Why Nonidentity Is Not a Problem: Parfitian Defence of Clinicians Refusing to Provide Assisted Reproductive Technologies.

Abstract

An accepted argument in reproductive rights literature holds that the welfare of future children is irrelevant in the provision of assisted reproductive technology (ART). A foundational philosophical concept underpinning such dismissal appeals to the "non-identity" problem. This argument holds that a future ART child's overriding interest lies in being born. I challenge this argument, suggesting it is a shallow and selective interpretation of the concept that narrowly applies the "person-affecting" harm principle to future ART children. I suggest a more extensive reading of the "non-identity" problem defends the opposite argument-that dismissing child welfare concerns in ART provision is wrong. In line with the work of one of the key architects of the "non-identity" problem, I formulate four Parfit-style arguments that justify clinician refusal of treatment. The key substantive claim of this paper is that delay or denial of ART is morally defensible within the "non-identity" problem paradigm in some instances.