{"title":"Competition and the two margins of privacy","authors":"David Bounie , Antoine Dubus , Patrick Waelbroeck","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106262","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106262","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article analyzes the relationship between privacy protection and market competition. We consider a model where firms collect data to price discriminate consumers in a competitive product market, and we distinguish two margins of privacy. Firms strategically choose the number of consumers on whom they collect data – the extensive margin of privacy – as well as the precision of information – the intensive margin of privacy. We show that policymakers can efficiently protect both margins of privacy and consumer surplus by safeguarding the intensive margin. Indeed, when both strategic variables are strategic complements, restricting the amount of information that firms have on each consumer (the intensive margin) also induces firms to collect data on fewer consumers, thereby protecting the extensive margin of privacy. This softens the intensity of competition but also reduces rent extraction by firms, and total consumer surplus increases. When both variables are strategic substitutes, protecting the intensive margin harms privacy at the extensive margin, but still increases consumer surplus.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106262"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143833397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conflict and property law: The hidden costs of takings and of liability rule protection","authors":"Sergio Mittlaender","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106280","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106280","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper presents a novel argument for the law’s preference for property rules over liability rules based on their potential to reduce socially costly forms of retaliation by victims of takings. Property rules are more effective at mitigating conflict and discouraging costly retaliation by victims, thereby increasing social welfare. This hypothesis is tested empirically in a laboratory experiment involving a task that includes a valued possession that can be taken by others. Results reveal that both property and liability rules reduce retaliation, but property rules are more effective—particularly when the taking results in a net gain for the taker, who profits from the transgression. This suggests a hidden social cost in efficient takings under liability rules, providing evidence for the existing preference for property rules in legal systems. This paper contributes to the literature by revealing a significant, yet overlooked, advantage of property rules, rationalizing existing practice, and discussing the implications for the optimal choice of legal protection of entitlements.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106280"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144231450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Has the European Takeover Bids Directive reached its objectives? The cases of Finland, Germany and Spain","authors":"Nuria Alcalde-Fradejas , Inés Pérez-Soba","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106269","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106269","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Inspired in the common law tradition, the European Takeover Bids Directive (TBD) aimed to promote an efficient market for corporate control in Europe by facilitating competition among acquirers in EU economies while protecting the rights of minority shareholders of listed companies. After more than 15 years from its transposition into European national regulations, in this paper we investigate whether the main objectives of the Directive have been achieved in three European countries representing the three legal families included under the Civil law regime: Spain, as a country belonging to the French Civil law tradition, Finland, which belongs to the Nordic law tradition and, finally, Germany as a country representing Germanic Civil law tradition. To perform an in-depth analysis, we did not use a sample of takeovers, but a hand-collected database covering all takeovers launched in Finland and Spain over the period 2000–2019, and in Germany over 2002–2019. The results obtained in our analysis lead us to be sceptical about the clear achievement of the objectives intended by the Directive in the three countries analysed. Although more openness to European bidders seems to have been reached in Spain and Finland, there is no evidence of an increase in intra-European cross border takeovers following the TBD’s transposition in any of the countries analysed. Moreover, the premiums paid to minority shareholders (proxy for their higher protection) have remained unchanged in Germany and have been reduced in Spain and Finland.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143874217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Clearance rates and disposition times: Not the whole story of judicial efficiency","authors":"Miguel Alves Pereira","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106283","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106283","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Judicial efficiency is often measured through clearance rate (CR) and disposition time (DT), yet these traditional metrics fail to capture the complexity of resource utilisation in courts. This study critiques the widespread reliance on CR and DT, arguing that they provide an incomplete and potentially misleading picture of judicial efficiency. Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a non-parametric method designed to measure resource-based efficiency, this research analyses courts across Europe’s three-tier judicial hierarchy. The findings reveal significant shortcomings in CR and DT, including weak or negative correlations with DEA efficiency scores, particularly at the Supreme Court level, where these metrics neglect the intricacies of resource management and case complexity. DEA, by accounting for multiple inputs (e.g., judges, staff, budgets) and outputs (resolved and pending cases), offers a more nuanced framework for measuring efficiency. The analysis highlights inefficiencies hidden behind high CRs and low DTs, suggesting that resource misallocation is a key issue. Furthermore, prioritising efficiency improvements in first-instance courts, where resource bottlenecks are most acute, could generate cascading benefits throughout the judiciary. This study provides empirical evidence for the inadequacy of traditional metrics and advocates for a paradigm shift towards comprehensive tools like DEA to measure judicial efficiency. By moving beyond simplistic case throughput measures, policymakers can design targeted reforms that ensure both the equitable delivery of justice and the sustainable management of judicial resources. The results underscore the urgency of rethinking how justice is measured and understood in modern judicial systems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106283"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144306317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Chinese courts apply the “Hand Formula”: Empirical evidence from cases related to the duty of safety protection","authors":"Haoyi Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106279","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106279","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study analyzes over ten thousand judgments by Chinese courts in cases related to the duty of safety protection, using a sharp regression discontinuity design to examine the causal relationship between the ratio of expected loss to the burden of precaution and the determination of defendant negligence. The findings reveal that the decision-making process, guided by the Hand Formula, explains approximately 20% to 30% of judicial decisions. When focusing specifically on a cost–benefit analysis mindset, this process accounts for approximately 10% to 15% of decisions. These results indicate that the Hand Formula significantly influences judicial practice in China. Moreover, the cost–benefit analysis mindset inherent in the Hand Formula is not only a theoretical pursuit of economic efficiency but also reflects a universal intuitive sense of fairness and justice beyond positive legal norms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106279"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144253910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Notice-and-takedown as dispute resolution: An empirical analysis of GitHub notices","authors":"Pengfei Zhang, Ji Li","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106281","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106281","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The Section 512(c) notice-and-takedown regime is a primary mechanism that enforces online copyright in the U.S. The objective is to enable the disputants to settle on their own, but asymmetric information can lead to claimant abuse and bargaining impasse, as critics of Section 512 have pointed out. This paper studies the dispute resolution aspect of the notice-and-takedown. We evaluate two platform remedies (chance-to-change policy and revise-and-resubmit policy) and the recent trend of professionalization in the context of GitHub. We collect a novel sample of 4,684 takedown notices from GitHub and use it to empirically test the disputants’ settlement behavior. Our estimates show that the chance-to-change policy is associated with a higher settlement rate, whereas the revise-and-resubmit policy has little effect. The results are consistent with a signaling theory between the copyright owner and the infringer. To address the potential selection effects of GitHub, we apply text analysis to quantify and control latent attributes of the notices, including writing styles and informativeness, in addition to more substantive features. We also discuss the role of expert representatives and certain textual characteristics that appear influential in the dispute resolution process.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106281"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144490902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Platform Holdup” and Platform Regulation","authors":"Jinglei Huang , Danxia Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106266","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106266","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The interaction between a platform and its users plays a crucial role in shaping its pricing strategy and overall success. When users incur an initial cost to join the platform and stand to gain utility, the risk of receiving minimal benefits due to aggressive pricing arises. This discourages user participation, leading to launch failures for potential platforms and significant welfare loss in equilibrium, identified as the “platform holdup” issue. Addressing the platform holdup problem can be achieved, in part, by introducing an implicit guarantee through government oversight, providing subsidies to potential users, and granting users dividend rights. The analysis of oligopoly cases shows that, in most instances, market competition alone is not sufficient to fully resolve the problem.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106266"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143838877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The role of the regulatory framework in enhancing SMEs’ digital transformation","authors":"Marianna Succurro , Cristiana Donati","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106263","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106263","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper aims at exploring the current process of SMEs’ digital transformation in order to contribute to effective policy development. We first provide a definition of firms’ digital transformation and then investigate its fundamental determinants, so responding to the call for further research and more comprehensive understandings of the digital transformation process. The objective is to verify the impact of the regulatory environment on digital transformation of SMEs. The empirical analysis, based on data taken from the Flash Eurobarometer Survey of the European Commission, shows that the regulatory framework is strongly significant in explaining firms’ digital transformation. Specifically, SMEs’ awareness of the regulatory context and anticipated digital standards: 1) expedites their process of digital transformation; 2) positively moderates the relationship between any strategic plan and their digital transformation; 3) generates a relatively greater impact on the digital transformation of firms mainly involved in the adoption of more advanced digital technologies. Some policy implications conclude the work.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106263"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143776346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"And the law relaxed the rules – A quasi-experimental study of fatal police shootings in Europe","authors":"Sebastian Roché , Simon Varaine , Paul Le Derff","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106282","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106282","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Can the behavior of civil servants with a large autonomy, the police, be regulated by law? In the case of the use of deadly force, the subject remains understudied in Europe. A 2017 law in France relaxed restrictions and allowed for the first time the national police to use weapons beyond self-defense. This quasi-experimental study examines the impact that this regulatory change, used as an exogenous shock, has had on the number of deaths of occupants of vehicles. The monthly number of killings has significantly increased for the national police (experimental group), who are directly affected by the new regulation, but not other forces unaffected by the regulation such as the French gendarmerie, a military status force (control group 1), and other police forces of two neighboring states (Germany, Belgium, control group 2 and 3). The findings hold after controlling for the variations in level of violence in society, and police exposure to and death in dangerous traffic violations during the study period. When using more conservative specifications, the observed increase in lethal shootings does not reach statistical significance due to a lack of statistical power related to the rarity of police lethal shootings in the European context. We recommend that national regulations governing the use of weapons by police more clearly and unambiguously embed the notions of proportionality and absolute necessity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106282"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144263088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vertical interoperability in mobile ecosystems: Will the DMA deliver (what competition law could not)?","authors":"Giuseppe Colangelo , Alba Ribera Martínez","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106267","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106267","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To address concerns about the competitive dynamics of digital markets, the promotion of interoperability has been often pointed out as a fundamental component of policy reform agendas. In the case of mobile ecosystems, the smooth and seamless availability of interoperability features is crucial as third-party devices and apps would be otherwise unable to effectively work and participate within the ecosystems. However, access to application programming interfaces (APIs) may be restricted due to privacy, security, or technical constraints. Further, an ecosystem orchestrator may misuse its rule-setting role to pursue anticompetitive goals by restricting or degrading interoperability for third-party services and devices. The paper aims at investigating whether and how effective interoperability could be achieved through the enforcement of competition rules or whether it would require regulatory interventions, such as those envisaged in the European Digital Markets Act (DMA).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143759157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}