Do Investors in Controlled Firms Value Insider Trading Laws? International Evidence

IF 2.8 Q2 BUSINESS
L. N. Beny
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引用次数: 36

Abstract

This article characterizes insider trading in controlled firms as an agency problem. Using a standard agency model of corporate value diversion through insider trading by a controlling shareholder, I derive testable hypotheses about the relationship between corporate value and insider trading laws. The article tests these hypotheses using cross-sectional data on firms from a group of developed countries. The results show that stringent insider trading laws and enforcement are associated with greater corporate valuation among firms in common law countries, a result that is consistent with the claim that insider trading laws can mitigate agency costs. In contrast, insider trading laws and enforcement are generally insignificant to corporate valuation among firms in civil law countries. These results are robust to alternative regression specifications and to controlling for a variety of relevant factors and they suggest that the firm-level impact of insider trading regulation may depend on the local context in which it is applied.
受控公司的投资者重视内幕交易法吗?国际证据
本文将受控公司的内幕交易定性为一个代理问题。本文利用控制股东通过内幕交易进行公司价值转移的标准代理模型,提出了公司价值与内幕交易法之间关系的可检验假设。本文使用来自一组发达国家的公司的横截面数据来检验这些假设。结果表明,在英美法系国家,严格的内幕交易法和执法与更高的公司估值相关,这一结果与内幕交易法可以降低代理成本的说法一致。相比之下,大陆法系国家的内幕交易法律和执法对公司估值的影响通常微不足道。这些结果对于替代回归规范和控制各种相关因素是稳健的,它们表明内幕交易监管的公司层面影响可能取决于其应用的当地背景。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.90
自引率
20.00%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Corporate Communications: An International Journal addresses the issues arising from the increased awareness that an organisation''s communications are part of the whole organisation, and that the relationship an organisation has with its external public requires careful management. The responsibility for communications is increasingly being seen as part of every employee''s role and not simply the function of the marketing/PR departments. This journal will illustrate why communications are important and how best to implement a strategic communications plan.
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