{"title":"An analysis of different concepts of \"identity\" in the heritable genome editing debate.","authors":"Ying-Qi Liaw","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10189-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10189-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Human heritable genome editing (HHGE) involves editing the genes of human gametes and/or early human embryos. Whilst 'identity' is a key concept underpinning the current HHGE debate, there is a lack of inclusive analysis on different concepts of 'identity' which renders the overall debate confusing at times. This paper first contributes to reviewing the existing literature by consolidating how 'identity' has been discussed in the HHGE debate. Essentially, the discussion will reveal an ontological and empirical understanding of identity when different types of identity are involved. Here, I discuss genetic, numerical, qualitative and narrative and how each of them is relevant in the HHGE context. Secondly, given the different types of identity, the paper explores how we could navigate these different interpretations of identity in a way that promotes an inclusive and informed discussion between primary stakeholders and the general public in the HHGE debate. Here, I argue for and refine a multi-faceted concept of identity as a suitable framework for discussing the ethical and societal implications of HHGE because it not only could integrate different understandings of identity but also highlight the interconnectedness between these different understandings.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"121-131"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10904499/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139378542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A reply to Gillham on the impairment principle.","authors":"Bruce P Blackshaw","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10180-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10180-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The impairment argument claims that abortion is immoral, because it results in a greater impairment to a fetus than other actions that are clearly immoral, such as inflicting fetal alcohol syndrome. Alex Gillham argues that the argument requires clarification of the meaning of greater impairment. He proposes two definitions, and points out the difficulties with each. In response, I argue that while the impairment argument's definition of greater impairment is narrow in scope, it is sufficient for its intended purpose. Broadening its scope to more controversial comparisons of impairment is likely to undermine the intuitive appeal of the impairment principle that the argument is based upon.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"31-35"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71414708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ana M Pereira Daoud, Wybo J Dondorp, Annelien L Bredenoord, Guido M W R De Wert
{"title":"Potentiality switches and epistemic uncertainty: the Argument from Potential in times of human embryo-like structures.","authors":"Ana M Pereira Daoud, Wybo J Dondorp, Annelien L Bredenoord, Guido M W R De Wert","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10181-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10181-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Recent advancements in developmental biology enable the creation of embryo-like structures from human stem cells, which we refer to as human embryo-like structures (hELS). These structures provide promising tools to complement-and perhaps ultimately replace-the use of human embryos in clinical and fundamental research. But what if these hELS-when further improved-also have a claim to moral status? What would that imply for their research use? In this paper, we explore these questions in relation to the traditional answer as to why human embryos should be given greater protection than other (non-)human cells: the so-called Argument from Potential (AfP). According to the AfP, human embryos deserve special moral status because they have the unique potential to develop into persons. While some take the development of hELS to challenge the very foundations of the AfP, the ongoing debate suggests that its dismissal would be premature. Since the AfP is a spectrum of views with different moral implications, it does not need to imply that research with human embryos or hELS that (may) have 'active' potential should be completely off-limits. However, the problem with determining active potential in hELS is that this depends on development passing through 'potentiality switches' about the precise coordinates of which we are still in the dark. As long as this epistemic uncertainty persists, extending embryo research regulations to research with specific types of hELS would amount to a form of regulative precaution that as such would require further justification.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"37-48"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10904491/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71414709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"COVID-19 vaccine refusal as unfair free-riding.","authors":"Joshua Kelsall","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10188-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10188-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Contributions to COVID-19 vaccination programmes promise valuable collective goods. They can support public and individual health by creating herd immunity and taking the pressure off overwhelmed public health services; support freedom of movement by enabling governments to remove restrictive lockdown policies; and improve economic and social well-being by allowing businesses, schools, and other essential public services to re-open. The vaccinated can contribute to the production of these goods. The unvaccinated, who benefit from, but who do not contribute to these goods can be morally criticised as free-riders. In this paper defends the claim that in the case of COVID-19, the unvaccinated are unfair free-riders. I defend the claim against two objections. First, that they are not unfair free-riders because they lack the subjective attitudes and intentions of free-riders; second, that although the unvaccinated may be free-riders, their free-riding is not unfair.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"107-119"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10904454/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139378543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sharing a medical decision.","authors":"Coos Engelsma","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10179-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10179-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>During the last decades, shared decision making (SDM) has become a very popular model for the physician-patient relationship. SDM can refer to a process (making a decision in a shared way) and a product (making a shared decision). In the literature, by far most attention is devoted to the process. In this paper, I investigate the product, wondering what is involved by a medical decision being shared. I argue that the degree to which a decision to implement a medical alternative is shared should be determined by taking into account six considerations: (i) how the physician and the patient rank that alternative, (ii) the individual preference scores the physician and the patient (would) assign to that alternative, (iii) the similarity of the preference scores, (iv) the similarity of the rankings, (v) the total concession size, and (vi) the similarity of the concession sizes. I explain why shared medical decisions are valuable, and sketch implications of the analysis for the physician-patient relationship.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"3-14"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10904442/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138446583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A fair exchange: why living kidney donors in England should be financially compensated.","authors":"Daniel Rodger, Bonnie Venter","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10171-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10171-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Every year, hundreds of patients in England die whilst waiting for a kidney transplant, and this is evidence that the current system of altruistic-based donation is not sufficient to address the shortage of kidneys available for transplant. To address this problem, we propose a monopsony system whereby kidney donors can opt-in to receive financial compensation, whilst still preserving the right of individuals to donate without receiving any compensation. A monopsony system describes a market structure where there is only one 'buyer'-in this case the National Health Service. By doing so, several hundred lives could be saved each year in England, wait times for a kidney transplant could be significantly reduced, and it would lessen the burden on dialysis services. Furthermore, compensation would help alleviate the common disincentives to living kidney donation, such as its potential associated health and psychological costs, and it would also help to increase awareness of living kidney donation. The proposed system would also result in significant cost savings that could then be redirected towards preventing kidney disease and reducing health disparities. While concerns about exploitation, coercion, and the 'crowding out' of altruistic donors exist, we believe that careful implementation can mitigate these issues. Therefore, we recommend piloting financial compensation for living kidney donors at a transplant centre in England.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"625-634"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10725849/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10067691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Foucault and medicine: challenging normative claims.","authors":"Chris A Suijker","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10170-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10170-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Some of Michel Foucault's work focusses on an archeological and genealogical analysis of certain aspects of the medical episteme, such as 'Madness and Civilization' (1964/2001), 'The Birth of the Clinic' (1973) and 'The History of Sexuality' (1978/2020a). These and other Foucauldian works have often been invoked to characterize, but also to normatively interpret mechanisms of the currently existing medical episteme. Writers conclude that processes of patient objectification, power, medicalization, observation and discipline are widespread in various areas where the medical specialty operates and that these aspects have certain normative implications for how our society operates or should operate. The Foucauldian concepts used to describe the medical episteme and the normative statements surrounding these concepts will be critically analyzed in this paper.By using Foucault's work and several of his interpreters, I will focus on the balance between processes of subjectification and objectification and the normative implications of these processes by relating Foucault's work and the work of his interpreters to the current medical discipline. Additionally, by focusing on the discussion of death and biopower, the role of physicians in the negation and stigmatization of death is being discussed, mainly through the concept of biopower. Lastly, based on the discussion of panopticism in the medical discipline, this paper treats negative and positive forms power, and a focus will be laid upon forms of resistance against power. The discussed aspects will hopefully shed a different and critical light on the relationship between Foucault's work and medicine, something that eventually can also be deduced from Foucault's later work itself.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"539-548"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10725842/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41152068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Authenticity and the argument from testability: a bottom-up approach : Author.","authors":"Jasper Debrabander","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10166-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10166-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Jesper Ahlin Marceta published an article in this journal in which he formulated his \"argument from testability\", stating that it is impossible, at least practically, to operationalize procedural authenticity. That is, using procedural accounts of authenticity, one cannot reliably differentiate between authentic and inauthentic desires. There are roughly two ways to respond to the argument from testability: top-down and bottom-up. Several authors have endeavored the top-down approach by trying to show that some conceptions of authenticity might be operationalizable after all. At present, however, the bottom-up approach has not been put to the test. That is, no attempt has been made to use a currently existing assessment tool to guide the development of an account of authenticity. In this paper, I will investigate what it means to develop an account of authenticity bottom-up based on measures of concordance. More specifically, I will investigate the following three research questions. First, how do concordance and authenticity relate at a conceptual level? As crucial similarities exist between these concepts, concordance measures seem to offer a good starting point for the bottom-up approach. Second, how do judgements of concordance differ from judgements of authenticity? Both their scope and the way they are justified will turn out to be different. This suggests novel ways to react to Marceta's argument from testability. Third, should we develop a theory of concordance? The positive answer to this question will point towards a central limitation of the bottom-up approach.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"583-589"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10381674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gregory E Kaebnick, David Christopher Magnus, Audiey Kao, Mohammad Hosseini, David Resnik, Veljko Dubljević, Christy Rentmeester, Bert Gordijn, Mark J Cherry
{"title":"Correction: Editors' statement on the responsible use of generative AI technologies in scholarly journal publishing.","authors":"Gregory E Kaebnick, David Christopher Magnus, Audiey Kao, Mohammad Hosseini, David Resnik, Veljko Dubljević, Christy Rentmeester, Bert Gordijn, Mark J Cherry","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10183-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-023-10183-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":"26 4","pages":"505"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10725841/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138808551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Abortion, euthanasia, and the limits of principlism.","authors":"Brieann Rigby, Xavier Symons","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10162-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10162-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Principlism is an ethical framework that has dominated bioethical discourse for the past 50 years. There are differing perspectives on its proper scope and limits. In this article, we consider to what extent principlism provides guidance for the abortion and euthanasia debates. We argue that whilst principlism may be considered a useful framework for structuring bioethical discourse, it does not in itself allow for the resolution of these neuralgic policy discussions. Scholars have attempted to use principlism to analyse the ethics and legality of abortion and euthanasia; but such efforts are methodologically problematic. We close with a consideration of the proper scope of principlism in bioethics-a vision that is more modest than the manner in which principlism is often deployed in contemporary academic bioethics and medical education.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"549-556"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9828794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}