Corporate Communications最新文献

The Value of the Freezeout Option 冻结选项的值

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2019-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.217511

Z. Goshen, Z. Wiener

引用次数: 2

Pre-Announcement of Insiders' Trades 内幕交易预公告

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2004-06-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.216168

Steven Huddart, John S. Hughes, Michael G. Williams

{"title":"Pre-Announcement of Insiders' Trades","authors":"Steven Huddart, John S. Hughes, Michael G. Williams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.216168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.216168","url":null,"abstract":"Among the reactions to recent corporate scandals are calls for greater transparency of insiders' trades. The Securities and Exchange Commission's recent rule on fair disclosure is accompanied by a safe harbor from prosecution under insider trading laws for insiders who pre-commit to trades. A blue-ribbon commission convened to address recent financial scandals and subsequent decline in investor confidence recommended that insiders be required to preannounce sales of stock in their companies. The commission's call for insiders to preannounce their sales echoes proposals made over a decade ago in the legal press, law reviews, and the U.S. Congress that would require pre-announcement of all trades. We consider the effects of insiders pre-announcing their trades on their preferences for public disclosure that would pre-empt their private information when other motives for insiders to trade are present. Two principal forces emerge. With pre-announcement, insiders cannot expect to profit on their private information, but cannot ignore the incentive to do so when market makers are unable to disentangle insiders' motives. Pre-emptive public disclosure allows insiders to avoid the dysfunctional consequences of this incentive. However, such disclosure before insiders have an opportunity to trade exposes them to greater price risk than would otherwise be the case. Our analysis demonstrates these effects.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75220697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17

Do Investors in Controlled Firms Value Insider Trading Laws? International Evidence 受控公司的投资者重视内幕交易法吗?国际证据

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2003-04-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.296111

L. N. Beny

引用次数: 36

Do Takeover Targets Under-Perform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns 收购目标表现不佳吗?来自经营和股票回报的证据

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2002-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.272782

Anup Agrawal, J. Jaffe

引用次数: 19

Corporate Managers, Agency Costs and the Rise of Double Taxation 企业经理人、代理成本与双重征税的兴起

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2002-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.302170

Steven A. Bank

引用次数: 10

Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: 'Sacred Space' in Corporate Takeovers 股东角色的新理论:公司收购中的“神圣空间”

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2001-09-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.280896

R. Thompson, D. Smith

引用次数: 18

Corporate Governance and Equity Prices 公司治理和股票价格

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2001-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.278920

Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii, Andrew Metrick

引用次数: 3012

The Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure: Australian Evidence 公司所有权结构的决定因素:澳大利亚的证据

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2001-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.279015

Asjeet S. Lamba, G. Stapledon

{"title":"The Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure: Australian Evidence","authors":"Asjeet S. Lamba, G. Stapledon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.279015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.279015","url":null,"abstract":"There is growing interest in trying to explain differing corporate ownership structures in different countries. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) find that the quality of legal protection of shareholders helps determine ownership concentration: in countries with relatively poor legal protection of investors, publicly listed companies are likely to have large blockholders. In contrast, Roe (2000) seeks to explain ownership differences in terms of politics and finds that publicly listed companies in social democracies are more likely to have concentrated ownership than their counterparts in the (non-socially democratic) United States. Bebchuk (1999a, 1999b) develops a model which predicts that the proportion of a country's publicly listed firms having a controlling shareholder depends on the size of private benefits of control in the corporate sector. Bebchuk extends his model to explain differences in ownership structure among companies in the same country. The model indicates that a company is more likely to have a large blockholder when the private benefits of control potentially available to a blockholder at that company are comparatively large. This paper examines the factors associated with ownership structure among publicly listed Australian companies. The results indicate that private benefits of control help explain the differences in ownership structure among Australian companies.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2001-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86374320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 48

Allocation of Initial Public Offerings and Flipping Activity 首次公开发行股票的分配与翻转活动

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2001-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.274851

Reena Aggarwal

{"title":"Allocation of Initial Public Offerings and Flipping Activity","authors":"Reena Aggarwal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.274851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.274851","url":null,"abstract":"There is general misperception that the large trading volume in initial public offerings (IPOs) in the aftermarket is mostly due to \"flippers\" that are allocated shares in the offering and immediately resell them in the aftermarket when the stock starts trading. We find that on average flipping accounts for only 19 percent of trading volume (median of 17 percent) and 15 percent of shares offered (median of 7 percent) during the first two days of trading; institutions do more flipping than retail customers; and hot IPOs are flipped much more than cold IPOs. It has been argued that institutions are strong hands that do not flip shares and are therefore allocated large proportions of an offering. However, we find that institutions consistently flip a larger proportion of their allocation than retail customers and that the hypothesis that institutions are smart investors that quickly flip cold IPOs while the underwriter is still providing price support is not true. Investment banks closely monitor flipping activity because excessive flipping can put downward pressure on the stock price, particularly of weak offerings. They have devised mechanisms, such as penalty bids, to restrict flipping activity. In our sample, explicit penalty bids are directly assessed only in a few IPOs and the total dollar penalties are small.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2001-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89271762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 248

Proposals for Reform of Securities Regulation: An Overview 证券监管改革的建议:综述

IF 2

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2001-05-15 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.269126

E. Kitch

引用次数: 9