作为义务的规范

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2024.106235

Leonard Hoeft , Michael Kurschilgen , Wladislaw Mill

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引用次数: 0

摘要

经济学家将遵守法律视为效用最大化的过程，同时将违反规范的后果与其他（货币和非货币）考虑因素进行权衡。而法律哲学家则认为，法律的规范性是核心。公民遵守法律是因为他们有义务这样做。法律规范提供了排除性的理由，阻止了对其他问题的权衡。我们在一个受控在线实验中测试并比较了这两种模式。我们进行了一个改良的独裁者博弈，博弈中的报酬部分未知，但可以确定，并且在不同的处理中，权威性规范的存在和内容会有所不同。我们的实验结果表明，在有规范的情况下，参与者会遵守规范，而不会搜索他们在没有规范的情况下认为重要的信息。这种模式与规范的具体内容无关。我们的结果与遵守规范的法律模型是一致的。

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Norms as obligations

Economists model legal compliance as the process of maximizing utility while weighing the consequences from norm violation against other (monetary and non-monetary) considerations. Legal philosophers, on the other hand, believe that the normative side of law is central. Citizens comply because they have an obligation to do so. Legal norms provide exclusionary reasons that prevent weighing up on other issues. We test and compare both models in a controlled online experiment. We conduct a modified dictator game with partially unknown yet ascertainable payoffs, and vary between treatments the presence and content of authoritative norms. Our experimental results show that – in the presence of a norm – participants follow norms without searching for information that they deem important in the absence of a norm. This pattern is independent of the specific content of the norm. Our results are consistent with the legal model of norm compliance.

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来源期刊

International Review of Law and Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

18.20%

发文量

审稿时长

48 days

期刊介绍： The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.