International Review of Law and Economics最新文献

Inter-municipal cooperation in drinking water supply: Trade-offs between transaction costs, efficiency and service quality 城市间饮用水供应合作：交易成本、效率和服务质量之间的权衡

IF 1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106303

Mehdi Guelmamen , Serge Garcia , Alexandre Mayol

{"title":"Inter-municipal cooperation in drinking water supply: Trade-offs between transaction costs, efficiency and service quality","authors":"Mehdi Guelmamen , Serge Garcia , Alexandre Mayol","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106303","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106303","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) is frequently promoted as a solution to improve the management of local utilities such as drinking water. Yet its effectiveness remains ambiguous: while IMC can create economies of scale, it may also induce transaction costs that undermine its benefits. In France, drinking water services are managed at the municipal level, where local governments can decide whether to cooperate—and if so, whether to adopt a purely technical cooperative arrangement or a more politically integrated, supra-municipal governance structure. Using a comprehensive panel of French water utilities from 2008 to 2021, we investigate the factors that lead municipalities to remain independent. Our econometric analysis, based on a correlated random effects probit model with a control function approach, yields several key findings. First, while IMC is associated with higher water prices, these increased tariffs are offset by better network performance, as indicated by lower water loss indices and improved water quality. Second, we find that the more politically integrated form of cooperation is more common among publicly managed utilities and among municipalities seeking to reduce their dependence on imported water. These findings provide new insights into the governance of common-pool resources, suggesting that while cooperation can improve service provision, its institutional design must carefully balance organizational costs against expected efficiency gains.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"84 ","pages":"Article 106303"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145157667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Product liability influences incentives for horizontal mergers 产品负债影响横向并购的激励

IF 1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106302

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais , Tim Friehe , Eric Langlais

引用次数: 0

Populist constitutional backsliding and judicial independence: Evidence from Türkiye 民粹主义宪法倒退与司法独立：来自<s:1> rkiye的证据

IF 1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106301

Nuno Garoupa , Rok Spruk

引用次数: 0

Where’s Coase? Transaction costs reduction or rent-seeking in determining US environmental policies 科斯在哪里?决定美国环境政策的交易成本降低或寻租行为

IF 1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106286

Gary D. Libecap

{"title":"Where’s Coase? Transaction costs reduction or rent-seeking in determining US environmental policies","authors":"Gary D. Libecap","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106286","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106286","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In 1960, Ronald Coase offered a decentralized bargaining framework for reducing transaction costs in externality mitigation. Subsequent US environmental policies have not made it primary. Policies are centralized and prescriptive. To explore why, I examine the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 1977, 1990, the most wide-ranging US environmental law; the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Act of 1976, the primary US fishing regulation; and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, suggested to be the most powerful conservation law in the world. It is commonly asserted that the transaction costs of Coase are high relative to command and control. I find no empirical support for this claim; it is not tested; nor does it appear in legislative histories as justification for observed regulation. Prescriptive controls may involve higher transaction costs than Coase. Relevant externalities often are local where information about abatement costs and benefits would be available and costs of defining and trading decentralized property rights potentially lower than in the political arena with larger numbers of heterogeneous parties and objectives. Rent-seeking by political agents rather than transaction cost reduction dominates policy selection. Coase’s efficient collaborative problem solving has not been realized. Although the three laws provide public goods, they appear costly on the margin, inequitable, and mired in political controversy. High costs in all three laws is a key empirical finding. Predictions for policy formation motivated by transaction cost reduction or rent-seeking guide the analysis.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"84 ","pages":"Article 106286"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145105234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Ideology beyond elections: Path dependence in local public service provision 超越选举的意识形态：地方公共服务提供的路径依赖

IF 1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106300

Jean Beuve , Zoé Le Squeren , Marian W. Moszoro

引用次数: 0

AI devices and liability 人工智能设备与责任

IF 1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-08-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106284

Kene Boun My, Julien Jacob, Mathieu Lefebvre

引用次数: 0

Liability law, Defensive medicine and Healthcare quality 责任法，防御性医疗和医疗质量

IF 1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-08-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106285

Bertrand Chopard

引用次数: 0

Notice-and-takedown as dispute resolution: An empirical analysis of GitHub notices 通知-撤下作为争议解决：对GitHub通知的实证分析

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106281

Pengfei Zhang, Ji Li

{"title":"Notice-and-takedown as dispute resolution: An empirical analysis of GitHub notices","authors":"Pengfei Zhang, Ji Li","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106281","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106281","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The Section 512(c) notice-and-takedown regime is a primary mechanism that enforces online copyright in the U.S. The objective is to enable the disputants to settle on their own, but asymmetric information can lead to claimant abuse and bargaining impasse, as critics of Section 512 have pointed out. This paper studies the dispute resolution aspect of the notice-and-takedown. We evaluate two platform remedies (chance-to-change policy and revise-and-resubmit policy) and the recent trend of professionalization in the context of GitHub. We collect a novel sample of 4,684 takedown notices from GitHub and use it to empirically test the disputants’ settlement behavior. Our estimates show that the chance-to-change policy is associated with a higher settlement rate, whereas the revise-and-resubmit policy has little effect. The results are consistent with a signaling theory between the copyright owner and the infringer. To address the potential selection effects of GitHub, we apply text analysis to quantify and control latent attributes of the notices, including writing styles and informativeness, in addition to more substantive features. We also discuss the role of expert representatives and certain textual characteristics that appear influential in the dispute resolution process.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106281"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144490902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Clearance rates and disposition times: Not the whole story of judicial efficiency 清案率和处置时间：并不是司法效率的全部

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106283

Miguel Alves Pereira

{"title":"Clearance rates and disposition times: Not the whole story of judicial efficiency","authors":"Miguel Alves Pereira","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106283","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106283","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Judicial efficiency is often measured through clearance rate (CR) and disposition time (DT), yet these traditional metrics fail to capture the complexity of resource utilisation in courts. This study critiques the widespread reliance on CR and DT, arguing that they provide an incomplete and potentially misleading picture of judicial efficiency. Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a non-parametric method designed to measure resource-based efficiency, this research analyses courts across Europe’s three-tier judicial hierarchy. The findings reveal significant shortcomings in CR and DT, including weak or negative correlations with DEA efficiency scores, particularly at the Supreme Court level, where these metrics neglect the intricacies of resource management and case complexity. DEA, by accounting for multiple inputs (e.g., judges, staff, budgets) and outputs (resolved and pending cases), offers a more nuanced framework for measuring efficiency. The analysis highlights inefficiencies hidden behind high CRs and low DTs, suggesting that resource misallocation is a key issue. Furthermore, prioritising efficiency improvements in first-instance courts, where resource bottlenecks are most acute, could generate cascading benefits throughout the judiciary. This study provides empirical evidence for the inadequacy of traditional metrics and advocates for a paradigm shift towards comprehensive tools like DEA to measure judicial efficiency. By moving beyond simplistic case throughput measures, policymakers can design targeted reforms that ensure both the equitable delivery of justice and the sustainable management of judicial resources. The results underscore the urgency of rethinking how justice is measured and understood in modern judicial systems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106283"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144306317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Conflict and property law: The hidden costs of takings and of liability rule protection 冲突与财产法：征收与责任规则保护的隐性成本

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106280

Sergio Mittlaender

引用次数: 0