Pre-Announcement of Insiders' Trades

IF 2.8 Q2 BUSINESS
Steven Huddart, John S. Hughes, Michael G. Williams
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引用次数: 17

Abstract

Among the reactions to recent corporate scandals are calls for greater transparency of insiders' trades. The Securities and Exchange Commission's recent rule on fair disclosure is accompanied by a safe harbor from prosecution under insider trading laws for insiders who pre-commit to trades. A blue-ribbon commission convened to address recent financial scandals and subsequent decline in investor confidence recommended that insiders be required to preannounce sales of stock in their companies. The commission's call for insiders to preannounce their sales echoes proposals made over a decade ago in the legal press, law reviews, and the U.S. Congress that would require pre-announcement of all trades. We consider the effects of insiders pre-announcing their trades on their preferences for public disclosure that would pre-empt their private information when other motives for insiders to trade are present. Two principal forces emerge. With pre-announcement, insiders cannot expect to profit on their private information, but cannot ignore the incentive to do so when market makers are unable to disentangle insiders' motives. Pre-emptive public disclosure allows insiders to avoid the dysfunctional consequences of this incentive. However, such disclosure before insiders have an opportunity to trade exposes them to greater price risk than would otherwise be the case. Our analysis demonstrates these effects.
内幕交易预公告
对近期公司丑闻的反应之一是要求提高内幕交易的透明度。美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission,简称sec)最近出台的公平披露规定,还附带了一个安全港,让预先承诺交易的内部人士免于内幕交易法的起诉。为解决最近的金融丑闻和随后投资者信心的下降而召集的一个蓝带委员会建议,要求内部人士提前宣布其公司股票的出售。欧盟委员会呼吁内部人士提前宣布他们的交易,这与十多年前法律媒体、法律评论和美国国会提出的要求提前宣布所有交易的建议相呼应。我们考虑了内部人预先宣布其交易对其公开披露偏好的影响,当内部人交易的其他动机存在时,公开披露偏好会优先于他们的私人信息。出现了两股主要力量。在预先公告的情况下,内部人士不能指望从他们的私人信息中获利,但当做市商无法弄清内部人士的动机时,他们也不能忽视这样做的动机。先发制人的公开披露让内部人士得以避免这种激励带来的不良后果。然而,在内幕人士有机会交易之前进行披露,会使他们面临更大的价格风险。我们的分析证明了这些影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.90
自引率
20.00%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Corporate Communications: An International Journal addresses the issues arising from the increased awareness that an organisation''s communications are part of the whole organisation, and that the relationship an organisation has with its external public requires careful management. The responsibility for communications is increasingly being seen as part of every employee''s role and not simply the function of the marketing/PR departments. This journal will illustrate why communications are important and how best to implement a strategic communications plan.
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