could integrate different understandings of identity but also highlight the interconnectedness between these different understandings.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"121-131"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10904499/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139378542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A reply to Gillham on the impairment principle.","authors":"Bruce P Blackshaw","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10180-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10180-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The impairment argument claims that abortion is immoral, because it results in a greater impairment to a fetus than other actions that are clearly immoral, such as inflicting fetal alcohol syndrome. Alex Gillham argues that the argument requires clarification of the meaning of greater impairment. He proposes two definitions, and points out the difficulties with each. In response, I argue that while the impairment argument's definition of greater impairment is narrow in scope, it is sufficient for its intended purpose. Broadening its scope to more controversial comparisons of impairment is likely to undermine the intuitive appeal of the impairment principle that the argument is based upon.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"31-35"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71414708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}