International Review of Law and Economics最新文献

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Notice-and-takedown as dispute resolution: An empirical analysis of GitHub notices 通知-撤下作为争议解决:对GitHub通知的实证分析
IF 0.9 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106281
Pengfei Zhang, Ji Li
{"title":"Notice-and-takedown as dispute resolution: An empirical analysis of GitHub notices","authors":"Pengfei Zhang,&nbsp;Ji Li","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106281","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106281","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The Section 512(c) notice-and-takedown regime is a primary mechanism that enforces online copyright in the U.S. The objective is to enable the disputants to settle on their own, but asymmetric information can lead to claimant abuse and bargaining impasse, as critics of Section 512 have pointed out. This paper studies the dispute resolution aspect of the notice-and-takedown. We evaluate two platform remedies (chance-to-change policy and revise-and-resubmit policy) and the recent trend of professionalization in the context of GitHub. We collect a novel sample of 4,684 takedown notices from GitHub and use it to empirically test the disputants’ settlement behavior. Our estimates show that the chance-to-change policy is associated with a higher settlement rate, whereas the revise-and-resubmit policy has little effect. The results are consistent with a signaling theory between the copyright owner and the infringer. To address the potential selection effects of GitHub, we apply text analysis to quantify and control latent attributes of the notices, including writing styles and informativeness, in addition to more substantive features. We also discuss the role of expert representatives and certain textual characteristics that appear influential in the dispute resolution process.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106281"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144490902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Clearance rates and disposition times: Not the whole story of judicial efficiency 清案率和处置时间:并不是司法效率的全部
IF 0.9 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106283
Miguel Alves Pereira
{"title":"Clearance rates and disposition times: Not the whole story of judicial efficiency","authors":"Miguel Alves Pereira","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106283","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106283","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Judicial efficiency is often measured through clearance rate (CR) and disposition time (DT), yet these traditional metrics fail to capture the complexity of resource utilisation in courts. This study critiques the widespread reliance on CR and DT, arguing that they provide an incomplete and potentially misleading picture of judicial efficiency. Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a non-parametric method designed to measure resource-based efficiency, this research analyses courts across Europe’s three-tier judicial hierarchy. The findings reveal significant shortcomings in CR and DT, including weak or negative correlations with DEA efficiency scores, particularly at the Supreme Court level, where these metrics neglect the intricacies of resource management and case complexity. DEA, by accounting for multiple inputs (e.g., judges, staff, budgets) and outputs (resolved and pending cases), offers a more nuanced framework for measuring efficiency. The analysis highlights inefficiencies hidden behind high CRs and low DTs, suggesting that resource misallocation is a key issue. Furthermore, prioritising efficiency improvements in first-instance courts, where resource bottlenecks are most acute, could generate cascading benefits throughout the judiciary. This study provides empirical evidence for the inadequacy of traditional metrics and advocates for a paradigm shift towards comprehensive tools like DEA to measure judicial efficiency. By moving beyond simplistic case throughput measures, policymakers can design targeted reforms that ensure both the equitable delivery of justice and the sustainable management of judicial resources. The results underscore the urgency of rethinking how justice is measured and understood in modern judicial systems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106283"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144306317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conflict and property law: The hidden costs of takings and of liability rule protection 冲突与财产法:征收与责任规则保护的隐性成本
IF 0.9 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106280
Sergio Mittlaender
{"title":"Conflict and property law: The hidden costs of takings and of liability rule protection","authors":"Sergio Mittlaender","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106280","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106280","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper presents a novel argument for the law’s preference for property rules over liability rules based on their potential to reduce socially costly forms of retaliation by victims of takings. Property rules are more effective at mitigating conflict and discouraging costly retaliation by victims, thereby increasing social welfare. This hypothesis is tested empirically in a laboratory experiment involving a task that includes a valued possession that can be taken by others. Results reveal that both property and liability rules reduce retaliation, but property rules are more effective—particularly when the taking results in a net gain for the taker, who profits from the transgression. This suggests a hidden social cost in efficient takings under liability rules, providing evidence for the existing preference for property rules in legal systems. This paper contributes to the literature by revealing a significant, yet overlooked, advantage of property rules, rationalizing existing practice, and discussing the implications for the optimal choice of legal protection of entitlements.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106280"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144231450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Chinese courts apply the “Hand Formula”: Empirical evidence from cases related to the duty of safety protection 中国法院是否适用“汉德公式”:安全保护义务相关案件的经验证据
IF 0.9 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106279
Haoyi Zhang
{"title":"Do Chinese courts apply the “Hand Formula”: Empirical evidence from cases related to the duty of safety protection","authors":"Haoyi Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106279","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106279","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study analyzes over ten thousand judgments by Chinese courts in cases related to the duty of safety protection, using a sharp regression discontinuity design to examine the causal relationship between the ratio of expected loss to the burden of precaution and the determination of defendant negligence. The findings reveal that the decision-making process, guided by the Hand Formula, explains approximately 20% to 30% of judicial decisions. When focusing specifically on a cost–benefit analysis mindset, this process accounts for approximately 10% to 15% of decisions. These results indicate that the Hand Formula significantly influences judicial practice in China. Moreover, the cost–benefit analysis mindset inherent in the Hand Formula is not only a theoretical pursuit of economic efficiency but also reflects a universal intuitive sense of fairness and justice beyond positive legal norms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106279"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144253910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
And the law relaxed the rules – A quasi-experimental study of fatal police shootings in Europe 法律放宽了规定——一项关于欧洲警察致命枪击事件的准实验研究
IF 0.9 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106282
Sebastian Roché , Simon Varaine , Paul Le Derff
{"title":"And the law relaxed the rules – A quasi-experimental study of fatal police shootings in Europe","authors":"Sebastian Roché ,&nbsp;Simon Varaine ,&nbsp;Paul Le Derff","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106282","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106282","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Can the behavior of civil servants with a large autonomy, the police, be regulated by law? In the case of the use of deadly force, the subject remains understudied in Europe. A 2017 law in France relaxed restrictions and allowed for the first time the national police to use weapons beyond self-defense. This quasi-experimental study examines the impact that this regulatory change, used as an exogenous shock, has had on the number of deaths of occupants of vehicles. The monthly number of killings has significantly increased for the national police (experimental group), who are directly affected by the new regulation, but not other forces unaffected by the regulation such as the French gendarmerie, a military status force (control group 1), and other police forces of two neighboring states (Germany, Belgium, control group 2 and 3). The findings hold after controlling for the variations in level of violence in society, and police exposure to and death in dangerous traffic violations during the study period. When using more conservative specifications, the observed increase in lethal shootings does not reach statistical significance due to a lack of statistical power related to the rarity of police lethal shootings in the European context. We recommend that national regulations governing the use of weapons by police more clearly and unambiguously embed the notions of proportionality and absolute necessity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106282"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144263088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of antitrust enforcement on China’s digital platforms: Evidence from SAMR v. Alibaba 反垄断执法对中国数字平台的影响:来自SAMR诉阿里巴巴的证据
IF 0.9 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106268
Kenneth Khoo , Sinchit Lai , Chuyue Tian
{"title":"The impact of antitrust enforcement on China’s digital platforms: Evidence from SAMR v. Alibaba","authors":"Kenneth Khoo ,&nbsp;Sinchit Lai ,&nbsp;Chuyue Tian","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106268","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106268","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this article, we explore the dynamics of antitrust enforcement in the Chinese e-commerce platform market by examining the landmark decision of <em>SAMR v. Alibaba</em> (2021) using an event study methodology. We find that the announcement of the antitrust investigation leads to a negative impact on Alibaba’s abnormal returns, while its competitors experience mixed outcomes, with some showing positive abnormal returns and others showing statistically insignificant changes. However, the announcement of the financial penalty triggers a positive stock market response for Alibaba and a negative response for its competitors, consistent with narratives suggesting that investors adjust their expectations based on new information revealed by the investigation. To assess the cumulative effects of the investigation on Alibaba, we conduct a long-horizon event study, which shows a 17 to 25% decline in Alibaba’s abnormal stock returns, with a relatively smaller decrease for its competitors. Additionally, using a synthetic control approach, we identify a 7 to 9% reduction in Alibaba’s gross profit margins compared to similar firms. Our findings reveal that the decision has a substantial impact on Alibaba’s profitability, with our estimates indicating an effect significantly larger than that observed in comparable studies in the EU and U.S.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106268"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143929206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
News flow as a determinant of the voting premium of dual-class shares 新闻流对双层股权表决权溢价的决定作用
IF 0.9 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106270
Hubert de La Bruslerie
{"title":"News flow as a determinant of the voting premium of dual-class shares","authors":"Hubert de La Bruslerie","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106270","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106270","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article investigates the voting premium between two simultaneously traded classes of shares. We use a sample of dual-class firms listed in the U.S. and Canada for the 2012–2022 period to identify the determinants of the size of the voting premium. We do not confirm the results documented in the literature that the relative illiquidity between the two classes may explain the voting premium. The empirical tests also support the leverage effect hypothesis, a new feature in the literature. The empirical analysis also shows volatile voting premiums. We demonstrate that the voting premiums are not linked to the positive or negative sentiments attached to the disclosed information. This article contributes to the literature by showing that this instability is related to the magnitude of the news flow brought to the market about the controlling ownership’s change and the strategic shareholders’ behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"82 ","pages":"Article 106270"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143894352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
“Platform Holdup” and Platform Regulation “平台堵塞”和平台监管
IF 0.9 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106266
Jinglei Huang , Danxia Xie
{"title":"“Platform Holdup” and Platform Regulation","authors":"Jinglei Huang ,&nbsp;Danxia Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106266","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106266","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The interaction between a platform and its users plays a crucial role in shaping its pricing strategy and overall success. When users incur an initial cost to join the platform and stand to gain utility, the risk of receiving minimal benefits due to aggressive pricing arises. This discourages user participation, leading to launch failures for potential platforms and significant welfare loss in equilibrium, identified as the “platform holdup” issue. Addressing the platform holdup problem can be achieved, in part, by introducing an implicit guarantee through government oversight, providing subsidies to potential users, and granting users dividend rights. The analysis of oligopoly cases shows that, in most instances, market competition alone is not sufficient to fully resolve the problem.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106266"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143838877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competition and the two margins of privacy 竞争与隐私的两个边缘
IF 0.9 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106262
David Bounie , Antoine Dubus , Patrick Waelbroeck
{"title":"Competition and the two margins of privacy","authors":"David Bounie ,&nbsp;Antoine Dubus ,&nbsp;Patrick Waelbroeck","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106262","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106262","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article analyzes the relationship between privacy protection and market competition. We consider a model where firms collect data to price discriminate consumers in a competitive product market, and we distinguish two margins of privacy. Firms strategically choose the number of consumers on whom they collect data – the extensive margin of privacy – as well as the precision of information – the intensive margin of privacy. We show that policymakers can efficiently protect both margins of privacy and consumer surplus by safeguarding the intensive margin. Indeed, when both strategic variables are strategic complements, restricting the amount of information that firms have on each consumer (the intensive margin) also induces firms to collect data on fewer consumers, thereby protecting the extensive margin of privacy. This softens the intensity of competition but also reduces rent extraction by firms, and total consumer surplus increases. When both variables are strategic substitutes, protecting the intensive margin harms privacy at the extensive margin, but still increases consumer surplus.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106262"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143833397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Has the European Takeover Bids Directive reached its objectives? The cases of Finland, Germany and Spain 《欧洲收购投标指令》达到其目标了吗?芬兰、德国和西班牙的案例
IF 0.9 3区 社会学
International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106269
Nuria Alcalde-Fradejas , Inés Pérez-Soba
{"title":"Has the European Takeover Bids Directive reached its objectives? The cases of Finland, Germany and Spain","authors":"Nuria Alcalde-Fradejas ,&nbsp;Inés Pérez-Soba","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106269","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106269","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Inspired in the common law tradition, the European Takeover Bids Directive (TBD) aimed to promote an efficient market for corporate control in Europe by facilitating competition among acquirers in EU economies while protecting the rights of minority shareholders of listed companies. After more than 15 years from its transposition into European national regulations, in this paper we investigate whether the main objectives of the Directive have been achieved in three European countries representing the three legal families included under the Civil law regime: Spain, as a country belonging to the French Civil law tradition, Finland, which belongs to the Nordic law tradition and, finally, Germany as a country representing Germanic Civil law tradition. To perform an in-depth analysis, we did not use a sample of takeovers, but a hand-collected database covering all takeovers launched in Finland and Spain over the period 2000–2019, and in Germany over 2002–2019. The results obtained in our analysis lead us to be sceptical about the clear achievement of the objectives intended by the Directive in the three countries analysed. Although more openness to European bidders seems to have been reached in Spain and Finland, there is no evidence of an increase in intra-European cross border takeovers following the TBD’s transposition in any of the countries analysed. Moreover, the premiums paid to minority shareholders (proxy for their higher protection) have remained unchanged in Germany and have been reduced in Spain and Finland.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143874217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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