“平台堵塞”和平台监管

IF 0.9 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Jinglei Huang , Danxia Xie
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引用次数: 0

摘要

平台与用户之间的互动对其定价策略和整体成功起着至关重要的作用。当用户为加入平台并获得效用而产生初始成本时,由于激进的定价而获得最小收益的风险就会出现。这阻碍了用户的参与,导致潜在平台的启动失败和平衡中的重大福利损失,即“平台阻塞”问题。解决平台堵塞问题的部分方法是,通过政府监管引入隐性担保,向潜在用户提供补贴,并授予用户分红权。对寡头垄断案例的分析表明,在大多数情况下,仅靠市场竞争不足以完全解决问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
“Platform Holdup” and Platform Regulation
The interaction between a platform and its users plays a crucial role in shaping its pricing strategy and overall success. When users incur an initial cost to join the platform and stand to gain utility, the risk of receiving minimal benefits due to aggressive pricing arises. This discourages user participation, leading to launch failures for potential platforms and significant welfare loss in equilibrium, identified as the “platform holdup” issue. Addressing the platform holdup problem can be achieved, in part, by introducing an implicit guarantee through government oversight, providing subsidies to potential users, and granting users dividend rights. The analysis of oligopoly cases shows that, in most instances, market competition alone is not sufficient to fully resolve the problem.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
18.20%
发文量
38
审稿时长
48 days
期刊介绍: The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.
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