International Review of Law and Economics最新文献_第5页

Case law in European merger control 欧洲兼并控制判例法

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106236

Johan Callermo

引用次数: 0

Jury priors and observable defendant characteristics 陪审团先验和可观察的被告特征

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106245

Jesse Bull

{"title":"Jury priors and observable defendant characteristics","authors":"Jesse Bull","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106245","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106245","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Although prohibited, jurors sometimes condition, consciously or subconsciously, their belief that a defendant is guilty on the defendant’s race or ethnicity or other observable characteristics. This can be viewed as a juror forming a prior or pre-trial/evidence disclosure belief of guilt. In doing this, they rely on their perceptions of education, socio-economic status, religion, beliefs, networks, etc. for the defendant’s race (or other observable characteristic) and how they perceive those to influence the probability the defendant is guilty. This is consistent with aversive discrimination, which suggests that people want to be egalitarian and not condition on race but have a tendency to base decisions on factors that are discriminatory when race is not salient. When this prior or pre-trial/evidence disclosure belief of guilt overestimates the prior probability of guilt for those in the minority group, it underestimates the prior probability of guilt for those in the majority group. Prohibiting conditioning on observable defendant characteristics can be viewed as requiring the use of the population prior/pre-trial probability of guilt. Conditions for when such prohibition improves accuracy are provided. While it is difficult to effectively prohibit this, studies of aversive discrimination suggest that making race salient in a trial can reduce implicit bias on race. So these results may provide some guidance on when such activity should be permitted.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 106245"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143180526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An inspector calls: On the optimality of warning firms about ongoing inspections in antitrust policy 一名检查员呼吁：在反垄断政策中警告公司正在进行的检查的最优性

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-12-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106244

María C. Avramovich

引用次数: 0

Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: An axiomatic approach 公共服务经营者的公共成本分配：一种公理方法

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247

David Lowing , Léa Munich , Kevin Techer

{"title":"Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: An axiomatic approach","authors":"David Lowing , Léa Munich , Kevin Techer","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Accurate cost allocation is a challenge for both public service operators and regulatory bodies, given the dual objectives of ensuring essential public service provision and maintaining fair competition. Operators have the obligation to provide essential public services for all individuals, which may incur additional costs. To compensate this, the operators receive state aids, which are determined by an assessment of the net cost associated with these obligations. However, these aids introduce the risk of distorting competition, as operators may employ them to subsidize competitive activities. To avoid this risk, a precise cost allocation method that adequately assess the net cost of these obligations becomes necessary. Such a method must satisfy specific properties that effectively prevent cross-subsidization. In this paper, we propose a method grounded in cooperative game theory that offers a solution for allocating common costs between activities and obligations in public service provision. We adopt a normative approach by introducing a set of desirable axioms that prevent cross-subsidization. We provide two characterizations of our proposed solution on the basis of these axioms. Furthermore, we present an illustration of our method to the allocation of common costs for a public service operator.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 106247"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143221261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Norms as obligations 作为义务的规范

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106235

Leonard Hoeft , Michael Kurschilgen , Wladislaw Mill

引用次数: 0

ESG disclosure, investor awareness, and carbon risk pricing: Evidence from the Chinese market ESG信息披露、投资者意识和碳风险定价：来自中国市场的证据

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106217

Sirui Han , Haitian Lu , Hao Wu

{"title":"ESG disclosure, investor awareness, and carbon risk pricing: Evidence from the Chinese market","authors":"Sirui Han , Haitian Lu , Hao Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106217","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106217","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article examines the relationship between carbon disclosure, equity returns, and investor awareness in the Chinese A-share market. The study uses firm-disclosed and proprietary vendor-estimated carbon emissions data for A-share listed companies and investigates whether the presentation of carbon risks affects the cross-sectional equity returns of Chinese domestically listed firms. The results indicate that main-board listed companies with higher unscaled carbon emissions tend to earn higher equity returns, even after controlling for factors such as size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, and firm characteristics. Moreover, the observed carbon risk premium associated with carbon-emitting companies decreases as investor awareness improves following the launch of policy agendas promoting carbon neutrality in China. These findings support the research hypothesis that investors seek higher returns for equity investments in carbon-emission-intensive companies to compensate for the higher carbon risks associated with such firms. The study also highlights the importance of carbon disclosure, as companies generally disclose their ESG information when they have improved performance in reducing their carbon emissions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106217"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141853770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The broken-windows theory of crime: A Bayesian approach 破窗犯罪理论：贝叶斯方法

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106233

Thomas J. Miceli, Kathleen Segerson

引用次数: 0

Estimating the effect of concealed carry laws on murder: A response to Bondy, et al. 估计隐蔽携带枪支法对谋杀案的影响：对邦迪等人的回应

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106234

Carlisle Moody , John R. Lott

{"title":"Estimating the effect of concealed carry laws on murder: A response to Bondy, et al.","authors":"Carlisle Moody , John R. Lott","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106234","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106234","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In 2021 we wrote a short paper noting that truncating the sample when estimating the effect of right to carry laws on crime could be biased by comparisons to states that already adopted the law, instead of states without the law. In 2023 Bondy et al. criticized our paper but inaccurately described what we did and provided selective and misleading results. More importantly, they completely missed the point of our analysis, namely that applying two-way fixed effects to a truncated sample, say 1991–2018, biases the resulting RTC coefficient by invalidly comparing newly treated states to 11 previously treated states. The bias is so large that even if the true coefficient on the right-to-carry dummy is negative, the estimated coefficient could be positive. These biased results can be corrected by using new DID estimators, that do not make invalid comparisons, and which are robust to time and state heterogeneity. Using these new estimators, we find that RTC laws do not significantly increase violent crime. We find evidence that RTC laws significantly reduce murder and that constitutional carry laws significantly reduce rape.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142653074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Predicting patent lawsuits with machine learning 用机器学习预测专利诉讼

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-09-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106228

Steffen Juranek , Håkon Otneim

引用次数: 0

On the strategic choice of overconfident lawyers 关于过于自信的律师的战略选择

IF 0.9 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-09-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106231

Tim Friehe , Cat Lam Pham , Simon Xemaire

{"title":"On the strategic choice of overconfident lawyers","authors":"Tim Friehe , Cat Lam Pham , Simon Xemaire","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106231","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106231","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes how the plaintiff selects her lawyer based on lawyers’ confidence in their trial-effort productivity. The plaintiff’s lawyer works on a contingent fee and makes litigation decisions on the plaintiff’s behalf. When the lawyer’s preferences are decisive at both the settlement and the trial stage, the plaintiff must anticipate that a more confident lawyer evaluates settlement compared to trial differently and implies different equilibrium trial effort levels. When the lawyer implements the plaintiff’s ideal settlement demand, only the influence of the confidence level on trial effort levels is relevant. In both cases, the plaintiff prefers an <em>overconfident</em> lawyer but would be harmed by <em>excessive</em> overconfidence. In many circumstances, the optimal confidence level maximizes the plaintiff’s trial payoff. However, when the lawyer’s preferences are decisive at both the settlement and trial stage, the plaintiff may choose an even more confident lawyer to raise the settlement level her lawyer demands from the defendant.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 106231"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818824000516/pdfft?md5=95492fe750bb30a2275d19a70cc39bc7&pid=1-s2.0-S0144818824000516-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142228626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0