发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Corporate Communications最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States 美国股东维权主义与公司治理
IF 2
Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1997-12-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.45100
Bernard Black
{"title":"Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States","authors":"Bernard Black","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.45100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.45100","url":null,"abstract":"I survey corporate governance activity by institutional investors in the United States, and the empirical evidence on whether this activity affects firm performance. A small number of American institutional investors, mostly public pension plans, spend a trivial amount of money on overt activism efforts. They don't conduct proxy fights, and don't try to elect their own candidates to the board of directors. Legal rules, agency costs within the institutions, information costs, collective action problems, and limited institutional competence are all plausible partial explanations for this relative lack of activity. The currently available evidence, taken as a whole, is consistent with the proposition that the institutions achieve the effects on firm performance that one might expect from this level of effort -- namely, not much.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1997-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80447831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 411
Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance 隐性契约与高管薪酬对未来绩效的解释力
IF 2
Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1997-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.60870
Rachel M. Hayes, Scott Schaefer
{"title":"Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance","authors":"Rachel M. Hayes, Scott Schaefer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.60870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.60870","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research suggests that implicit incentive contracts may be based on performance measures that are observable only to the contracting parties. We derive and test implications of this insight for the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. If corporate boards optimally use both observable and unobservable (to outsiders) measures of executive performance and the unobservable measures are correlated with future firm performance, then unexplained variation in current compensation should predict future variation in firm performance. Further, compensation should be more positively associated with future performance when observable measures are less useful for contracting. Our results are consistent with these hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87950095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 246
From Stakeholders to Stockholders: A View from Organizational Theory 从利益相关者到股东:一个组织理论的视角
IF 2
Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1997-09-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.37366
W. Carney
{"title":"From Stakeholders to Stockholders: A View from Organizational Theory","authors":"W. Carney","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.37366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.37366","url":null,"abstract":"The public lands exhibit many of the characteristics of a commons--overuse and charges set well below market rates. This mismanagement has been noted and criticized within government for many years, without significant actions to cure the problem. This failure is attributed to both interest group pressures and agency costs, with government officials not accountable to any owner. Privatization through disposition of these lands to stock corporations created for the purpose is explored. Corporations solve interest group problems by holding managers accountable to a single group of owners, shareholders, while dealing with other constituencies through markets and contracting at prices calculated to maximize profits. Similarly, corporations deal with agency costs through a variety of incentives and the market for corporate control. It is shown how privatizing ownership of public lands in this manner serves conservation and recreation goals by providing incentives to unbundle claims on the public lands to allow bidding by all user groups (including conservationists) who value particular aspects of these resources.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1997-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88869948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Trust in Large Organizations 大型组织中的信任
IF 2
Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1996-12-01 DOI: 10.3386/W5864
R. La Porta, Florencio López de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
{"title":"Trust in Large Organizations","authors":"R. La Porta, Florencio López de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny","doi":"10.3386/W5864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W5864","url":null,"abstract":"Several authors suggest that trust is an important determinant of cooperation between strangers in a society, and therefore of performance of social institutions. We argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations. In a cross-section of countries, evidence on government performance, participation in civic and professional societies, importance of large firms, and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis. Moreover, trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions, which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross-section of countries.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75250527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2577
Shareholder Proposals to Rescind Poison Pills: All Bark and No Bite? 股东提议废除毒丸:只叫不咬?
IF 2
Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1996-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1352
Christopher J. Marquette, John M. Bizjak
{"title":"Shareholder Proposals to Rescind Poison Pills: All Bark and No Bite?","authors":"Christopher J. Marquette, John M. Bizjak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1352","url":null,"abstract":"We provide evidence on the incidence and effectiveness of shareholder monitoring by examining shareholder proposals to rescind poison pills. Our research indicates that shareholders present resolutions when they are more likely to increase the value of the firm. We find that pill rescission proposals are submitted more frequently when firm performance has been poor, when the initial market reaction to the adoption of the pill is negative, and when insider and block ownership of stock is low. In addition, pill rescission proposals receive more support when performance is poor and when the pill has characteristics that increase its potential for misuse by management. Unlike some previous studies, we find evidence that shareholder monitoring is effective. Poison pills are more likely to be restructured or rescinded when there is a shareholder resolution concerning the pill. In addition, once a pill rescission proposal is presented, the firm is more likely to restructure or rescind the poison pill if the initial market reaction to the pill adoption was negative and if the proposal was submitted by a pension fund. Overall, our results support the idea that shareholder proposals, despite the fact that they are non-binding, can be an effective mechanism in managerial oversight and an important component of the governance process of the firm.","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1996-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88173146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets: Evidence from the South African Boycott 社会积极投资政策对金融市场的影响:来自南非抵制的证据
IF 2
Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1995-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.10203
S. Teoh, I. Welch, C. P. Wazzan
{"title":"The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets: Evidence from the South African Boycott","authors":"S. Teoh, I. Welch, C. P. Wazzan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.10203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.10203","url":null,"abstract":"Governments and vocal institutional shareholders have been exerting pressure on companies they deem to have objectionable operations (such as tobacco or chemical producers). This paper studies the effect of the most important legislative and shareholder boycott to date, the boycott of the South Africa's apartheid regime. We find that the announcement of legislative/shareholder pressure of voluntary divestment from South Africa had little discernible effect either on the valuation of banks and corporations with South African operations or on the South African financial markets. There is weak evidence that institutional shareholdings increased when corporations divested. In sum, despite the public significance of the boycott and the multitude of divesting companies, financial markets seem to have perceived the boycott to be merely a \"sideshow.\"","PeriodicalId":47357,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Communications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"1995-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89262844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 504
首页 上一页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信