Corporate Communications最新文献_第4页

Financial Packaging of IPO Firms in China 中国IPO公司的融资包装

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2000-01-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.201093

J. Aharony, J. Aharony, Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, T. Wong

{"title":"Financial Packaging of IPO Firms in China","authors":"J. Aharony, J. Aharony, Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, T. Wong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.201093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.201093","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the earnings patterns of initial public offering (IPO) firms in China to shed light on the role of earnings management in the \"financial packaging\" of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for public listing. We base our analysis on the case of B-Shares and H-Shares in China, two types of securities that now allow foreign investors to buy shares in SOEs previously wholly owned by the state. These IPOs mark the beginning of the stock market in China and signify an important step of Chinese economic reform. We examine the pre- and post-IPO earnings patterns for the entire sample, and separately for firms in protected vs. unprotected industries and for B-Shares vs. H-Shares. We find a statistically significant post-issue earnings decline for unprotected industry firms. This earnings decline is most significant for unprotected B-Share firms, and marginally significant for protected B-Share and unprotected H-Share firms, but not significant for protected H-Share firms. In addition, we find some evidence that the accounting accruals of sample firms in unprotected industries decline whereas their cash flows from operations increase after the IPO. Taken together, earnings management in the process of financial packaging seems to depend on the firm's relationship with the central government and on where the securities are listed. The evidence also suggests that the SOEs in unprotected industries may manage accounting accruals to boost earnings and/or list those business units with temporarily high profits resulting from high accounting accruals during the process of financial packaging.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89685514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 561

Derivatives on TV: A Tale of Two Derivatives Debacles in Prime-Time 电视上的衍生品:黄金时段两个衍生品崩溃的故事

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2000-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.259854

P. H. Huang, Frank Partnoy, K. Krawiec

{"title":"Derivatives on TV: A Tale of Two Derivatives Debacles in Prime-Time","authors":"P. H. Huang, Frank Partnoy, K. Krawiec","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.259854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.259854","url":null,"abstract":"This essay discusses two recent episodes in the financial derivatives industry and the television coverage of those episodes. Our discussion focuses on (1) the 1994 bankruptcy of Orange County and the 60 Minutes television program describing that county's derivatives losses and (2) the 1998 near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) and the PBS NOVA program describing that hedge funds' losses. Orange County and LTCM appear at opposite ends of the spectrum of recent derivatives losses. Orange County's Treasury was a one-man show, and its now-infamous treasurer, Robert L. Citron, was a seventy-year-old college dropout. In contrast, LTCM was a slick, sophisticated hedge fund, led by John Meriwether, whose principals included two Nobel laureates and several \"rocket scientists\" recruited from the investment bank Salomon Brothers. Notwithstanding these differences, Orange County and LTCM had two things in common: each lost more than a billion dollars on derivatives and each shrouded the details of its operations in secrecy. Coverage of LTCM was more accurate than coverage of Orange County. We discuss possible reasons for the difference and make some recommendations about how television programs could depict the derivatives markets more accurately, an important issue given the substantial number of policymakers who learn about derivatives through television. We conclude that television, when done properly, is more than capable of keeping pace with derivatives markets.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82434875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Coase V. The Coasians

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1999-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.193776

Simon Johnson, Andrei Shleifer

引用次数: 43

Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix 在公司法中加入衍生品

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1999-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.245553

Frank Partnoy

引用次数: 6

Employee Involvement in Workplace Governance Post-Collective Bargaining 集体谈判后员工参与工作场所治理

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1999-10-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.183869

Stephen M. Bainbridge

{"title":"Employee Involvement in Workplace Governance Post-Collective Bargaining","authors":"Stephen M. Bainbridge","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.183869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.183869","url":null,"abstract":"Prepared for a festschrift in honor of Philip Selznick, this essay looks back at his 1969 book Law, Society, and Industrial Justice. The focus is on employee participation in corporate decisionmaking. Taking an interdisciplinary approach (law and sociology), Selznick treats employee involvement as a means to an end; namely, industrial justice. In this model, employee participation is channeled through the collective bargaining system, especially the grievance arbitration process. Participation through such means is desirable, Selznick posits, because it promotes employee self-actualization, confers legitimacy on the enterprise, and protects employees from opportunism. Although acknowledging that LSIJ was an important scholarly work, this essay argues that the decline of private sector collective bargaining and the move towards alternative forms of participatory management calls into question the continuing vitality of Selznick's argument. The essay concludes that a transaction costs economics-based approach to employee involvement is far more revealing than Selznick's sociology-based model, in that it offers generalized predictions about the function of employee involvement that have proven explanatory over time.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1999-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83211631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Theory and Evidence on the Relationship between Ownership Structure and Capital Structure 股权结构与资本结构关系的理论与实证研究

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1999-09-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.181888

T. Brailsford, B. Oliver, Lay Hwa Sandra Pua

{"title":"Theory and Evidence on the Relationship between Ownership Structure and Capital Structure","authors":"T. Brailsford, B. Oliver, Lay Hwa Sandra Pua","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.181888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.181888","url":null,"abstract":"Agency theory embeds the influential relationship that exist between managers and shareholders of firms. This relationship has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn has potential impacts on firm characteristics such as firm value. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by proposing a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework we argue that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders has a significant relationship with leverage. The paper tests four hypotheses that explore various aspects of this relationship. The empirical results provide support for a positive relationship between external blockholders and leverage, a curvilinear relationship between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage and finally, the results suggest that the relationship between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results parallel and are consistent with the \"active monitoring hypothesis\", \"convergence-of-interests\" and the \"entrenchment\" hypotheses which have been proposed in a different context.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1999-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85230107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 39

Share Ownership and Control in Listed Australian Companies 澳大利亚上市公司的股权与控制权

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1999-08-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.164129

G. Stapledon

引用次数: 18

Is Corporate Hedging Consistent with Value Maximization? An Empirical Analysis 企业套期保值是否符合价值最大化?实证分析

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1999-06-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.170348

J. Graham, D. A. Rogers

引用次数: 96

Resolution of Corporate Distress: Evidence from East Asia's Financial Crisis 企业困境的解决:来自东亚金融危机的证据

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1999-06-01 DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-2133

S. Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Leora F. Klapper

{"title":"Resolution of Corporate Distress: Evidence from East Asia's Financial Crisis","authors":"S. Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Leora F. Klapper","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-2133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2133","url":null,"abstract":"The widespread financial crisis in East Asia caused large economic shocks, which varied by degree across the region. That crisis provides a unique opportunity for investigating the factors that determine the use of bankruptcy processes in a number of economies. The authors study the use of bankruptcy in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China), and Thailand. These economies differ in their institutional frameworks for resolving financial distress, partly because of the different origins of their judicial systems. One difference is the strength of creditor rights, which the authors document. They expect that differences in legal enforcement and judicial efficiency should affect the resolution of financial distress. Using a sample of 4,569 publicly traded East Asian firms, they observe a total of 106 bankruptcies in 1997 and 1998. They find that: 1) The likelihood of filing for bankruptcy is lower for firms with ownership links to banks and families, controlling for firm and country characteristics. 2) Filings are more likely in countries with better judicial systems. 3) Filings are more likely where there are both strong creditor rights and a good judicial system. These results alone do not allow the authors to address whether increased use of bankruptcy is an efficient resolution mechanism.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1999-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87221638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 80

How Offshore Financial Competition Disciplines Exit Resistence by Incentive-Conflicted Bank Regulators 离岸金融竞争规则如何摆脱激励冲突银行监管机构的阻力

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1999-06-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4757-5228-1_13

E. Kane

引用次数: 7