International Review of Law and Economics最新文献

When do governments attack the judiciary? The explanatory power of political corruption

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106248

Aylin Aydin-Cakir , Ebru İlter Akarçay

{"title":"When do governments attack the judiciary? The explanatory power of political corruption","authors":"Aylin Aydin-Cakir , Ebru İlter Akarçay","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106248","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106248","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In recent decades, the world has witnessed various examples of elected governments verbally attacking the judiciary, accusing judges of bias, or claiming that court decisions are politically motivated. Despite the prevalence of such court-curbing practices, we know very little about when exactly governments decide to verbally attack the judiciary. Focusing on the effect of political corruption, the objective of this study is to understand 1) whether and, if so, how corruption affects governments’ attacks on the judiciary and 2) whether and, if so, how its effect changes across different political contexts. We argue that in countries with fully or partially independent media, verbal attacks on the judiciary would increase with the level of corruption. However, in regimes where the media is not independent, political corruption would not have a significant effect on attacks on the judiciary. We conduct a time-series cross-sectional analysis across 165 countries (1991–2022) to test our hypotheses. The empirical results support our hypotheses. To better understand the causal mechanisms through which corruption and media independence together trigger governments’ verbal attacks on the judiciary, we compare the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela in the second part of the study.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"82 ","pages":"Article 106248"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143436673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: An axiomatic approach

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247

David Lowing , Léa Munich , Kevin Techer

{"title":"Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: An axiomatic approach","authors":"David Lowing , Léa Munich , Kevin Techer","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Accurate cost allocation is a challenge for both public service operators and regulatory bodies, given the dual objectives of ensuring essential public service provision and maintaining fair competition. Operators have the obligation to provide essential public services for all individuals, which may incur additional costs. To compensate this, the operators receive state aids, which are determined by an assessment of the net cost associated with these obligations. However, these aids introduce the risk of distorting competition, as operators may employ them to subsidize competitive activities. To avoid this risk, a precise cost allocation method that adequately assess the net cost of these obligations becomes necessary. Such a method must satisfy specific properties that effectively prevent cross-subsidization. In this paper, we propose a method grounded in cooperative game theory that offers a solution for allocating common costs between activities and obligations in public service provision. We adopt a normative approach by introducing a set of desirable axioms that prevent cross-subsidization. We provide two characterizations of our proposed solution on the basis of these axioms. Furthermore, we present an illustration of our method to the allocation of common costs for a public service operator.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 106247"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143221261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Did recreational marijuana legalization increase crime in the long run?

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106246

Sunyoung Lee

引用次数: 0

Jury priors and observable defendant characteristics

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106245

Jesse Bull

{"title":"Jury priors and observable defendant characteristics","authors":"Jesse Bull","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106245","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106245","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Although prohibited, jurors sometimes condition, consciously or subconsciously, their belief that a defendant is guilty on the defendant’s race or ethnicity or other observable characteristics. This can be viewed as a juror forming a prior or pre-trial/evidence disclosure belief of guilt. In doing this, they rely on their perceptions of education, socio-economic status, religion, beliefs, networks, etc. for the defendant’s race (or other observable characteristic) and how they perceive those to influence the probability the defendant is guilty. This is consistent with aversive discrimination, which suggests that people want to be egalitarian and not condition on race but have a tendency to base decisions on factors that are discriminatory when race is not salient. When this prior or pre-trial/evidence disclosure belief of guilt overestimates the prior probability of guilt for those in the minority group, it underestimates the prior probability of guilt for those in the majority group. Prohibiting conditioning on observable defendant characteristics can be viewed as requiring the use of the population prior/pre-trial probability of guilt. Conditions for when such prohibition improves accuracy are provided. While it is difficult to effectively prohibit this, studies of aversive discrimination suggest that making race salient in a trial can reduce implicit bias on race. So these results may provide some guidance on when such activity should be permitted.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 106245"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143180526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An inspector calls: On the optimality of warning firms about ongoing inspections in antitrust policy

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106244

María C. Avramovich

引用次数: 0

Norms as obligations 作为义务的规范

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106235

Leonard Hoeft , Michael Kurschilgen , Wladislaw Mill

引用次数: 0

Case law in European merger control 欧洲兼并控制判例法

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106236

Johan Callermo

引用次数: 0

Estimating the effect of concealed carry laws on murder: A response to Bondy, et al. 估计隐蔽携带枪支法对谋杀案的影响：对邦迪等人的回应

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106234

Carlisle Moody , John R. Lott

{"title":"Estimating the effect of concealed carry laws on murder: A response to Bondy, et al.","authors":"Carlisle Moody , John R. Lott","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106234","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106234","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In 2021 we wrote a short paper noting that truncating the sample when estimating the effect of right to carry laws on crime could be biased by comparisons to states that already adopted the law, instead of states without the law. In 2023 Bondy et al. criticized our paper but inaccurately described what we did and provided selective and misleading results. More importantly, they completely missed the point of our analysis, namely that applying two-way fixed effects to a truncated sample, say 1991–2018, biases the resulting RTC coefficient by invalidly comparing newly treated states to 11 previously treated states. The bias is so large that even if the true coefficient on the right-to-carry dummy is negative, the estimated coefficient could be positive. These biased results can be corrected by using new DID estimators, that do not make invalid comparisons, and which are robust to time and state heterogeneity. Using these new estimators, we find that RTC laws do not significantly increase violent crime. We find evidence that RTC laws significantly reduce murder and that constitutional carry laws significantly reduce rape.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142653074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The broken-windows theory of crime: A Bayesian approach 破窗犯罪理论：贝叶斯方法

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106233

Thomas J. Miceli, Kathleen Segerson

引用次数: 0

Workload, legal doctrine, and judicial review in an authoritarian regime: A study of expropriation judgments in China 专制制度下的工作量、法律理论和司法审查：中国征用判决研究

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106232

Chaoqun Zhan , Shitong Qiao

{"title":"Workload, legal doctrine, and judicial review in an authoritarian regime: A study of expropriation judgments in China","authors":"Chaoqun Zhan , Shitong Qiao","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106232","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106232","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper contributes one of the first systematic studies on how courts adjudicate expropriation disputes both in the absence of judicial independence and in the face of resource constraints, extends the study of judicial workload into an authoritarian context, and demonstrates the complicated and dynamic interactions between apolitical and political aspects of courts in authoritarian regimes. Our results demonstrate that legal doctrine can check the abuse of government power even in situations where it is least expected. Specifically, we examined how Chinese courts, faced with an explosive increase in workload caused by a legal reform in 2015, adjudicated expropriation disputes between the government and property rights holders. Employing a difference-in-differences method, we found that an increased judicial workload improved the chances of property rights holders winning their cases against the government. We discovered that judges’ use of hard-edged legal doctrine—administrative procedures, in particular—to save time constrained judicial discretion, which is prone to arbitrary political influence in authoritarian regimes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106232"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142653075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0