{"title":"Do Non-Compensating Plasma Centers Exploit Donors?","authors":"D Robert MacDougall","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf014","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Some authors defend prohibiting compensation for blood plasma on the grounds that compensating donors exploits them. James Taylor has recently argued against this view. According to Taylor, not only does compensation not exploit donors but also accepting uncompensated donations in jurisdictions requiring this exploits donors. In this article, I evaluate Taylor's novel market-based account of exploitation and the conclusions about plasma donations he draws from it. I accept and offer further support for his account of exploitation but argue that (contra Taylor) the market-based account suggests that it is only in cases of capped compensation or legal monopsonies that centers can exploit donors. Uncompensated donations required by prohibitions are unlikely to exploit donors because a system of uncompensated donations does not actually benefit plasma centers, assuming a reasonable understanding of \"benefits\" for these nonprofit organizations. Finally, I discuss whether centers that can increase benefits to everyone by making exploitative offers should.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144102645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Illness Experience and Social Suffering: Synthesizing Medical Phenomenology and Critical Theory.","authors":"Domonkos Sik","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf015","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Medical phenomenology describes the illness experience while providing an alternative to the reductionist biomedical discourse. Phenomenologically oriented critical theories focus on the experiences of structural paradoxes manifesting as social suffering. While both approaches elaborate different patterns of suffering, so far, their parallelisms and interactions have not been adequately analyzed. This task is all the more important because illness experience is never only about the disabled body or the distressed mind, it is also inseparable from a distorted intersubjectivity; and vice versa, untreated social suffering also has the potential of turning into illness. After overviewing various experiences characterizing illness and those disrupted intersubjectivities, which can produce a homologous phenomenological pattern, four idealtypical patterns are analyzed. The parallel occurrence of illness and social suffering represents extreme existential disembedding; illness without social suffering represents a chance for countering the bodily disembedding by intersubjective re-embedding; social suffering without illness is a constellation, wherein the chance of medicalizing structural distortions is high; the lack of illness and social suffering represents a carefree, yet unreflective potential. Differentiating between these patterns opens new horizons for medical phenomenology and critical theories as well, both on the theoretical and the practical level.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144102730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Skewed Transgender Narratives in Western Media.","authors":"Hans-Georg Moeller, Jorge Ponseti","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf016","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This essay compares representations of transgender people in Western mass and social media with data drawn from studies on transgender individuals. Three differences between the surveyed data and the media representations stand out: (1) while Western media focus on male-to-female (M-F) individuals, most transgender people in Western societies today are female-to-male (F-M). (2) Western media representations of transgender individuals highlight glamorous, successful people. Empirical data show that the socioeconomic status of transgender individuals in Western societies tends to be lower than that of nontransgender people. (3) In Western media, the transitioning process of transgender people is often portrayed as a successful soteriological journey of becoming one's \"true self.\" Medical surveys show that transgender people suffer from psychological and physical problems both before and after transitioning. It is concluded that the disparity between the empirical data and the media narratives on transgender people is due to the persistence of neoliberal narratives in Western media.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144102844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Justification and Limitations of the Duty to Treat.","authors":"Gustavo Ortiz-Millán","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf017","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Do healthcare workers have a duty to treat contagious patients, even when it poses risks to their own health and lives during a pandemic? This article explores various justifications proposed in the literature to support such a duty. However, it contends that none of these provides a strong enough basis for establishing an absolute duty to treat-although it acknowledges that the bar of justification may be raised when working on more clear and explicit conditions in contracts and codes of ethics, among others. Furthermore, even if such a duty were acknowledged, it must be weighed against healthcare workers' other duties toward their families, co-workers, and personal well-being. Moreover, the duty to treat is argued to be contingent on the circumstances in which healthcare professionals operate, including access to adequate personal protective equipment provided by their institutions. It would have to be balanced against their right to safe working conditions. Within this context, the duty to treat is inherently tied to the preparedness of the State, healthcare systems, or institutions to effectively respond to emergencies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144081385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rethinking Phenomenology of Health and Illness: An Alternative Interpretation.","authors":"Junguo Zhang","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf013","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper critically evaluates Matthew Burch's interpretations and critiques of the phenomenological account of health and illness, which are predominantly situated within the realm of static phenomenology within Husserl's framework, thereby neglecting the potential insights offered by genetic phenomenology. The primary focus of this paper is to explore genetic phenomenology in order to present an alternative interpretation of PHI. It argues that illness experience involves subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity, unified within a structural interdependence. Additionally, normality comprises subjective, intersubjective, and objective dimensions, reflecting its multifaceted nature. It encompasses both a pregiven aspect and a constitutive process. Moreover, the distinction between the lived body and the physical body is a result of first-person subjectification and third-person objectification perspectives. These perspectives mutually complement and intertwine, where bodily transparency and bodily conspicuousness do not necessarily conflict.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144054097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Nonidentity Is Not a Problem: Parfitian Defence of Clinicians Refusing to Provide Assisted Reproductive Technologies.","authors":"Georgina Hall","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf010","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>An accepted argument in reproductive rights literature holds that the welfare of future children is irrelevant in the provision of assisted reproductive technology (ART). A foundational philosophical concept underpinning such dismissal appeals to the \"non-identity\" problem. This argument holds that a future ART child's overriding interest lies in being born. I challenge this argument, suggesting it is a shallow and selective interpretation of the concept that narrowly applies the \"person-affecting\" harm principle to future ART children. I suggest a more extensive reading of the \"non-identity\" problem defends the opposite argument-that dismissing child welfare concerns in ART provision is wrong. In line with the work of one of the key architects of the \"non-identity\" problem, I formulate four Parfit-style arguments that justify clinician refusal of treatment. The key substantive claim of this paper is that delay or denial of ART is morally defensible within the \"non-identity\" problem paradigm in some instances.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144054098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Boundaries of Disease: Vagueness and Overdiagnosis.","authors":"Christopher Boorse","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf001","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In five related essays, Mary Jean Walker and Wendy Rogers, joined in one essay by Jenny Doust, defend various theses about the concept of disease. First, they argue \"disease\" is a cluster concept, not a \"classically structured\" one definable by necessary and sufficient conditions. Second, \"disease\" is vague, in the standard philosophical sense of having borderline cases. In fascinating detail, they argue that this vagueness shows up almost everywhere one looks among ordinary diseases, even if disease is taken to require dysfunction. Still, they conclude, vagueness per se need not be a problem because logicians and philosophers know several ways to handle it. Third, Rogers and Walker believe that the vagueness of \"disease\" is a clue to how to reduce the much-discussed medical problem of \"overdiagnosis\": the diagnosis of permanently harmless disease. Finally, they find my analysis of disease-the \"biostatistical theory\" (BST)-defective and dangerous in four different ways: it offers insufficient guidance on how to draw disease boundaries; it does not fit actual medical practice in doing so; it is ambiguous as to reference class; and it facilitates overdiagnosis. In this article, I freely concede the vagueness of disease, but argue that it is considerably less than Rogers and Walker suppose, and no threat to the BST in any case. I also rebut all their other charges of deficiency in my analysis.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144040767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rejoinder to Dominiak and Wysocki on Evictionism.","authors":"Walter E Block","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf007","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Dominiak and Wysocki (2023, hence, DW) offer a series of criticisms of my analysis of abortion: evictionism, which is a compromise position between the pro-life and the pro-choice viewpoints. The present article is a response to DW.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144052086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"First-Person Authorization and Family Objections to Organ Donation.","authors":"Ana S Iltis, Briana Denny","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf008","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf008","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the United States, individuals who authorize organ donation through various mechanisms make a legally binding decision that only they may revoke. When a person who has given first-person authorization for organ donation becomes eligible to donate organs, according to laws across the United States, their next-of-kin should be informed, not asked, about the impending organ procurement. Despite this, sometimes families are asked for permission to proceed with donation, or they express unsolicited objections to donation. Some scholars and activists argue for the importance of honoring first-person authorization and not accepting what are sometimes called \"family overrides\" or \"family vetoes\" of donation. We consider two arguments for this view, the respect-for-wishes and the prevent-harm arguments and defend a more nuanced approach to family objections to organ donation in the presence of first-person authorization. We also examine the role of families or legally authorized representatives in making decisions regarding premortem interventions for potential donors who are not yet deceased. We argue that such decisions are about living patients and should be treated like all other clinical decisions that legally authorized representatives make for incapacitated living patients.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12097891/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144054096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Destroy, Let Die, or Grow the Embryo Further? Puzzles Raised by the 14-Day Rule and Other Time Limits for Embryo Research.","authors":"Helen Watt","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf006","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Supporting the 14-day rule or other embryo research time limits raises puzzling questions for those wishing to protect older embryos (or indeed, more developed human subjects). What are, or should be, our more immediate aims in setting or implementing such time limits? May death for the research subject be sought as the limit approaches? If the embryo is worth protecting, is it in the embryo's interests to be sustained by a scientist, albeit for instrumental reasons? Should embryo research, including observational research, be prevented, despite the embryo's interest in living further? This paper argues that the aim to prevent more prolonged experimentation, while reasonable, should not be promoted via the means of deliberately arranging the embryo's death. Time limits can encourage such intentions, even if they do not require them. The case is made that while a regulatory status quo should not be amended in favor of a worse alternative, there are several morally preferable options with which the 14-day rule or more permissive alternatives might be replaced.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144053103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}