{"title":"Depression and Autonomy in Physician-Assisted Suicide.","authors":"Rina Tzinman","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhaf005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The standard view in medical practice is that patients have to be in an appropriate state of mind to count as autonomous. For example, according to the Macarthur Competency Assessment Tool for Treatment patients need to be able to: (1) communicate a choice; (2) factually understand the issues; (3) appreciate their situation; and (4) rationally manipulate information. These capacities are normally taken to be compromised by factors that may diminish one's capacity to properly assess one's situation. One of these diminishing factors is depression, which is especially relevant to decisions about assisted suicide or termination of treatment, since depression might contribute to the patient's leaning towards an action resulting in her death. I argue, however, that in certain circumstances, depression and the accompanying desires can be appropriate. Specifically, I demonstrate that even when depression is a factor in the patient's decision, it does not automatically undermine autonomy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf005","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The standard view in medical practice is that patients have to be in an appropriate state of mind to count as autonomous. For example, according to the Macarthur Competency Assessment Tool for Treatment patients need to be able to: (1) communicate a choice; (2) factually understand the issues; (3) appreciate their situation; and (4) rationally manipulate information. These capacities are normally taken to be compromised by factors that may diminish one's capacity to properly assess one's situation. One of these diminishing factors is depression, which is especially relevant to decisions about assisted suicide or termination of treatment, since depression might contribute to the patient's leaning towards an action resulting in her death. I argue, however, that in certain circumstances, depression and the accompanying desires can be appropriate. Specifically, I demonstrate that even when depression is a factor in the patient's decision, it does not automatically undermine autonomy.
期刊介绍:
This bimonthly publication explores the shared themes and concerns of philosophy and the medical sciences. Central issues in medical research and practice have important philosophical dimensions, for, in treating disease and promoting health, medicine involves presuppositions about human goals and values. Conversely, the concerns of philosophy often significantly relate to those of medicine, as philosophers seek to understand the nature of medical knowledge and the human condition in the modern world. In addition, recent developments in medical technology and treatment create moral problems that raise important philosophical questions. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy aims to provide an ongoing forum for the discussion of such themes and issues.