International Review of Law and Economics最新文献

The role of the regulatory framework in enhancing SMEs’ digital transformation

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106263

Marianna Succurro , Cristiana Donati

{"title":"The role of the regulatory framework in enhancing SMEs’ digital transformation","authors":"Marianna Succurro , Cristiana Donati","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106263","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106263","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper aims at exploring the current process of SMEs’ digital transformation in order to contribute to effective policy development. We first provide a definition of firms’ digital transformation and then investigate its fundamental determinants, so responding to the call for further research and more comprehensive understandings of the digital transformation process. The objective is to verify the impact of the regulatory environment on digital transformation of SMEs. The empirical analysis, based on data taken from the Flash Eurobarometer Survey of the European Commission, shows that the regulatory framework is strongly significant in explaining firms’ digital transformation. Specifically, SMEs’ awareness of the regulatory context and anticipated digital standards: 1) expedites their process of digital transformation; 2) positively moderates the relationship between any strategic plan and their digital transformation; 3) generates a relatively greater impact on the digital transformation of firms mainly involved in the adoption of more advanced digital technologies. Some policy implications conclude the work.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106263"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143776346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Reinforcing data protection and competition through art. 6(2) of the Digital Markets Act 通过《数字市场法》第 6(2)条加强数据保护和竞争数字市场法》第 6(2)条

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106265

Peter J. van de Waerdt

{"title":"Reinforcing data protection and competition through art. 6(2) of the Digital Markets Act","authors":"Peter J. van de Waerdt","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106265","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106265","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>With the Digital Markets Act (DMA) the European Union has taken significant steps in the regulation of large digital market ecosystems. Data protection and competition law are becoming increasingly intertwined, and the DMA’s goals are tightly aligned with them. However, the provision explicitly intended to address the use (and cross-use) of data within gatekeepers’ ecosystems leaves much to be desired. Art. 5(2) DMA offers no substantive new obligations over the established GDPR system, especially in light of the ECJ’s judgement in <em>Meta v. Bundeskartellamt</em>. Furthermore, the consent exception on which it relies leaves a distinct risk of anti-competitive effects and decreasing privacy as a result of information asymmetries and the powerful market position of gatekeepers. However, art. 6(2) DMA also restricts gatekeepers’ ability to use data, if it was received through gatekeepers’ business users. The protective value of the DMA can be significantly increased if the European Commission adopts broad interpretations of when data is used “in competition with business users”, when it is “collected through commercial activities of business users or their customers” and when it is obtained “on the relevant core platform services or on services provided together with, or in support of, the relevant core platform services of the gatekeeper”. Doing so would conform to the interconnected nature of ecosystems’ data collection practices and their competitive position, and it would bolster the Commission’s ability to act against both the anti-competitive effects and potential privacy infringements of data pooling, above and beyond what art. 5(2) DMA offers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"82 ","pages":"Article 106265"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143816972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Ex-ante versus Ex-post in competition law enforcement: Blurred boundaries and economic rationale

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106264

Patrice Bougette , Oliver Budzinski , Frédéric Marty

引用次数: 0

Vertical interoperability in mobile ecosystems: Will the DMA deliver (what competition law could not)?

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106267

Giuseppe Colangelo , Alba Ribera Martínez

引用次数: 0

Can independent directors effectively monitor related party transactions? Evidence from Hong Kong

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106261

Hong Huang , Charles Zhen Qu , Haitian Lu

{"title":"Can independent directors effectively monitor related party transactions? Evidence from Hong Kong","authors":"Hong Huang , Charles Zhen Qu , Haitian Lu","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106261","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106261","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper empirically investigates whether independent directors of Hong Kong listed companies effectively monitor related party transactions (“RPTs”). We employ a quasi-experimental approach, utilizing a mandatory rule introduced in 2004 that changed the minimum number of independent directors, and enhanced the independence and qualification requirements of independent directors for listed companies. Using a triple-differences setup, we find that companies affected by these new requirements experienced a significant increase in the value of announced RPTs. This positive effect is observed both in companies affected by all aspects of the reform and in those that only needed to increase their number of independent directors. We also observe that return on assets for the affected companies increased significantly following the rule change. However, these affected companies showed no significant reduction in their preference for RPTs. Our findings underscore the positive value created by independent directors of Hong Kong listed companies in vetting RPTs. They suggest that, within an appropriately structured regulatory framework, independent directors, even where the company is owner-controlled, can be effective in enhancing shareholder value. As the regulatory framework resulted from the 2004 reform has remained largely unchanged, our findings are still relevant for Hong Kong and offer valuable insights on the function of independent directors for other jurisdictions, particularly those with ownership-concentrated markets seeking to enhance their RPT monitoring mechanisms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"82 ","pages":"Article 106261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143769187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Corporate control: Persistence and the shifting role of control-enhancing mechanisms in Italian listed firms (1978–2018)

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106260

Silvia Rigamonti

引用次数: 0

(Not) Canceling out the cross-section: Mitigating the effect of peremptory challenges on jury selection

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106259

Francis X. Flanagan

引用次数: 0

Balancing power and performance: The role of managerial rent in competitive advantage

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106258

Chandra S. Mishra

引用次数: 0

When do governments attack the judiciary? The explanatory power of political corruption

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106248

Aylin Aydin-Cakir , Ebru İlter Akarçay

{"title":"When do governments attack the judiciary? The explanatory power of political corruption","authors":"Aylin Aydin-Cakir , Ebru İlter Akarçay","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106248","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106248","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In recent decades, the world has witnessed various examples of elected governments verbally attacking the judiciary, accusing judges of bias, or claiming that court decisions are politically motivated. Despite the prevalence of such court-curbing practices, we know very little about when exactly governments decide to verbally attack the judiciary. Focusing on the effect of political corruption, the objective of this study is to understand 1) whether and, if so, how corruption affects governments’ attacks on the judiciary and 2) whether and, if so, how its effect changes across different political contexts. We argue that in countries with fully or partially independent media, verbal attacks on the judiciary would increase with the level of corruption. However, in regimes where the media is not independent, political corruption would not have a significant effect on attacks on the judiciary. We conduct a time-series cross-sectional analysis across 165 countries (1991–2022) to test our hypotheses. The empirical results support our hypotheses. To better understand the causal mechanisms through which corruption and media independence together trigger governments’ verbal attacks on the judiciary, we compare the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela in the second part of the study.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"82 ","pages":"Article 106248"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143436673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: An axiomatic approach

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247

David Lowing , Léa Munich , Kevin Techer

{"title":"Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: An axiomatic approach","authors":"David Lowing , Léa Munich , Kevin Techer","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Accurate cost allocation is a challenge for both public service operators and regulatory bodies, given the dual objectives of ensuring essential public service provision and maintaining fair competition. Operators have the obligation to provide essential public services for all individuals, which may incur additional costs. To compensate this, the operators receive state aids, which are determined by an assessment of the net cost associated with these obligations. However, these aids introduce the risk of distorting competition, as operators may employ them to subsidize competitive activities. To avoid this risk, a precise cost allocation method that adequately assess the net cost of these obligations becomes necessary. Such a method must satisfy specific properties that effectively prevent cross-subsidization. In this paper, we propose a method grounded in cooperative game theory that offers a solution for allocating common costs between activities and obligations in public service provision. We adopt a normative approach by introducing a set of desirable axioms that prevent cross-subsidization. We provide two characterizations of our proposed solution on the basis of these axioms. Furthermore, we present an illustration of our method to the allocation of common costs for a public service operator.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 106247"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143221261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0