Manon van Daal, Anne-Floor J de Kanter, Karin R Jongsma, Annelien L Bredenoord, Nienke de Graeff
{"title":"Embodiment and regenerative implants: a proposal for entanglement.","authors":"Manon van Daal, Anne-Floor J de Kanter, Karin R Jongsma, Annelien L Bredenoord, Nienke de Graeff","doi":"10.1007/s11019-024-10199-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-024-10199-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Regenerative Medicine promises to develop treatments to regrow healthy tissues and cure the physical body. One of the emerging developments within this field is regenerative implants, such as jawbone or heart valve implants, that can be broken down by the body and are gradually replaced with living tissue. Yet challenges for embodiment are to be expected, given that the implants are designed to integrate deeply into the tissue of the living body, so that implant and body become one. In this paper, we explore how regenerative implants may affect the embodied experience of implant recipients. To this end, we take a phenomenological approach. First, we explore what insights the existing phenomenological and empirical literature on embodiment offers regarding the experience of illness and of living with regular (non-regenerative) implants and organ transplants. Second, we apply these insights to better understand how future implant recipients might experience living with regenerative implants. Third, we conclude that concepts and considerations from the existing phenomenological literature do not sufficiently address what it might be like to live with an implantable technology that, over time, becomes one with the living body. We argue that the interwovenness and intimate relationship of people living with regenerative implants should be understood in terms of 'entanglement'. Entanglement allows us to explore the complexities of human-technology relations, acknowledging the inseparability of humans and implantable technologies. Our theoretical foundations regarding the role of embodiment may be tested empirically once more people will be living with regenerative implants.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"241-252"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11076359/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140140948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Severity and death.","authors":"Adam Ehlert","doi":"10.1007/s11019-024-10193-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-024-10193-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article discusses the relationship between two theories about the badness of death, the Life-Comparative Account and the Gradualist Account, and two methods of operationalizing severity in health care priority setting, Absolute Shortfall and Proportional Shortfall. The aim is that theories about the badness of death can influence and inform the idea of the basis of severity as a priority setting criterion. I argue that there are strong similarities between the Life-Comparative Account and Absolute Shortfall, and since the Life-Comparative Account is one of the most reasonable accounts of the badness of death, this provides some support for using Absolute Shortfall. I also argue that it is difficult to find support for Proportional Shortfall from theories about the badness of death, and also, that it is difficult to find support for Gradualist Account from theories about severity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"217-226"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11076339/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139703758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fostering dialogue: a phenomenological approach to bridging the gap between the \"voice of medicine\" and the \"voice of the lifeworld\".","authors":"Junguo Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s11019-024-10195-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-024-10195-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article adopts Husserl's transcendental phenomenology to explore the complex relationship between patients and physicians. It delves into the coexistence of two distinct voices in the realm of medicine and health: the \"voice of medicine\" and the \"voice of life-world.\" Divided into three sections, the article emphasizes the importance of shifting from a scientific-medical attitude to a more personalistic approach in physician-patient interactions. This shift aims to prevent depersonalization and desubjectification. Additionally, it highlights the equal and irreducible nature of patients while acknowledging the vital role physicians hold in the realm of illness. The article stresses the need for a balanced and equitable relationship between both parties, rooted in the shared life-world. Moreover, empathy is underscored as a crucial element in fostering meaningful dialogue, wherein understanding diverse perspectives and attitudes towards illness is paramount. The article argues that differences between patients and physicians are necessary for empathy, while shared similarities form its foundation. Ultimately, a harmonious relationship facilitates empathy and enables the constitution of a new sense of life for both patients and physicians.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"155-164"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139571102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who has a meaningful life? A care ethics analysis of selective trait abortion.","authors":"Riley Clare Valentine","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10192-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10192-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Trait Selective Abortions (TSA) have come under critique as a medical practice that presents potential disabled infants as burdens and lacking the potential for meaningful lives. This paper, using the author's background as a disabled person, contends that the philosophy underpinning TSAs reflects liberal society's lack of a theory of needs. The author argues for a care ethics based approach informed by disability analyses to engage with TSAs.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"205-216"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139673297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Donald Boudreau, Hubert Wykretowicz, Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, Abraham Fuks, Michael Saraga
{"title":"Discovering clinical phronesis.","authors":"Donald Boudreau, Hubert Wykretowicz, Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, Abraham Fuks, Michael Saraga","doi":"10.1007/s11019-024-10198-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-024-10198-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Phronesis is often described as a 'practical wisdom' adapted to the matters of everyday human life. Phronesis enables one to judge what is at stake in a situation and what means are required to bring about a good outcome. In medicine, phronesis tends to be called upon to deal with ethical issues and to offer a critique of clinical practice as a straightforward instrumental application of scientific knowledge. There is, however, a paucity of empirical studies of phronesis, including in medicine. Using a hermeneutic and phenomenological approach, this inquiry explores how phronesis is manifest in the stories of clinical practice of eleven exemplary physicians. The findings highlight five overarching themes: ethos (or character) of the physician, clinical habitus revealed in physician know-how, encountering the patient with attentiveness, modes of reasoning amidst complexity, and embodied perceptions (such as intuitions or gut feeling). The findings open a discussion about the contingent nature of clinical situations, a hermeneutic mode of clinical thinking, tacit dimensions of being and doing in clinical practice, the centrality of caring relations with patients, and the elusive quality of some aspects of practice. This study deepens understandings of the nature of phronesis within clinical settings and proposes 'Clinical phronesis' as a descriptor for its appearance and role in the daily practice of (exemplary) physicians.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"165-179"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11076326/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140060796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A critical view on using \"life not worth living\" in the bioethics of assisted reproduction.","authors":"Agnes Elisabeth Kandlbinder","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10191-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11019-023-10191-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"189-203"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11076207/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139742307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Making things specific: towards an anthropology of everyday ethics in healthcare","authors":"Jeannette Pols","doi":"10.1007/s11019-024-10204-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-024-10204-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper is the English translation and adaptation of my inaugural lecture in Amsterdam for the Chair Anthropology of Everyday Ethics in Health Care. I argue that the challenges in health care may look daunting and unsolvable in their scale and complexity, but that it helps to consider these problems in their specificity, while accepting that some problems may not be solved but have become chronic. The paper provides reflections on how to develop a scientific approach that does not aim to eradicate bad things but explores ways in which to live with them. Crucial in this quest is the attention to how we conceptualize problems, and whether this is specific enough for addressing present day concerns. I propose an anthropology of everyday ethics as a way to study people’s everyday ways of handling a variety of goods in practice. I draw specific attention to exploring aesthetic values in everyday life amongst these, values that are used abundantly to qualify events in everyday life but rarely theorized in philosophy or social science.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140838498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against age limits for men in reproductive care","authors":"Steven R. Piek, Andrea Martani, Guido Pennings","doi":"10.1007/s11019-024-10203-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-024-10203-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Almost all countries and fertility clinics impose age limits on women who want to become pregnant through Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART). Age limits for aspiring fathers, however, are much less common and remain a topic of debate. This article departs from the principle of reproductive autonomy and a <i>conditional positive</i> right to receive ART, and asks whether there are convincing arguments to also impose age limits on aspiring fathers. After considering three consequentialist approaches to justifying age limits for aspiring fathers, we take in a concrete normative stance by concluding that those are not strong enough to justify such cut-offs. We reinforce our position by drawing a comparison between the case of a 39-year-old woman who wants to become a single mother via a sperm donor on the one hand, and on the other hand the same woman who wants to have a child with a 64-year-old man who she loves and who is willing to care for the child as long as he is able to. We conclude that, as long as appropriate precautions are taken to protect the welfare of the future child, couples who want to receive fertility treatment should never be limited on the basis of the age of the (male) partner. An absence of age limits for men would respect the reproductive autonomy of both the man <i>and</i> the woman.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140799470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutional design and moral conflict in health care priority-setting","authors":"Philip Petrov","doi":"10.1007/s11019-024-10201-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-024-10201-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Priority-setting policy-makers often face moral and political pressure to balance the conflicting motivations of <i>efficiency</i> and <i>rescue/non-abandonment</i>. Using the conflict between these motivations as a case study can enrich the understanding of institutional design in developed democracies. This essay presents a cognitive-psychological account of the conflict between efficiency and rescue/non-abandonment in health care priority-setting. It then describes three sets of institutional arrangements—in Australia, England/Wales, and Germany, respectively—that contend with this conflict in interestingly different ways. The analysis yields at least three implications for institutional design in developed democracies: (1) indeterminacy at the level of moral psychology can increase the probability of indeterminacy at the level of institutional design; (2) situational constraints in effect require priority-setting policy-makers to adopt normative-moral pluralism; and (3) the U.S. health care system may be in an <i>anti-priority-setting equilibrium</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140571854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vision, body and interpretation in medical imaging diagnostics","authors":"Renzhen Chen, Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis","doi":"10.1007/s11019-024-10200-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-024-10200-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article explores the profound impact of visualism and visual perception in the context of medical imaging diagnostics. It emphasizes the intricate interplay among vision, embodiment, subjectivity, language, and historicity within the realm of medical science and technology, with a specific focus on image consciousness. The study delves into the role of subjectivity in perception, facilitating the communication of opacity and historicity to the perceiving individual. Additionally, it scrutinizes the image interpretation process, drawing parallels to text interpretation and highlighting the influence of personal biases and individuality in medical practice. By revisiting Husserl’s conceptualization of “image consciousness” and introducing the notion of “image theme”, the paper seeks to establish a theoretical framework for making sense of images within the context of technological interpretation. A key objective is to enhance the phenomenology of technology through a systematic analysis of medical imaging diagnosis, contributing to an expanded epistemological foundation for medical practice. The article recognizes that the construction of medical knowledge incorporates subjective elements, especially within a historical context. The interpretation of images involves both instrumental and expert interpretation, with human subjectivity playing a crucial role. The article asserts that human creativity and conscious engagement are indispensable in interpreting all medical images.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":"238 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140571850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}