International Review of Law and Economics最新文献_第2页

Corporate control: Persistence and the shifting role of control-enhancing mechanisms in Italian listed firms (1978–2018) 公司控制：意大利上市公司控制增强机制的持久性和角色转换（1978-2018）

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106260

Silvia Rigamonti

引用次数: 0

(Not) Canceling out the cross-section: Mitigating the effect of peremptory challenges on jury selection （不）取消横截面：减轻强制性质疑对陪审团选择的影响

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106259

Francis X. Flanagan

引用次数: 0

Balancing power and performance: The role of managerial rent in competitive advantage 权力与绩效的平衡：管理租金在竞争优势中的作用

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106258

Chandra S. Mishra

引用次数: 0

When do governments attack the judiciary? The explanatory power of political corruption 政府什么时候攻击司法？政治腐败的解释力

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106248

Aylin Aydin-Cakir , Ebru İlter Akarçay

{"title":"When do governments attack the judiciary? The explanatory power of political corruption","authors":"Aylin Aydin-Cakir , Ebru İlter Akarçay","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106248","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106248","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In recent decades, the world has witnessed various examples of elected governments verbally attacking the judiciary, accusing judges of bias, or claiming that court decisions are politically motivated. Despite the prevalence of such court-curbing practices, we know very little about when exactly governments decide to verbally attack the judiciary. Focusing on the effect of political corruption, the objective of this study is to understand 1) whether and, if so, how corruption affects governments’ attacks on the judiciary and 2) whether and, if so, how its effect changes across different political contexts. We argue that in countries with fully or partially independent media, verbal attacks on the judiciary would increase with the level of corruption. However, in regimes where the media is not independent, political corruption would not have a significant effect on attacks on the judiciary. We conduct a time-series cross-sectional analysis across 165 countries (1991–2022) to test our hypotheses. The empirical results support our hypotheses. To better understand the causal mechanisms through which corruption and media independence together trigger governments’ verbal attacks on the judiciary, we compare the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela in the second part of the study.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"82 ","pages":"Article 106248"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143436673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: An axiomatic approach 公共服务经营者的公共成本分配：一种公理方法

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247

David Lowing , Léa Munich , Kevin Techer

{"title":"Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: An axiomatic approach","authors":"David Lowing , Léa Munich , Kevin Techer","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Accurate cost allocation is a challenge for both public service operators and regulatory bodies, given the dual objectives of ensuring essential public service provision and maintaining fair competition. Operators have the obligation to provide essential public services for all individuals, which may incur additional costs. To compensate this, the operators receive state aids, which are determined by an assessment of the net cost associated with these obligations. However, these aids introduce the risk of distorting competition, as operators may employ them to subsidize competitive activities. To avoid this risk, a precise cost allocation method that adequately assess the net cost of these obligations becomes necessary. Such a method must satisfy specific properties that effectively prevent cross-subsidization. In this paper, we propose a method grounded in cooperative game theory that offers a solution for allocating common costs between activities and obligations in public service provision. We adopt a normative approach by introducing a set of desirable axioms that prevent cross-subsidization. We provide two characterizations of our proposed solution on the basis of these axioms. Furthermore, we present an illustration of our method to the allocation of common costs for a public service operator.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 106247"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143221261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Did recreational marijuana legalization increase crime in the long run? 从长远来看，娱乐性大麻合法化会增加犯罪吗？

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106246

Sunyoung Lee

引用次数: 0

Jury priors and observable defendant characteristics 陪审团先验和可观察的被告特征

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106245

Jesse Bull

{"title":"Jury priors and observable defendant characteristics","authors":"Jesse Bull","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106245","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106245","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Although prohibited, jurors sometimes condition, consciously or subconsciously, their belief that a defendant is guilty on the defendant’s race or ethnicity or other observable characteristics. This can be viewed as a juror forming a prior or pre-trial/evidence disclosure belief of guilt. In doing this, they rely on their perceptions of education, socio-economic status, religion, beliefs, networks, etc. for the defendant’s race (or other observable characteristic) and how they perceive those to influence the probability the defendant is guilty. This is consistent with aversive discrimination, which suggests that people want to be egalitarian and not condition on race but have a tendency to base decisions on factors that are discriminatory when race is not salient. When this prior or pre-trial/evidence disclosure belief of guilt overestimates the prior probability of guilt for those in the minority group, it underestimates the prior probability of guilt for those in the majority group. Prohibiting conditioning on observable defendant characteristics can be viewed as requiring the use of the population prior/pre-trial probability of guilt. Conditions for when such prohibition improves accuracy are provided. While it is difficult to effectively prohibit this, studies of aversive discrimination suggest that making race salient in a trial can reduce implicit bias on race. So these results may provide some guidance on when such activity should be permitted.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 106245"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143180526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An inspector calls: On the optimality of warning firms about ongoing inspections in antitrust policy 一名检查员呼吁：在反垄断政策中警告公司正在进行的检查的最优性

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106244

María C. Avramovich

引用次数: 0

Norms as obligations 作为义务的规范

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106235

Leonard Hoeft , Michael Kurschilgen , Wladislaw Mill

引用次数: 0

Case law in European merger control 欧洲兼并控制判例法