{"title":"Which companies pay more (or less) in legal fees? An empirical study of India","authors":"Srinivasan Sankaraguruswamy , Umakanth Varottil","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106138","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Although the demand for corporate legal services has grown significantly, so has the pressure on companies to reduce legal costs, thereby necessitating a “data-and-metrics” driven approach to legal fees. Accordingly, we exploit the availability of a unique dataset comprising legal fees that Indian corporations have spent over a 30-year period from 1990 to 2020. We undertake the first cross-sectional analysis of legal fees across various exploratory variables over a long period of time. The results show an increasing trend in the quantum of legal fees incurred by Indian companies during the period. They overwhelmingly suggest that large companies (measured along the lines of total assets, industry segmentation, export and import orientation) spend a higher quantum in legal fees than do small companies. Legal costs are higher for companies that undertake capital raising or mergers and acquisitions transactions in a given financial year than those that do not experience such events. Finally, legal fees tend to be higher in certain industry sectors such as technology and energy where significant contracting, regulatory or other form of legal work is pervasive. It is our expectation that the results and accompanying data analysis will aid purchasers of legal services (being corporations and their in-house legal departments) as well as providers (being law firms and legal professionals) in planning and budgeting for legal fees, and also in devising and implementing appropriate fee arrangements.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106138"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49748534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mutual optimism and risk preferences in litigation","authors":"Keith N. Hylton","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106157","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Why do some legal disputes fail to settle? From a bird’s eye view, the literature offers two categories of reasons. One consists of arguments based on informational disparities. The other consists of psychological arguments. This paper explores the psychological theory. It presents a model of litigation driven by risk preferences and examines the model’s implications for trials and settlements. The model suggests a foundation in Prospect Theory for the Mutual Optimism model of litigation. The model’s implications for plaintiff win rates, settlement patterns, and informational asymmetry with respect to the degree of risk aversion are examined.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106157"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49758102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Law and inequality: A comparative approach to the distributive implications of legal systems","authors":"Illan Barriola , Bruno Deffains , Olivier Musy","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106139","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>The literature on legal traditions focuses on the comparative macroeconomic effects of legal systems, concentrating on efficiency alone and leaving distributive issues to taxation. However, a country’s legal structure also conditions the primary distribution of income and may have a comparative advantage over taxation as a distributive instrument. We use cross-section and panel estimates to show that the level of income </span>inequality<span> in a country is correlated with its legal system. By several measures of inequality, common law countries are on average more unequal than civil law countries. We explain these results by the nature of the systems. The looser regulation in common law countries limits their capacity to achieve social objectives such as combating income inequality.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106139"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49758635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effects of reputational sanctions on culpable firms: Evidence from China’s stock markets","authors":"Robin Hui Huang , Linhan Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106152","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine an important yet understudied form of reputational sanction in China, namely public criticisms imposed on culpable firms by the Chinese stock exchanges from 2013 to 2018. We find significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date, and they were affected by several factors, including financing propensity, governance mechanism, and equity nature. However, the market reaction is significantly negative only for firms relying on external financing and non-state enterprises, and importantly, becomes insignificant in cases where the firm had self-exposed misconduct before the official announcement of public criticism. Further, we examine other effects of public criticism, finding that public criticism does not improve firms’ long-term values, nor produce strong deterrence to change their behaviour. Overall, the evidence of the effects of public criticism on culpable firms is mixed, suggesting that reputational sanction is a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of market regulation in China.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106152"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49747913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Response to “Contracting for sex in the Pacific War” by J. Mark Ramseyer","authors":"Yoshiaki Yoshimi, Emi Koyama (Trans.), Norma Field (Trans.), Tomomi Yamaguchi (Trans.)","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106158","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106158","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper critically examines J. Mark Ramseyer’s \"Contracting for sex in the Pacific War,\" published in the <em>International Review of Law and Economics</em>, Volume 65, March 2021, Article 105971.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 106158"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47795928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiscal pressure and judicial decisions: Evidence from financial penalties for official corruption in China","authors":"Hongli Chu , Shengmin Sun , Jian Wei","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106156","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106156","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>The connection between court resources and judicial behavior has long been acknowledged. This article examines the linkages between local governments' fiscal pressures and Chinese judges' decisions on financial sanctions. Based on data from criminal verdicts of official corruption<span> and county government expenditures, this study finds that Chinese judges are more likely to impose financial penalties, especially fines, when judicial expenditures in a region are low. The conclusion remains unchanged after accounting for the </span></span>endogeneity problem<span> using the age of the county party secretary and the per capita financial expenditure lagged for one period as instrumental variables. Finally, the imprisonment penalty without increasing revenue is used to test the placebo, and no effect of fiscal pressure on the imprisonment penalty is found.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 106156"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134950526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Advance disclosure of insider transactions: Empirical evidence from the Vietnamese stock market","authors":"Jérémie Lefebvre , Paolo Mazza","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106137","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the impact of legal insider trading announcements on stock returns in Vietnam. Vietnamese insiders must announce their trading intentions in advance as well as after the actual trade, which contrasts with the vast majority of countries where only post-trade announcement is mandatory. This regulatory setting allows to put to test the predictions from the theoretical models of advance disclosures (Huddart et al., 2004, Lenkey, 2014). Consistent with the theoretical literature, we find that the abnormal returns are large and significant after the pre-trade announcement, showing that the market takes into consideration the information content of the insiders' intention to trade. In addition, no significant stock price effect is found after the announcement of the actual trade occurrence or cancellation. We argue in favor of the implementation of advance disclosure policies since they help mitigate the returns obtained by insiders, better share the profits with outsiders and contribute to a better information dissemination.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 106137"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49751189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Judicial compliance in district courts","authors":"Daniel L. Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2022.106122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2022.106122","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Are judges motivated only by policy preferences? Public enforcement of law relies on the use of public agents, such as judges, to follow the law. We use the random assignment of U.S. Federal judges setting geographically-local precedent to document the causal impact of court decisions in a hierarchical legal system. We examine lower court cases filed before and resolved after higher court decisions and find that lower courts are 29%–37% points more likely to rule in the manner of the higher court. The results obtain when the higher court case was decided in the same doctrinal area as the pending case and when the higher court case was decided on the merits. Reversals by the higher court have no significant effects. These results provide evidence that judges are motivated to follow the law and are not solely motivated by policy preferences.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 106122"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49751281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effect of opioids on crime: Evidence from the introduction of OxyContin","authors":"Yongbo Sim","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106136","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106136","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Since the late 1990s, the U.S. has experienced a substantial rise in drug overdose and overdose deaths due to the increased use of opioid drugs. This study estimates the effects of the opioid epidemic on crime relying for identification on geographic variation in the distribution of OxyContin, which in turn was driven by initial state drug prescription policies. Using Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data, I find that compared to states with stringent prescription policies, states more exposed to OxyContin had 25% higher violent crime rates. Thus, the supply shock of opioids combined with loose policies on prescription drugs created unintended and negative consequences beyond health and mortality. This conclusion is supported by suggestive evidence on mechanisms of mood instability, alcohol abuse, and illegal drug markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 106136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47379588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The dominance of skill in online poker","authors":"Jerome Hergueux , Gabriel Smagghue","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2022.106119","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2022.106119","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Does skill dominate luck in online poker? In many countries around the world, the legality of the online poker industry rests on courts’ evaluation of the “skill dominance” criterion. Because it is not precisely defined, however, the skill dominance criterion may be misleading when it comes to the legal qualification of online gambling activities. We argue that this concept might be better framed as “do skilled players dominate the game” than as “does skill dominate game outcomes”. We introduce a novel, comprehensive dataset on online poker play – where we follow 91,439 players over 40 consecutive months (representing over 85 million hands played) – and develop simple tests to show that (i) skill in the game drives individual results, and (ii) players improve their skills with experience and quit playing the game as a function of starting ability. A lower bound estimate suggests that it takes at least 7 months of full-time training for a novice to acquire the basic skills exhibited by the most experienced players in our data. We conclude that the scholarly debate around this industry may move beyond that of its legality to focus instead on issues of regulation. Beyond the case of online poker, the procedures and tools we develop can be readily transferred to evaluate the skill dominance criterion in other purported games of skill, such as sports betting or stock trading.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 106119"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49242960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}