{"title":"An inspector calls: On the optimality of warning firms about ongoing inspections in antitrust policy","authors":"María C. Avramovich","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106244","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106244","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the effects of disclosing information about the likelihood of an inspection on the sustainability of cartels. To this end, I develop a model in which the Antitrust Authority can credibly disclose this type of information before firms make strategic decisions. In this way, the Antitrust Authority can distort the optimal behavior of the cartel firms related to production and cartel activities between inspection periods and non-inspection periods. I show how this can destabilize some cartel agreements, but it can also create productive inefficiencies not considered in standard models of collusion, to the extent that it induces cartel firms to devote costly resources to cartel activities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 106244"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143180527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Leonard Hoeft , Michael Kurschilgen , Wladislaw Mill
{"title":"Norms as obligations","authors":"Leonard Hoeft , Michael Kurschilgen , Wladislaw Mill","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106235","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106235","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Economists model legal compliance as the process of maximizing utility while weighing the consequences from norm violation against other (monetary and non-monetary) considerations. Legal philosophers, on the other hand, believe that the normative side of law is central. Citizens comply because they have an obligation to do so. Legal norms provide exclusionary reasons that prevent weighing up on other issues. We test and compare both models in a controlled online experiment. We conduct a modified dictator game with partially unknown yet ascertainable payoffs, and vary between treatments the presence and content of authoritative norms. Our experimental results show that – in the presence of a norm – participants follow norms without searching for information that they deem important in the absence of a norm. This pattern is independent of the specific content of the norm. Our results are consistent with the legal model of norm compliance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 106235"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142720569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Case law in European merger control","authors":"Johan Callermo","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106236","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106236","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies references to case law in merger control decisions by the EC Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) in 1990–2022. I use the full set of references to Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgments in DG COMP decisions to examine implementation, industry dynamics and effects of the 2004 merger control reform. New case law is shown to be immediately incorporated into the merger control practice without a learning period, subsequent citations correlate with industry-specific merger activity and the 2004 ECMR reform changed which judgments are frequently cited. European merger control should thus be viewed as a dynamic framework rather than constant in time and across industries. When controlling for quantifiable determinants of case law citations, the <em>ceteris paribus</em> relevance of case law is constant for 20–25 years, implying that judgments do not intrinsically lose relevance over time.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 106236"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142700071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Estimating the effect of concealed carry laws on murder: A response to Bondy, et al.","authors":"Carlisle Moody , John R. Lott","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106234","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106234","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In 2021 we wrote a short paper noting that truncating the sample when estimating the effect of right to carry laws on crime could be biased by comparisons to states that already adopted the law, instead of states without the law. In 2023 Bondy et al. criticized our paper but inaccurately described what we did and provided selective and misleading results. More importantly, they completely missed the point of our analysis, namely that applying two-way fixed effects to a truncated sample, say 1991–2018, biases the resulting RTC coefficient by invalidly comparing newly treated states to 11 previously treated states. The bias is so large that even if the true coefficient on the right-to-carry dummy is negative, the estimated coefficient could be positive. These biased results can be corrected by using new DID estimators, that do not make invalid comparisons, and which are robust to time and state heterogeneity. Using these new estimators, we find that RTC laws do not significantly increase violent crime. We find evidence that RTC laws significantly reduce murder and that constitutional carry laws significantly reduce rape.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142653074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The broken-windows theory of crime: A Bayesian approach","authors":"Thomas J. Miceli, Kathleen Segerson","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106233","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106233","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The broken-windows theory of crime is based on the idea that aggressive enforcement of petty crimes, like misdemeanors, will have a deterring effect on would-be perpetrators of more serious crimes. This paper develops a model of this theory that depends on three factors: (1) potential offenders make decisions about committing crimes based on their beliefs about the probability of apprehension; (2) those beliefs depend on prior observations or knowledge about the rate of petty crimes; and (3) there is a linkage across criminal categories (minor vs. serious crimes) as a component of actual enforcement policy. Our results show that even if these factors are all present, increased enforcement of low-harm crimes does not necessarily lead to fewer high-harm crimes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106233"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142554457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Workload, legal doctrine, and judicial review in an authoritarian regime: A study of expropriation judgments in China","authors":"Chaoqun Zhan , Shitong Qiao","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106232","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106232","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper contributes one of the first systematic studies on how courts adjudicate expropriation disputes both in the absence of judicial independence and in the face of resource constraints, extends the study of judicial workload into an authoritarian context, and demonstrates the complicated and dynamic interactions between apolitical and political aspects of courts in authoritarian regimes. Our results demonstrate that legal doctrine can check the abuse of government power even in situations where it is least expected. Specifically, we examined how Chinese courts, faced with an explosive increase in workload caused by a legal reform in 2015, adjudicated expropriation disputes between the government and property rights holders. Employing a difference-in-differences method, we found that an increased judicial workload improved the chances of property rights holders winning their cases against the government. We discovered that judges’ use of hard-edged legal doctrine—administrative procedures, in particular—to save time constrained judicial discretion, which is prone to arbitrary political influence in authoritarian regimes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106232"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142653075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Illicit enrichment in Germany: An evaluation of the reformed asset recovery regime's ability to confiscate proceeds of crime","authors":"Cornelia Körtl, Imad Chbib","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106230","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106230","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the effectiveness of Germany's reformed asset recovery regime, which was implemented in 2017, in terms of its ability to confiscate proceeds of crime and whether it qualifies as illicit enrichment legislation. The research utilizes Dornbierer's (2021) definition of illicit enrichment to evaluate the reformed asset recovery law and analyses trends in asset recovery by reviewing data on assets seized and confiscated since 2017. Additionally, the study compares the reformed asset recovery regime to its predecessor to determine whether weaknesses that reduced the effectiveness of the previous framework to confiscate PoC have been addressed, while also evaluating the reformed regime for any potential weaknesses that may hinder its ability to confiscate proceeds of crime. The study concludes that while the reformed regime introduces some elements of illicit enrichment, it does not satisfy the criteria for illicit enrichment legislation. Nonetheless, the reformed regime is more effective in confiscating proceeds of crime, as evidenced by the high value of assets seized since the reform was implemented. Additionally, most of the weaknesses that existed in the previous system have been resolved. However, the research highlights the remaining challenges regarding the confiscation of proceeds implicated in ML, fraud, and corruption, as well as profits from non-criminal offenses. Future studies could explore whether the increased confiscation of assets leads to a decrease in profit-driven crime.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106230"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818824000504/pdfft?md5=b1a15c15d6d4520b3ec0e687f248e681&pid=1-s2.0-S0144818824000504-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142272115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the strategic choice of overconfident lawyers","authors":"Tim Friehe , Cat Lam Pham , Simon Xemaire","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106231","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106231","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes how the plaintiff selects her lawyer based on lawyers’ confidence in their trial-effort productivity. The plaintiff’s lawyer works on a contingent fee and makes litigation decisions on the plaintiff’s behalf. When the lawyer’s preferences are decisive at both the settlement and the trial stage, the plaintiff must anticipate that a more confident lawyer evaluates settlement compared to trial differently and implies different equilibrium trial effort levels. When the lawyer implements the plaintiff’s ideal settlement demand, only the influence of the confidence level on trial effort levels is relevant. In both cases, the plaintiff prefers an <em>overconfident</em> lawyer but would be harmed by <em>excessive</em> overconfidence. In many circumstances, the optimal confidence level maximizes the plaintiff’s trial payoff. However, when the lawyer’s preferences are decisive at both the settlement and trial stage, the plaintiff may choose an even more confident lawyer to raise the settlement level her lawyer demands from the defendant.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106231"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818824000516/pdfft?md5=95492fe750bb30a2275d19a70cc39bc7&pid=1-s2.0-S0144818824000516-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142228626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Judiciary-driven finance: Quasi-experimental evidence from specialized financial adjudication institutions in China","authors":"Kangyun Bao , Shenghua Lu","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106227","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106227","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The \"law and finance\" paradigm posits that legal institutions play a crucial role in financial development; however, China has long been considered an exception. This study challenges that assumption by examining how improvements in the judiciary affect financial development in China. Using a quasi-natural experiment (i.e., staggered difference-in-difference estimation) over a twenty-year period, we find that the establishment of specialized financial adjudication institutions (i.e., financial courts and tribunals) in certain prefecture-level cities significantly reduces financing constraints for local listed companies. Further heterogeneity tests show that these effects are more pronounced among private enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and companies in the central and western regions. Through the analysis of representative practices and interviews with relevant judges and enterprises, we find that China's financial judiciary demonstrates efficiency and proactiveness. Additionally, political considerations enable courts to regulate finance and maintain stability, improving the local financial legal environments and reducing transaction costs for market participants. By investigating the causal relationship between judicial reforms and financial development, our findings provide new insights into the \"law and finance\" theory and offer policy implications for addressing financial development gaps and promoting financial inclusion in emerging markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106227"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818824000474/pdfft?md5=d562f1c3697f23a806d039440ec91876&pid=1-s2.0-S0144818824000474-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142163363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mandatory disclosure of open-ended real estate fund shares that are registered for redemption?","authors":"Thomas Kaspereit","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106229","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106229","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Open-ended funds that invest in long-term assets face constant liquidity transformation risk, which can lead to financial instability. German lawmakers have responded to the liquidity crisis of open-ended real estate funds by introducing mandatory minimum holding and notice periods of 24 and 12 months, respectively. Since the new regulations were enacted in July 2013, the management companies of German open-ended real estate funds have received detailed information on the expected cash outflows from share redemptions. This article explores the question of whether the number of shares registered for redemption should be disclosed. A teleological analysis of German fund accounting law and regulation reveals a mismatch between the current nondisclosure and the stated objective to provide decision-useful information. However, a trade-off must be made between investors’ need for information and the risk of self-reinforcing panic effects, which is investigated using agent-based modeling. Parameterizing the model with historical fund data shows that disclosure would increase the probability of a redemption suspension but that such suspensions would occur timelier; thus, fewer investors would be trapped in a fund that has to suspend the redemption of shares. In addition, such disclosure would shift not only risk from uninformed, life-cycle, saving investors to sophisticated investors but also investment returns from sophisticated investors to saving investors. Such disclosure would thus constitute the opposite of what Georgakopoulos (1996, 2017) calls a disclosure subsidy for informed traders, i.e., a disclosure subsidy for uninformed investors that is borne by informed investors. However, the model in this article is distinguishable from the one outlined in Georgakopoulos (1996, 2017) because it does not model noise traders. The framework provided in this article is also relevant to the legislature in the United Kingdom and its recently created fund category of long-term asset funds.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142426323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}