地区检察官薪酬及表现

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2022.106102

Gregory DeAngelo , Bryan C. McCannon , Morgan Stockham

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们试图通过研究纽约的外生工资增长来确定工资对检察官工作的因果影响。我们通过上诉时维持判决的可能性来衡量表现。如果效率工资理论解释了行为，那么外生工资冲击应该会吸引更好的绩效。或者，如果担任公职的个人主要受到内在动机的激励，而不是严格的经济报酬，那么他们的表现将与他们的工资变化无关。我们主要发现，与效率工资理论不一致的是，加薪对检察官的绩效没有任何影响。

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District attorney compensation and performance

We attempt to identify the causal effect of wages on a prosecutor’s effort by studying an exogenous salary increase in New York. We measure the performance by the likelihood that a conviction is upheld when appealed. If the efficiency wage theory explains behavior, then the exogenous wage shock should entice better performance. Alternatively, if individuals who hold office are motivated primarily by an intrinsic motivations rather than strictly financial compensation, then their performance would be unrelated to changes in their salary. We mostly find, inconsistent with efficiency wage theory, that a pay increase has a null effect on prosecutor performance.

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来源期刊

International Review of Law and Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

18.20%

发文量

审稿时长

48 days

期刊介绍： The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.