International Review of Law and Economics最新文献_第2页

Scale and scope economies in first-instance courts: Portuguese specialized vs non-specialized courts 一审法院的规模经济和范围经济：葡萄牙专门法院与非专门法院

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106216

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引用次数: 0

Institutional flexibility in tax law and enforcement 税法和执法机构的灵活性

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106215

引用次数: 0

Beyond courts: Does strategic litigation affect climate change policy support? 法院之外：战略性诉讼会影响气候变化政策支持吗？

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106213

引用次数: 0

No War of Courts in the protection of fundamental rights: The case of amparo appeals in Spain 法院在保护基本权利方面没有战争：西班牙宪法权利保护令上诉案

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106212

引用次数: 0

Patent law reform and innovation: An empirical assessment of the last 20 years 专利法改革与创新：对过去 20 年的实证评估

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106210

Christian Helmers , Brian J. Love

{"title":"Patent law reform and innovation: An empirical assessment of the last 20 years","authors":"Christian Helmers , Brian J. Love","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2024.106210","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We ask whether four of the most important U.S. patent system reforms of the last 20 years—elimination of presumptive injunctive relief for victorious patent enforcers in <em>eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC</em>, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); creation of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in the America Invents Act; restriction of software’s eligibility for patent protection in <em>Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l</em>, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); and limitation of patent enforcers’ choice of forum in <em>TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, LLC</em>, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017)—had a measurable impact on innovation in the U.S. Specifically, we use a sample of publicly traded firms to construct firm-level measures of innovation and exposure to each reform and adopt a variety of difference-in-differences approaches that assesses how innovation-related activities changed post-reform at relatively exposed versus relatively unexposed firms. We find: a positive association between <em>eBay</em> and R&D spending by firms that were relatively more exposed to patent litigation prior to the Court’s decision; a positive association between the introduction of PTAB proceedings and R&D expenditures by firms that innovate in tech classes where PTAB has been most active; a positive association between <em>Alice</em> and R&D spending by software firms; and a positive association between <em>TC Heartland</em> and R&D spending by firms that thereafter could not be sued in the Eastern District of Texas, a court long associated with opportunistic forum shopping.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141594618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules 人工智能、注意力不集中和责任规则

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106211

Marie Obidzinski , Yves Oytana

{"title":"Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules","authors":"Marie Obidzinski , Yves Oytana","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2024.106211","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We characterize the socially optimal liability sharing rule in a situation where a manufacturer develops an artificial intelligence (AI) system that is then used by a human operator (or user). First, the manufacturer invests to increase the autonomy of the AI (<em>i.e</em>, the set of situations that the AI can handle without human intervention) and sets a selling price. The user then decides whether or not to buy the AI. Since the autonomy of the AI remains limited, the human operator must sometimes intervene even when the AI is in use. Our main assumptions relate to behavioral inattention. Behavioral inattention reduces the effectiveness of user intervention and increases the expected harm. Only some users are aware of their own attentional limits. Under the assumption that AI outperforms users, we show that policymakers may face a trade-off when choosing how to allocate liability between the manufacturer and the user. Indeed, the manufacturer may underinvest in the autonomy of the AI. If this is the case, the policymaker can incentivize the latter to invest more by increasing his share of liability. On the other hand, increasing the liability of the manufacturer may come at the cost of slowing down the diffusion of AI technology.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141605406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An economic rationale for the different methods of feeding enslaved people in the antebellum South and British West Indies 前贝鲁姆时期南方和英属西印度群岛采用不同方法喂养被奴役者的经济学原理

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106206

Eleanor Brown , Ian Ayres

{"title":"An economic rationale for the different methods of feeding enslaved people in the antebellum South and British West Indies","authors":"Eleanor Brown , Ian Ayres","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2024.106206","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article focuses on two different systems of feeding enslaved people. In the first system, primarily associated with the cotton, tobacco, and rice plantations of antebellum South and the <em>early</em> sugar plantations of the British West Indies, the obligation to feed enslaved people was executed by the plantation. In contrast, under a second system known as provisioning associated with the <em>later</em> British West Indian colonies, the master allocated land to enslaved people on which they would grow their own food. Over time, this land was understood, in the wider community of both those enslaved and the planters, to be the “property” of the enslaved person. This article offers potential explanations both for why provisioning was adopted in the West Indies, and why provisioning did not take hold in southern U.S. plantations. Following Ronald Coase’s <em>Nature of the Firm</em>, we should expect to see provisioning when doing so economizes on transaction and agency costs. As it became more difficult to purchase imported food, plantations had to provide their own food. Provisioning sacrificed the plantations’ claims to surplus food, but in the West Indies such decentralized production could enhance incentives for enslaved people to produce their own food while economizing on the need for supervision.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141312758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Strategic anarchy; a model of prison violence as a means to informal governance and rent extraction 战略无政府状态；监狱暴力作为非正式治理和榨取租金手段的模式

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106205

Jonathan Kurzfeld

引用次数: 0

Ex ante litigation risk and firm restatement decisions: Evidence from district courts 事前诉讼风险与公司重述决策：来自地方法院的证据

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106198

C.S. Agnes Cheng , Henry He Huang , Zhen Lei , Haitian Lu

引用次数: 0

Unequal unification? Income inequality and unification in nineteenth century Italy and Germany 不平等的统一？十九世纪意大利和德国的收入不平等与统一

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106197

Philipp Erfurth

引用次数: 0