隐性契约与高管薪酬对未来绩效的解释力

IF 2.8 Q2 BUSINESS

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1997-11-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.60870

Rachel M. Hayes, Scott Schaefer

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引用次数: 246

摘要

最近的研究表明，隐性激励合同可能是基于只有签约方才能观察到的绩效指标。我们推导并检验了这一见解对高管薪酬与公司绩效之间关系的影响。如果公司董事会最优地使用可观察和不可观察(对外部人士而言)的高管绩效指标，且不可观察指标与未来公司绩效相关，那么当前薪酬中无法解释的变化应该可以预测未来公司绩效的变化。此外，当可观察的措施对签约不太有用时，薪酬应与未来业绩更积极地联系在一起。我们的结果与这些假设是一致的。

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Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance

Recent research suggests that implicit incentive contracts may be based on performance measures that are observable only to the contracting parties. We derive and test implications of this insight for the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. If corporate boards optimally use both observable and unobservable (to outsiders) measures of executive performance and the unobservable measures are correlated with future firm performance, then unexplained variation in current compensation should predict future variation in firm performance. Further, compensation should be more positively associated with future performance when observable measures are less useful for contracting. Our results are consistent with these hypotheses.

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来源期刊

Corporate Communications BUSINESS-

CiteScore

3.90

自引率

20.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Corporate Communications: An International Journal addresses the issues arising from the increased awareness that an organisation''s communications are part of the whole organisation, and that the relationship an organisation has with its external public requires careful management. The responsibility for communications is increasingly being seen as part of every employee''s role and not simply the function of the marketing/PR departments. This journal will illustrate why communications are important and how best to implement a strategic communications plan.