IF 2.8 Q2 BUSINESS
Simon Johnson, Andrei Shleifer
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引用次数: 43

摘要

科斯定理意味着,在一个交易成本为正的世界里,任何一种策略,包括司法强制执行的私人合同、司法强制执行的法律,甚至政府监管,都可能是实现有效资源配置的最廉价方式。不幸的是,一些coasian忽视了最后一种策略有时可能是最好的可能性。本文比较了波兰和捷克共和国在20世纪90年代的金融市场监管,当时两国的司法制度都不发达。在波兰,独立的证券交易委员会严格执行证券法与股票市场的快速发展有关。在捷克共和国,不干涉监管曾导致股市几近崩溃。这些事件说明了执法在使市场运转方面的核心作用,以及监管机构在执法中可能发挥的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Coase V. The Coasians
The Coase theorem implies that, in a world of positive transaction costs, any of a number of strategies, including judicially enforced private contracts, judicially enforced laws, or even government regulation, may be the cheapest way to bring about efficient resource allocation. Unfortunately, some Coasians have ignored the possibility that the last of these strategies may sometimes be the best. This paper compares the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s, when the judicial systems remained underdeveloped in both countries. In Poland, strict enforcement of the securities law by an independent Securities and Exchange Commission was associated with rapid development of the stock market. In the Czech Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a near collapse of the stock market. These episodes illustrate the centrality of law enforcement in making markets work, and the possible role of regulators in law enforcement.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.90
自引率
20.00%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Corporate Communications: An International Journal addresses the issues arising from the increased awareness that an organisation''s communications are part of the whole organisation, and that the relationship an organisation has with its external public requires careful management. The responsibility for communications is increasingly being seen as part of every employee''s role and not simply the function of the marketing/PR departments. This journal will illustrate why communications are important and how best to implement a strategic communications plan.
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