{"title":"“平台堵塞”和平台监管","authors":"Jinglei Huang , Danxia Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106266","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The interaction between a platform and its users plays a crucial role in shaping its pricing strategy and overall success. When users incur an initial cost to join the platform and stand to gain utility, the risk of receiving minimal benefits due to aggressive pricing arises. This discourages user participation, leading to launch failures for potential platforms and significant welfare loss in equilibrium, identified as the “platform holdup” issue. Addressing the platform holdup problem can be achieved, in part, by introducing an implicit guarantee through government oversight, providing subsidies to potential users, and granting users dividend rights. The analysis of oligopoly cases shows that, in most instances, market competition alone is not sufficient to fully resolve the problem.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 106266"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"“Platform Holdup” and Platform Regulation\",\"authors\":\"Jinglei Huang , Danxia Xie\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106266\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>The interaction between a platform and its users plays a crucial role in shaping its pricing strategy and overall success. When users incur an initial cost to join the platform and stand to gain utility, the risk of receiving minimal benefits due to aggressive pricing arises. This discourages user participation, leading to launch failures for potential platforms and significant welfare loss in equilibrium, identified as the “platform holdup” issue. Addressing the platform holdup problem can be achieved, in part, by introducing an implicit guarantee through government oversight, providing subsidies to potential users, and granting users dividend rights. The analysis of oligopoly cases shows that, in most instances, market competition alone is not sufficient to fully resolve the problem.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47202,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Review of Law and Economics\",\"volume\":\"83 \",\"pages\":\"Article 106266\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-04-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Review of Law and Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818825000225\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Law and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818825000225","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The interaction between a platform and its users plays a crucial role in shaping its pricing strategy and overall success. When users incur an initial cost to join the platform and stand to gain utility, the risk of receiving minimal benefits due to aggressive pricing arises. This discourages user participation, leading to launch failures for potential platforms and significant welfare loss in equilibrium, identified as the “platform holdup” issue. Addressing the platform holdup problem can be achieved, in part, by introducing an implicit guarantee through government oversight, providing subsidies to potential users, and granting users dividend rights. The analysis of oligopoly cases shows that, in most instances, market competition alone is not sufficient to fully resolve the problem.
期刊介绍:
The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.