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Does heat cause homicides? A meta-analysis 高温会导致凶杀案吗？荟萃分析
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 Epub Date: 2024-03-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106191
Vojtěch Mišák
{"title":"Does heat cause homicides? A meta-analysis","authors":"Vojtěch Mišák","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2024.106191","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Several studies provide evidence that heat is positively associated with criminal activity. However, the empirical literature does not provide conclusive evidence about the effect of high temperature on homicides. I examine 156 estimates from 20 studies on the relationship between temperature and homicide rates. In particular, in this meta-analysis I study publication bias using linear and nonlinear techniques together with Bayesian model averaging to explain the heterogeneity in the estimates. After correcting estimates from the publication bias, I cannot conclude that there is a significant effect of temperature on homicide rates. Moreover, monthly data produce larger estimates. Conversely, studies using data from Asia or the OLS estimation method lead to smaller estimates.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 106191"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140191063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ban-the-box laws: Fair and effective? 禁塑法：公平而有效？
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 Epub Date: 2024-03-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106192
Robert Kaestner , Xufei Wang
{"title":"Ban-the-box laws: Fair and effective?","authors":"Robert Kaestner ,&nbsp;Xufei Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106192","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106192","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Ban-the-box (BTB) laws are a widely used public policy rooted in employment law related to unnecessarily exclusionary hiring practices. BTB laws are intended to improve the employment opportunities of those with criminal backgrounds by giving them a fair chance during the hiring process. Prior research on the effectiveness of these laws in meeting their objective is limited and inconclusive. In this article, we extend the prior literature in two ways: we expand the years of analysis to a period of rapid expansion of BTB laws and we examine different types of BTB laws depending on the employers affected (e.g., public sector). Results indicate that BTB laws, any type of BTB law or BTB laws covering different types of employers, have no systematic or statistically significant association with employment of low-educated men, both young and old and across racial and ethnic groups. We speculate that the lack of effectiveness of BTB laws stems from the difficulty in enforcing such laws and already high rates of employer willingness to hire those with criminal histories.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 106192"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140279066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unequal unification? Income inequality and unification in nineteenth century Italy and Germany 不平等的统一？十九世纪意大利和德国的收入不平等与统一
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 Epub Date: 2024-04-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106197
Philipp Erfurth
{"title":"Unequal unification? Income inequality and unification in nineteenth century Italy and Germany","authors":"Philipp Erfurth","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2024.106197","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This research provides a comprehensive study of the linkages between institutional structures, balance of power between core and peripheries, endogenous extractive policies and inequality in the context of nineteenth century unification of Germany and Italy. To conduct this analysis, the study puts forward estimates of income inequality for pre-unification German states using social tables, compiled using primary data, some of which have thus far been unexplored in economic research. The findings suggest that the power balance between core and periphery, systems of government as well as distorted policies contributed to differences between the Italian and German experiences, specifically to the rise of inequality in the former and no marked increase in the latter.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 106197"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140824347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Elective corporate governance: Does board choice matter? 选择性公司治理：董事会的选择是否重要？
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 Epub Date: 2024-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106190
Martin Gelter , Mathias Siems
{"title":"Elective corporate governance: Does board choice matter?","authors":"Martin Gelter ,&nbsp;Mathias Siems","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106190","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106190","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Recent literature discusses how “menu laws” allow corporations to opt into one of multiple competing statutory regimes. This paper contributes to this literature by presenting original empirical research on the choice between corporate board models. Today, many countries not only allow modifications of a particular board structure, but they provide separate legal templates, giving firms a choice between a one-tier and a two-tier board model (and sometimes a third hybrid model). However, how companies actually use these rules is largely underexplored. Based on data from 14 European countries that permit a choice between two models, this paper examines the use of this form of “elective corporate governance” at the firm level: what types of firms make use of which model and whether this choice can be associated with specific financial measures such as operating revenue, cash ratio and leverage. The descriptive statistics show that introducing board choice has led to a gradual decline of the two-tier model. Yet, despite this decline, we did not find that the regression results unambiguously speak against the two-tier model, nor did we find that companies that have changed their board model with the introduction of choice performed better than companies that have retained the original model.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 106190"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818824000103/pdfft?md5=6379cbcceaf83856a94acc3a6d02e0c9&pid=1-s2.0-S0144818824000103-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140055818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Commercial arbitration regime and sourcing decision 商事仲裁制度和采购决定
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 Epub Date: 2024-04-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106195
Se Mi Park
{"title":"Commercial arbitration regime and sourcing decision","authors":"Se Mi Park","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106195","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106195","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Introducing commercial arbitration into a two-country sourcing model, this paper examines how the quality of commercial arbitration regime affects sourcing decision when production involves a relationship-specific transaction. Arbitration may be invoked when a firm shaves the investment value of a customized intermediate input or does not pay in full for investment. Under the full verifiability of an ex-post investment value by an arbitrator, firm behavior is governed by the quality of arbitration regime, measuring how fully a national arbitration regime supports the enforcement of arbitral awards. I theoretically find that a firm’s likelihood of choosing global sourcing over domestic sourcing increases with the source and destination countries’ qualities of international arbitration regimes and the source country’s quality of general arbitration regime. These impacts are magnified as the production of an intermediate input involves a greater degree of relationship-specific transaction. Results also show that as the production of an intermediate input entails a greater degree of relationship-specific transaction, a firm’s likelihood of choosing global sourcing over domestic sourcing decreases when domestic arbitration offers the better enforcement of arbitral awards compared to international arbitration.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 106195"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140775379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bayesian persuasion in lawyer–client communication 律师与客户沟通中的贝叶斯说服法
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 Epub Date: 2024-04-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106196
Mehdi Ayouni , Tim Friehe , Yannick Gabuthy
{"title":"Bayesian persuasion in lawyer–client communication","authors":"Mehdi Ayouni ,&nbsp;Tim Friehe ,&nbsp;Yannick Gabuthy","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2024.106196","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>When considering whether to bring a lawsuit, a plaintiff may delegate the decision to her lawyer- better informed about the case’s merits- or consult with her lawyer and decide for herself. Focusing on the latter, we assess how a lawyer communicates with his client about the case’s merits if the client relies on the lawyer’s information to decide whether to bring suit. In some circumstances, the lawyer only partially reveals the case’s merits to <em>persuade</em> the client to bring a suit. In addition, in anticipation of the lawyer’s <em>strategic</em> communication, the plaintiff sometimes adjusts her questions to the lawyer about the case’s merits. Focusing on the communication between lawyers and clients, our paper explores a new consequence of misaligned incentives between the two parties.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 106196"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818824000164/pdfft?md5=a047e43c3cda9ecdabf9156ee27a2985&pid=1-s2.0-S0144818824000164-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140633211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Inequality snowballing 不平等像滚雪球一样越滚越大
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-01-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106180
Daniel Giraldo Paez , Zachary Liscow
{"title":"Inequality snowballing","authors":"Daniel Giraldo Paez ,&nbsp;Zachary Liscow","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106180","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106180","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>It has long been argued that efficient policies tend to provide larger legal entitlements to the rich than to the poor. This article shows how efficient legal rules can become even more skewed against the poor <em>over time</em> by sowing the seeds of their own vicious cycles. Repeated application over time of these rules can lead to increasingly adverse outcomes for the poor, which the article calls “policy snowballing”.</p><p>Consider a set of polluters choosing between locating in places with rich versus poor people and facing a strict liability rule for harm to earnings. Polluters will disproportionately locate in the poor area, where they face lower damages. That disproportionate share of polluters in the poor area can make it cheaper to harm the poor in the next period, making subsequent polluters locate yet more disproportionately in poor neighborhoods, driving down the poor’s earnings further. And so on.</p><p>We identify the conditions for snowballing and explore its dynamics. When compensation for the harm is incomplete, policy snowballing can lead to spiraling income inequality. As a result, government transfers to the poor to compensate for the change in legal regime would be inadequate if calculated in a way that ignores the snowballing. The article raises the intriguing prospect that legal rules could generate state dependence in the legal costs of harm, and that efficient policymaking could be a contributing factor to increasing inequality over time.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 106180"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139374227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Proposal convergence and settlement under final offer arbitration 最终报价仲裁下的提案趋同与结算
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-01 Epub Date: 2023-12-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106179
Amy Farmer , Paul Pecorino
{"title":"Proposal convergence and settlement under final offer arbitration","authors":"Amy Farmer ,&nbsp;Paul Pecorino","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106179","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Under final offer arbitration (FOA), each party to the dispute submits a proposal to the arbitrator who must choose one of the two submitted proposals in the event an agreement is not reached. A long line of research on FOA has assumed that the submitted proposals to the arbitrator are the final bargaining positions of the parties to the dispute. One consequence of this assumption has been a focus on whether proposals submitted to the arbitrator converge towards one another. However, current practice implies a separation between settlement negotiations and proposals submitted to the arbitrator. We use a simple setting to show that proposal convergence can be consistent with an increase in disputes, a decrease in disputes or no effect on the dispute rate. In order to be fully evaluated, mechanisms which lead to proposal convergence must be embedded in a model in which disputes arise endogenously. Understanding FOA is important because it is a widely used procedure. These uses include labor disputes as well as pricing disputes in the </span>telecommunications industries of the United States and Canada.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 106179"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138502005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Did the French reform of the judicial map affect conciliation activities? 法国的司法地图改革是否影响了调解活动？
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-01-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106181
Matthieu Belarouci , Nicolas Vaillant , François-Charles Wolff
{"title":"Did the French reform of the judicial map affect conciliation activities?","authors":"Matthieu Belarouci ,&nbsp;Nicolas Vaillant ,&nbsp;François-Charles Wolff","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106181","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106181","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In France, the reform of the judicial map, initiated in mid-2007 and completed in 2010, led to a large reduction in the number of courts of first instance, from almost 500 to around 300. This led to an increase of about eight kilometers in the distance litigants should travel to courts in the treated jurisdictions. In this paper, we examine the impact of this reform on conciliation activity. We use a panel data set of courts covering the period 2003–2015 and consider a synthetic difference-in-differences strategy to compare changes in the number of referrals, conciliators, and conciliations between courts affected by the reform and those unaffected. We find that the number of conciliators decreased more significantly in treated courts than in control courts. Evidence is less clear for the number of referrals, showing a slightly higher increase in the courts where distance increased the most. Estimation of a production function shows that the reform had no effect on the number of conciliations once inputs are controlled for.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 106181"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139516478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fiscal pressure and judicial decisions: Evidence from financial penalties for official corruption in China 财政压力与司法裁决:来自中国官员腐败经济处罚的证据
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-01 Epub Date: 2023-07-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106156
Hongli Chu , Shengmin Sun , Jian Wei
{"title":"Fiscal pressure and judicial decisions: Evidence from financial penalties for official corruption in China","authors":"Hongli Chu ,&nbsp;Shengmin Sun ,&nbsp;Jian Wei","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106156","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106156","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>The connection between court resources and judicial behavior has long been acknowledged. This article examines the linkages between local governments' fiscal pressures and Chinese judges' decisions on financial sanctions. Based on data from criminal verdicts of official corruption<span> and county government expenditures, this study finds that Chinese judges are more likely to impose financial penalties, especially fines, when judicial expenditures in a region are low. The conclusion remains unchanged after accounting for the </span></span>endogeneity problem<span> using the age of the county party secretary and the per capita financial expenditure lagged for one period as instrumental variables. Finally, the imprisonment penalty without increasing revenue is used to test the placebo, and no effect of fiscal pressure on the imprisonment penalty is found.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 106156"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134950526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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