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A Defense of the Obligation to Keep Promises to the Dead. 为履行对死者承诺的义务辩护。
IF 1.3 3区 哲学
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-08 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae034
James Stacey Taylor
{"title":"A Defense of the Obligation to Keep Promises to the Dead.","authors":"James Stacey Taylor","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhae034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhae034","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>It is widely held that to break a promise that one made to a person who is now dead would be to wrong her. This view undergirds many positions in bioethics, ranging from those that concern who may access a person's medical records after she has died, to questions concerning organ procurement and posthumous procreation. Ashley Dressel has argued that there is no reason to believe that promissory obligations can be owed to people who are dead. Although her arguments are unsuccessful, others establish that neither of the promissory obligation accounts that she considers (the \"Authority Account\" and the \"harm-based view\") can justify the standard view that directed posthumous promissory obligation is possible. However, this does not mean that the received view that we should keep our promises to the dead is mistaken. First, the theoretical commitments and argumentative strategies of those who endorse the possibility of posthumous promissory obligations preclude them from grounding such on either of these accounts of directed promissory obligation. They are thus already committed to justifying such obligations in other ways. Second, the obligation to keep promises to the dead could be justified on the grounds that not to do so would adversely affect the living.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142156342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Moral Bioenhancement Cannot Reliably Produce Virtue. 为什么道德生物强化不能可靠地产生美德？
IF 1.3 3区 哲学
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-08 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae035
Gina Lebkuecher, Marley Hornewer, Maya V Roytman, Sydney Samoska, Joseph M Vukov
{"title":"Why Moral Bioenhancement Cannot Reliably Produce Virtue.","authors":"Gina Lebkuecher, Marley Hornewer, Maya V Roytman, Sydney Samoska, Joseph M Vukov","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhae035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhae035","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Moral bioenhancement presents the possibility of enhancing morally desirable emotions and dispositions. While some scholars have proposed that moral bioenhancement can produce virtue, we argue that within a virtue ethics framework moral bioenhancement cannot reliably produce virtue. Moreover, on a virtue ethics framework, the pursuit of moral bioenhancement carries moral risks. To make this argument, we consider three aspects of virtue-its motivational, rational, and behavioral components. In order to be virtuous, we argue, a person must (i) take pleasure in doing the right thing and have the correct motivational attitudes; (ii) reason correctly about what is called for in a particular ethical dilemma; and (iii) intentionally and continuously practice and cultivate virtues. These dimensions of morality-in short: precisely those emphasized in a virtue ethics framework-cannot be consistently or reliably met using existing moral bioenhancement technology.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142156343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
To Know Me Is to Exonerate Me: Appeals to Character in Defense of the Willowbrook Hepatitis Study. 认识我就是为我开脱罪责：为威洛布鲁克肝炎研究辩护的人格诉求》。
IF 1.3 3区 哲学
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae024
John Lynch
{"title":"To Know Me Is to Exonerate Me: Appeals to Character in Defense of the Willowbrook Hepatitis Study.","authors":"John Lynch","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhae024","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhae024","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Willowbrook Hepatitis Study is one of the best-known examples of unethical medical research, but the research has always had defenders. One of the more intriguing defenses continually used was that critics did not know the researchers on the study and, therefore, could not assess their ethics. This essay traces the appeal to the researchers' characters across published research and archival sources from the 1960s through today. These appeals reflect the observation as old as Aristotle that one of the most potent modes of persuasion is ethos or character. The specific types of character in these appeals develop out of the paternalistic nature of clinical and research practice in the mid-twentieth century. If the individual physician is the locus of medical judgment, then the physician's character becomes a key concern for bioethics. These appeals still appear and have implications for bioethics in the present day.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141159372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Impairment Arguments, Interests, and Circularity. 减值论证、利益和循环性。
IF 1.3 3区 哲学
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae023
Stephen Napier
{"title":"Impairment Arguments, Interests, and Circularity.","authors":"Stephen Napier","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhae023","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhae023","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A common justification for abortion rights is that the death of the fetus does not violate any of the fetus's time-relative interests. The time-relative interest account (TRIA) of harm and wrongdoing tells us that a necessary condition for harming someone is that his or her time-relative interests are frustrated. Regarding the justification for abortion, this account falls prey to impairment arguments. Impairment arguments entertain cases of prenatal injury, such as the mother using illicit drugs that disable the child. The intuition is that the child who is born with such disabilities is harmed by the mother's drug use. But it is unclear what time-relative interest is violated in cases of prenatal harm. Typical responses to impairment arguments point out that the abortion case is different because the child does not exist to experience such harms; but in prenatal injury + survival cases, the child does live to experience those harms. Thus, the TRIA justification for abortion is not impugned by impairment counter-examples. This article argues that this response to impairment arguments is viciously circular. The response must say that so long as you kill the child, no harm is done. But this assumes that killing itself is morally inconsequential and is not itself a case of harm. The response to impairment arguments, then, assumes the permissibility of abortion.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11369812/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140913136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is Cryocide an Ethically Feasible Alternative to Euthanasia? 冷冻杀戮在伦理上是否可以替代安乐死？
IF 1.3 3区 哲学
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae027
Gabriel Andrade, Maria Campo Redondo
{"title":"Is Cryocide an Ethically Feasible Alternative to Euthanasia?","authors":"Gabriel Andrade, Maria Campo Redondo","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhae027","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhae027","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>While some countries are moving toward legalization, euthanasia is still criticized on various fronts. Most importantly, it is considered a violation of the medical ethics principle of non-maleficence, because it actively seeks a patient's death. But, medical ethicists should consider an ethical alternative to euthanasia. In this article, we defend cryocide as one such alternative. Under this procedure, with the consent of terminally-ill patients, their clinical death is induced, in order to prevent the further advance of their brain's deterioration. Their body is then cryogenically preserved, in the hope that in the future, there will be a technology to reanimate it. This prospect is ethically distinct from euthanasia if a different criterion of death is assumed. In the information-theoretic criterion of death, a person is not considered dead when brain and cardiopulmonary functions cease, but rather, when information constituting psychology and memory is lost.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141162945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Disability and Achievement: A Reply to Campbell, Nyholm, and Walter. 残疾与成就：答复坎贝尔、尼霍尔姆和沃尔特》。
IF 1.3 3区 哲学
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae026
Ian D Dunkle
{"title":"Disability and Achievement: A Reply to Campbell, Nyholm, and Walter.","authors":"Ian D Dunkle","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhae026","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhae026","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this article, I explore the impact of disability on one of life's goods: achievement. Contra Campbell, Nyholm, and Walter. I argue that construing the magnitude of achievements in terms of subjective effort trivializes what it means to achieve. This poses a problem for the authors' argument that disability, in general, does not reduce access to this good. I draw on an alternative construal of achievement that I have proposed elsewhere to show that, indeed, many disabilities do not restrict access to achievement. I defend this argument against an objection that it problematically relativizes the achievements of persons with disability, and I close with general lessons for future work.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141097145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Organ Donation by the Imminently Dead: Addressing the Organ Shortage and the Dead Donor Rule. 濒死者器官捐献：解决器官短缺和死亡捐献者规则。
IF 1.3 3区 哲学
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae028
Sarah Chen, Robert M Sade, John W Entwistle
{"title":"Organ Donation by the Imminently Dead: Addressing the Organ Shortage and the Dead Donor Rule.","authors":"Sarah Chen, Robert M Sade, John W Entwistle","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhae028","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhae028","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The dead donor rule (DDR) has facilitated the saving of hundreds of thousands of lives. Recent advances in heart donation, however, have exposed how DDR has limited donation of all organs. We propose advancing the moment in the dying process at which death can be determined to increase substantially the supply of organs for transplantation. We justify this approach by identifying certain flaws in the Uniform Determination of Death Act and proposing a modification of that law that permits earlier procurement of healthier organs in greater numbers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141155733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cognitive Enhancement, Hyperagency, and Responsibility Explosion. 认知增强、超代理和责任爆炸。
IF 1.3 3区 哲学
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae025
Emma C Gordon
{"title":"Cognitive Enhancement, Hyperagency, and Responsibility Explosion.","authors":"Emma C Gordon","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhae025","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhae025","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Hyperagency objections appeal to the risk that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by giving us too much control. I charitably formulate and engage with a prominent version of this objection due to Sandel (2009) -viz., that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by creating an \"explosion\" of responsibilities. I first outline why this worry might look prima facie persuasive, and then I show that it can ultimately be defended against. At the end of the day, if we are to resist cognitive enhancement, it should not be based on a Sandel-style hyperagency argument.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11369811/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141447319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Plastic Resilience: Rethinking Resilience in Illness with Catherine Malabou. 塑料复原力：与凯瑟琳-马拉博（Catherine Malabou）一起重新思考疾病中的复原力。
IF 1.3 3区 哲学
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae032
Cillian Ó Fathaigh
{"title":"Plastic Resilience: Rethinking Resilience in Illness with Catherine Malabou.","authors":"Cillian Ó Fathaigh","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhae032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhae032","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Drawing on Catherine Malabou's notion of plasticity, this article argues for a conception of resilience as plastic. Resilience has proven an important concept in health care, describing how we manage life-changing illnesses. Yet, resilience is not without its critics, who suggest it neglects a political, social, or personal dimension in illness. In this article, I propose that a concept of plastic resilience can address these criticisms. On this account, success should not be based on a return to function, but rather on how actively we are involved in the formation of a new self after illness. I address some approaches that can benefit from \"plastic resilience,\" namely, art therapy, expert companionship, and shared decision-making. In each case, I underline how we should help patients thematize and engage with their new selves, while also being constantly vigilant for how these changes might impact our current assumptions around their preferences for treatment.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142126957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kidney Sales and Disrespectful Demands: A Reply to Rippon. 卖肾和不尊重的要求：答复里彭。
IF 1.3 3区 哲学
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-02 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae033
Luke Semrau
{"title":"Kidney Sales and Disrespectful Demands: A Reply to Rippon.","authors":"Luke Semrau","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhae033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhae033","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Simon Rippon, revising an earlier argument against kidney sales, now claims that offers involving the performance of invasive acts, when extended to people under pressure, constitute a kind of rights violation, Impermissibly Disrespectful Demands. Since offers involving kidney sales so qualify, Rippon finds prima facie reason to prohibit them. The present article levels four independent objections to Rippon's argument: the account of Impermissibly Disrespectful Demands implausibly condemns kidney donation as much as kidney sales; the normative importance of having autonomous veto control over bodily incursions does not plausibly underwrite a right to not be extended invasive offers under pressure; Impermissibly Disrespectful Demands can easily be transformed into innocuous offers; and the prohibition has greater welfare costs than Rippon acknowledges.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142120884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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