International Review of Law and Economics最新文献

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Variability in punishment, risk preferences and crime deterrence 惩罚、风险偏好和犯罪威慑的可变性
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 Epub Date: 2023-05-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106140
Mario Menegatti
{"title":"Variability in punishment, risk preferences and crime deterrence","authors":"Mario Menegatti","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106140","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106140","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This work studies for the first time the effect on crime deterrence of variability in punishment under different assumptions on criminals risk preferences. We show that when criminals are risk averse, greater variability in punishment reduces the incentive to commit crimes, and that the opposite holds in the case of risk loving. The linkages between certainty of punishment, initial wealth and the incentive to commit crimes are also analyzed. We then analyze the effects of greater variability in punishment on deterrence policies founded on punishment severity, showing that this effect is positive if criminals are prudent and negative if they are imprudent. Lastly, we analyze for the first time variability in punishment as an instrument of deterrence policy. This analysis determines the optimal level of variability in the two cases of homogeneity and heterogeneity in risk preference.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106140"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45532244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Ethnolinguistic diversity, quality of local public institutions, and firm-level innovation 民族语言多样性、地方公共机构质量与企业层面创新
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 Epub Date: 2023-07-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106155
Chiara Natalie Focacci , Mitja Kovac , Rok Spruk
{"title":"Ethnolinguistic diversity, quality of local public institutions, and firm-level innovation","authors":"Chiara Natalie Focacci ,&nbsp;Mitja Kovac ,&nbsp;Rok Spruk","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106155","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106155","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Institutional quality is crucial for innovation and economic growth. In this article, we exploit historical linguistic differences across Slovenian municipalities between the Italian, German, and Slovenian-speaking population prior to World War 1, as a plausible exogenous source of variation in firm-level innovation to estimate the effect of institutional quality on innovation. Employing a set of limited dependent variable and instrumental variable models, we show that greater historical exposure to multilingualism is associated with markedly better quality of government and provision of public goods, more impartial local government administration, and lower prevalence of corruption, which in turn predicts systematically more vibrant economic activity, greater economic complexity, and higher rates of firm-level innovation at the local level. The estimated effects are robust to a variety of specification checks and do not appear to be sensitive to the choice of ethnic and linguistic diversity measures.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106155"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47103587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Recourse restrictions and judicial foreclosures: Effects of mortgage law on loan price and collateralization 追索权限制和司法止赎:抵押贷款法对贷款价格和抵押的影响
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 Epub Date: 2023-06-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106142
Ana Isabel Sá
{"title":"Recourse restrictions and judicial foreclosures: Effects of mortgage law on loan price and collateralization","authors":"Ana Isabel Sá","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106142","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106142","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Borrower-friendly laws, such as recourse restrictions and judicial foreclosures, impose higher costs and risks to lenders. Yet, there is little evidence on how lenders transfer them to borrowers at the mortgage </span>origination<span>. By exploiting the mortgage law heterogeneity across U.S. states, I show that recourse restrictions trigger a collateral channel, through which lenders require a 1.6 to 1.9 percentage points lower loan-to-value ratio to compensate for worse recovery opportunities and respective higher expected loss. This effect holds both before and after the Great Recession<span>, and is robust to a regression discontinuity design approach. I also find that lenders do not penalize strategic defaults when recourse is not allowed. Regarding the impact of judicial requirements, the findings are mixed.</span></span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106142"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43314608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When more isn’t always better: The ambiguity of fully transparent judicial action and unrestricted publication rules 当更多并不总是更好时:完全透明的司法行动和不受限制的出版规则的模糊性
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 Epub Date: 2023-07-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106154
Florian Baumann , Frank Fagan
{"title":"When more isn’t always better: The ambiguity of fully transparent judicial action and unrestricted publication rules","authors":"Florian Baumann ,&nbsp;Frank Fagan","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106154","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106154","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Unrestricted publication of judicial opinions and full transparency of judicial action are often considered a means to increase information relevant for future litigants and public discourse. In this paper, we analyze a model that captures the potential for unintended consequences of such policies. Under certain conditions, unrestricted publication of judicial opinions, full transparency of judicial behavior at trial and oral argument enabled by telecasting, and other forms of surveillance of judicial behavior may induce judges to obscure their opinions and actions leading to less information for the public over time. Unrestricted publication and full transparency of judicial action should be carefully considered as a policy preference.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106154"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48452184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Which companies pay more (or less) in legal fees? An empirical study of India 哪些公司支付的法律费用更多(或更少)?印度的实证研究
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106138
Srinivasan Sankaraguruswamy , Umakanth Varottil
{"title":"Which companies pay more (or less) in legal fees? An empirical study of India","authors":"Srinivasan Sankaraguruswamy ,&nbsp;Umakanth Varottil","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106138","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Although the demand for corporate legal services has grown significantly, so has the pressure on companies to reduce legal costs, thereby necessitating a “data-and-metrics” driven approach to legal fees. Accordingly, we exploit the availability of a unique dataset comprising legal fees that Indian corporations have spent over a 30-year period from 1990 to 2020. We undertake the first cross-sectional analysis of legal fees across various exploratory variables over a long period of time. The results show an increasing trend in the quantum of legal fees incurred by Indian companies during the period. They overwhelmingly suggest that large companies (measured along the lines of total assets, industry segmentation, export and import orientation) spend a higher quantum in legal fees than do small companies. Legal costs are higher for companies that undertake capital raising or mergers and acquisitions transactions in a given financial year than those that do not experience such events. Finally, legal fees tend to be higher in certain industry sectors such as technology and energy where significant contracting, regulatory or other form of legal work is pervasive. It is our expectation that the results and accompanying data analysis will aid purchasers of legal services (being corporations and their in-house legal departments) as well as providers (being law firms and legal professionals) in planning and budgeting for legal fees, and also in devising and implementing appropriate fee arrangements.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106138"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49748534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mutual optimism and risk preferences in litigation 诉讼中的相互乐观与风险偏好
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106157
Keith N. Hylton
{"title":"Mutual optimism and risk preferences in litigation","authors":"Keith N. Hylton","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106157","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Why do some legal disputes fail to settle? From a bird’s eye view, the literature offers two categories of reasons. One consists of arguments based on informational disparities. The other consists of psychological arguments. This paper explores the psychological theory. It presents a model of litigation driven by risk preferences and examines the model’s implications for trials and settlements. The model suggests a foundation in Prospect Theory for the Mutual Optimism model of litigation. The model’s implications for plaintiff win rates, settlement patterns, and informational asymmetry with respect to the degree of risk aversion are examined.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106157"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49758102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Law and inequality: A comparative approach to the distributive implications of legal systems 法律与不平等:法律制度分配含义的比较方法
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106139
Illan Barriola , Bruno Deffains , Olivier Musy
{"title":"Law and inequality: A comparative approach to the distributive implications of legal systems","authors":"Illan Barriola ,&nbsp;Bruno Deffains ,&nbsp;Olivier Musy","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106139","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>The literature on legal traditions focuses on the comparative macroeconomic effects of legal systems, concentrating on efficiency alone and leaving distributive issues to taxation. However, a country’s legal structure also conditions the primary distribution of income and may have a comparative advantage over taxation as a distributive instrument. We use cross-section and panel estimates to show that the level of income </span>inequality<span> in a country is correlated with its legal system. By several measures of inequality, common law countries are on average more unequal than civil law countries. We explain these results by the nature of the systems. The looser regulation in common law countries limits their capacity to achieve social objectives such as combating income inequality.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106139"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49758635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effects of reputational sanctions on culpable firms: Evidence from China’s stock markets 声誉制裁对应受谴责企业的影响:来自中国股市的证据
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106152
Robin Hui Huang , Linhan Zhang
{"title":"The effects of reputational sanctions on culpable firms: Evidence from China’s stock markets","authors":"Robin Hui Huang ,&nbsp;Linhan Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106152","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine an important yet understudied form of reputational sanction in China, namely public criticisms imposed on culpable firms by the Chinese stock exchanges from 2013 to 2018. We find significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date, and they were affected by several factors, including financing propensity, governance mechanism, and equity nature. However, the market reaction is significantly negative only for firms relying on external financing and non-state enterprises, and importantly, becomes insignificant in cases where the firm had self-exposed misconduct before the official announcement of public criticism. Further, we examine other effects of public criticism, finding that public criticism does not improve firms’ long-term values, nor produce strong deterrence to change their behaviour. Overall, the evidence of the effects of public criticism on culpable firms is mixed, suggesting that reputational sanction is a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of market regulation in China.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106152"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49747913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Advance disclosure of insider transactions: Empirical evidence from the Vietnamese stock market 内幕交易的提前披露:来自越南股票市场的经验证据
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106137
Jérémie Lefebvre , Paolo Mazza
{"title":"Advance disclosure of insider transactions: Empirical evidence from the Vietnamese stock market","authors":"Jérémie Lefebvre ,&nbsp;Paolo Mazza","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106137","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the impact of legal insider trading announcements on stock returns in Vietnam. Vietnamese insiders must announce their trading intentions in advance as well as after the actual trade, which contrasts with the vast majority of countries where only post-trade announcement is mandatory. This regulatory setting allows to put to test the predictions from the theoretical models of advance disclosures (Huddart et al., 2004, Lenkey, 2014). Consistent with the theoretical literature, we find that the abnormal returns are large and significant after the pre-trade announcement, showing that the market takes into consideration the information content of the insiders' intention to trade. In addition, no significant stock price effect is found after the announcement of the actual trade occurrence or cancellation. We argue in favor of the implementation of advance disclosure policies since they help mitigate the returns obtained by insiders, better share the profits with outsiders and contribute to a better information dissemination.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 106137"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49751189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Judicial compliance in district courts 区域法院的司法遵从
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-06-01 Epub Date: 2023-01-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2022.106122
Daniel L. Chen
{"title":"Judicial compliance in district courts","authors":"Daniel L. Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2022.106122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2022.106122","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Are judges motivated only by policy preferences? Public enforcement of law relies on the use of public agents, such as judges, to follow the law. We use the random assignment of U.S. Federal judges setting geographically-local precedent to document the causal impact of court decisions in a hierarchical legal system. We examine lower court cases filed before and resolved after higher court decisions and find that lower courts are 29%–37% points more likely to rule in the manner of the higher court. The results obtain when the higher court case was decided in the same doctrinal area as the pending case and when the higher court case was decided on the merits. Reversals by the higher court have no significant effects. These results provide evidence that judges are motivated to follow the law and are not solely motivated by policy preferences.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 106122"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49751281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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