Corporate Governance and Equity Prices

IF 2.8 Q2 BUSINESS
Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii, Andrew Metrick
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引用次数: 3012

Abstract

Shareholder rights vary across firms. Using the incidence of 24 unique governance rules, we construct a "Governance Index" to proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the sample period. We find that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions.
公司治理和股票价格
不同公司的股东权利各不相同。利用24条独特的治理规则的发生率,我们构建了一个“治理指数”来代表20世纪90年代约1500家大公司的股东权利水平。在样本期间,购买指数最低十分之一(最强权利)的公司并出售指数最高十分之一(最弱权利)的公司的投资策略每年将获得8.5%的异常回报。我们发现,拥有更强股东权利的公司拥有更高的公司价值、更高的利润、更高的销售增长、更低的资本支出,并且进行更少的公司收购。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.90
自引率
20.00%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Corporate Communications: An International Journal addresses the issues arising from the increased awareness that an organisation''s communications are part of the whole organisation, and that the relationship an organisation has with its external public requires careful management. The responsibility for communications is increasingly being seen as part of every employee''s role and not simply the function of the marketing/PR departments. This journal will illustrate why communications are important and how best to implement a strategic communications plan.
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