{"title":"Reciprocal Accord: Seeing Microbiomes as Parts of Ourselves.","authors":"Martin J Fitzgerald","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf040","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Human beings and their microbiomes are interrelated. Now what is the nature of their relation? In this paper, I claim that human beings have microbiomes as parts of themselves. In other words, rather than merely being casually associated with human beings, those microbiomes that reside in/on/around people are constituent parts of human beings. I argue this by reference to organismal homeostasis as understood as a systems-level phenomenon. To support my argument, I provide a survey of contemporary scientific literature surrounding the composition, location, structure, and function of the human microbiome(s). Finally, I cash out this finding by developing the idea of the \"constitutive publicity\" of the human organism. By this I mean that the human organism is not a \"private\" entity that then finds itself in the world, but rather that it is constantly created, suffused by, and contributing to the \"public\" world.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147272538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Autotomized Tails, Ear Tufts, and Facial Reconstructions: Further Thoughts on a Functional Definition of Bodily Parthood.","authors":"Hilary Yancey","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf042","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this article I argue for an Aristotelian hylomorphic view of bodily parthood on which parthood turns on functionality: something is part of a human being's body just in case it functions in the right way for the sake of that person; that is, its functioning aims at the flourishing of the particular human's biological life. Thus, perhaps counterintuitively, some things can stand in the body part relation without being composed of human cells-say, transplanted non-human organs or prosthetic appendages. I argue that there is evidence that some functions of the human body are relational: body parts can perform social functions. If these social or relational functions are genuine functions of the human body, then parts that may not appear to be functioning are. I argue that this could have ethical implications for delineating surgeries that are \"functional\" versus \"aesthetic\" (and perhaps necessary versus elective), and implications for human enhancement.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147272469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Case Against Legalizing Medically Assisted Suicide or Voluntary Active Euthanasia in Islamic Regions.","authors":"Sanwar Siraj, Ruiping Fan","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhag001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhag001","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This essay presents arguments against legalizing medically assisted suicide (MAS) or voluntary active euthanasia (VAE) in Islamic regions. MAS and VAE should be determined by particular regions based on their respective mainstream moral cultures. Taking the Islamic regions of Bangladesh as examples, the essay argues that MAS or VAE should not be legalized in such regions because it would contradict the Islamic classical moral convictions, authentic interpretations, and relevant bioethical codes that prioritize saving human lives and providing quality palliative care rather than MAS or VAE for patients. The essay also provides practical ethical justifications for why the implementation of a non-legalization policy does not disregard non-Muslims in these regions, including secular liberals who may not align with the predominant Islamic moral culture concerning MAS and VAE.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147272558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Case for Pluralism in Death Determination: From Empirical Data to a Policy Proposal.","authors":"Ivars Neiders, Vilius Dranseika","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf028","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf028","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The article defends the pluralist policy of death determination. According to this view, competent persons should be free to choose the criteria under which they should be diagnosed as dead. Our argument partly relies on the diagnosis of the current state of the discussion in the bioethical literature on death determination and partly on empirical evidence that lay intuitions about death determination differ, that is, that there is interpersonal psychological pluralism about death determination. The article then introduces empirical evidence for intrapersonal psychological pluralism about death determination. We argue that intrapersonal psychological pluralism strengthens the case for the pluralist policy of death determination.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"25-37"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145349310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pellegrino and Thomasma's Anatomy of Clinical Judgments Revisited.","authors":"Michael Trimble, Pat Croskerry","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf029","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf029","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In 1981, Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma published A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice. In this work, they situated the process of clinical judgment in the clinical encounter between an individual doctor and their patient. The encounter revolves around three questions: What can be wrong? What can be done? And what should be done for this patient? They analyzed the complete process of clinical reasoning involving both technical and ethical aspects. Pellegrino and Thomasma's subsequent work focused more on professionalism and ethics, while more recent analysis of clinical decision-making has been in the realm of psychology rather than along philosophical lines, particularly in the use of dual-process theory. Here we seek to review Pellegrino and Thomasma's analysis and to reintegrate the technical and ethical aspects of clinical reasoning.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"13-24"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145187408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemically Transformative Medical Procedures and Informed Consent.","authors":"Rajeev R Dutta","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf025","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf025","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>I argue that true informed consent is impossible to obtain for certain medical procedures in which epistemic transformation occurs. Cases in which undergoing a procedure itself provides new experiential information, that is, phenomenal knowledge (what I call \"knowledge-what-it's-like\"), true informed consent for that procedure cannot be attained from knowing facts about the procedure (\"knowledge-that\") alone. If epistemically transformative medical procedures indeed undermine informed consent as I argue they do, I suggest that there are important implications for the decision-making of patients considering these procedures (e.g., chemotherapy, invasive surgeries, cochlear implants, gender-affirming procedures). Rather than solely communicating biological, clinical, and epidemiological facts about procedures, clinicians should supplement pre-procedure counseling with previous patient testimonials or even virtual/augmented reality to compensate (albeit partially) for the \"knowledge-what-it's-like\" that is absent prior to undergoing epistemically transformative medical procedures. Although these interventions may not (accurately) convey what it is like to undergo the procedure, they address the traditionally under-explored experiential aspect of medical treatments in medical decision-making from the patient's perspective.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"52-62"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145139062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Matter of Judgment? Second-Hand Medical Knowledge and Professional Responsibility.","authors":"Andreas Eriksen","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf026","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf026","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Professional judgment is of contested value today. Some argue that the current availability of tools for aligning decisions with evidence-based standards implies that individual judgment should be limited as much as possible. This article argues to the contrary: professional judgment remains a precondition for responsible practice. Nevertheless, increased epistemic dependence-the turn to second-hand medical knowledge-alters the domains of judgment. As first-order evidence has become overwhelming and opaque to practitioners, they need intelligent ways of placing their trust, of integrating different kinds of epistemic tools, and taking responsibility for consequences. The article suggests how these tasks can be seen as a complement to the original ambition of the evidence movement of promoting research literacy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"63-78"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145187354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Compassionate Understanding.","authors":"Steve Matthews","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf027","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf027","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The trauma and anguish professional people encounter in their work over time can lead to losses in competence and occupational burnout. However, the practice of detachment designed to avoid these outcomes can tip over into losses in the ability to connect with clients, and even to alienation from the professional role itself. Some have thought that the proper regulation of levels of empathic concern ensures a balance between these two poles. I argue against this and instead advocate for a stance I call compassionate understanding. I contend that this best achieves sustained professionalism while remaining morally attuned to the norms of one's occupation. I focus on health care to illustrate what is at stake in compassionate understanding, though the position I defend has applications across a significant range of professions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"38-51"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145303973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Apart Together: Getting to the Heart of Biofixture Status.","authors":"Kelsey Gipe","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf041","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This project explores what it means to be a 'biofixture': a medical implant, transplant, or therapy that is morally analogous to a native body part. A motivating case is provided wherein a decision to deactivate a ventricular assist device (VAD) provokes discomfort in medical providers. Taking as a starting point a previous project where a similar case of provider discomfort around pacemaker deactivation led to the conclusion that pacemakers are biofixtures, an argument is made that VADs are likewise biofixtures, the deactivation of which would be more morally analogous to active euthanasia than to standard cases of withdrawal of life support. To this end, criteria for biofixture status are developed, motivated, and applied to VADs and other cardiopulmonary therapies. Clinical entailments of this account of biofixture status are considered and further avenues of research for better understanding the nature and moral import of biofixtures are proposed.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145949373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Baby Parts.","authors":"Rose Hershenov","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf044","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In her recent work, Elselijn Kingma applies four criteria for the individuation of an organism to determine whether the fetus is a part of or mereologically distinct from the mother. These criteria are: homeostasis, metabolic and functional integration, topological continuity, and immunological tolerance. She concludes on the basis of these four criteria that the evidence supports a thesis to the effect that the fetus is a part of the mother and that the point of topological continuity is at the placenta, a \"shared organ.\" In this paper, I use Kingma's four criteria offered to argue that the fetus is mereologically distinct from the mother; the fetus is not a maternal part. The placenta, which I argue is a fetal part, is precisely the point at which there is topological discontinuity between mother and fetus.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145935539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}