International Review of Law and Economics最新文献_第7页

Non-compliance of the European Court of Human Rights decisions: A machine learning analysis 不遵守欧洲人权法院判决:机器学习分析

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106167

Engin Yıldırım , Mehmet Fatih Sert , Burcu Kartal , Şuayyip Çalış

{"title":"Non-compliance of the European Court of Human Rights decisions: A machine learning analysis","authors":"Engin Yıldırım , Mehmet Fatih Sert , Burcu Kartal , Şuayyip Çalış","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106167","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The paper investigates all (971) non-executed pending leading cases of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between 2012 and 2020 through Machine Learning (ML) techniques. Drawing on the extant scholarship, our interest on compliance has centred on state level and case level variables. For the identification of important variables, four databases have been used. Each country party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) received 232 distinct factors for eight years. Since we aim to make a parameter estimation for a high-dimensional data set, Simulated Annealing (SA) is employed as feature selection method. In the state level analysis, Support Vector Regression (SVR) model has been applied yielding the coefficients of the variables, which have been found to be important in spelling out non-compliance with the ECtHR decisions. For the case level analysis, different cluster techniques have been utilized and the countries have been grouped into four different clusters. We have found that the states that have relatively high levels of equality before the law, protection of individual liberties, social class equality with regard to enjoying civil liberties, access to justice and free and autonomous election management arrangements, are less susceptible to non-compliance of the decisions of the ECtHR. For the case level analysis, type of violated rights, the existence of dissent in the decision and dissenting votes of national judges for their appointing states affect the compliance behaviour of the states. In addition, a notable result of the research is that if a national judge casts a dissenting vote against the violation judgment of the ECtHR involving the state that appointed him/her, the judgment is likely not to be executed by the respondent state.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 106167"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49750962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Dynamics in environmental legislation 环境立法的动态

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106170

Nicolae Stef , Arvind Ashta

引用次数: 0

Ask more, awarded more: Evidence from Taiwan’s courts 问得多，判得多:来自台湾法院的证据

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106171

Yun-chien Chang , Kong-Pin Chen , Jen-Che Liao , Chang-Ching Lin

引用次数: 0

Liability and the incentive to improve information about risk when injurers may be judgment-proof 责任和激励，以改善有关风险的信息，当伤害可能是判断证明

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106168

Till Requate , Tim Friehe , Aditi Sengupta

引用次数: 0

Competing with Leviathan: Law and government ownership in China’s public-private partnership market 与利维坦竞争:中国公私合作市场中的法律与政府所有权

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106166

James Si Zeng

{"title":"Competing with Leviathan: Law and government ownership in China’s public-private partnership market","authors":"James Si Zeng","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106166","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Despite years of economic reform, government-owned enterprises (GOEs) continue to be prevalent in certain sectors of China’s economy. Drawing on empirical evidence from China’s public-private partnership (PPP) market, this article empirically tests whether the theory of the ownership of enterprise can explain the distribution of GOEs in China. It first conducts an empirical study on the disclosed judgments of Chinese courts to show that the enforcement of PPP contracts remains relatively weak in China, which gives rise to the concern of government opportunism. It then presents empirical evidence that the level of government ownership in each project correlates with the chances of government opportunism, which can be measured by project duration, project sector, and renegotiation terms in the contract. These findings show that the level of government ownership is affected by two competing forces—ownership costs and transaction costs. While GOEs incur relatively high ownership costs, they generally incur lower transaction costs because they can curb government opportunism and thus can outcompete private firms in some projects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 106166"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49750990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Motivations for the restructuring of China’s patent court system 中国专利法院制度重构的动因

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106165

Jun Wang

{"title":"Motivations for the restructuring of China’s patent court system","authors":"Jun Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106165","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Is the evolution of China’s patent litigation courts from a scattered expansion to a shrinking concentration spontaneous or is it a rational construction? Understanding the motivation for the adjustment of China’s patent court system is important for judging whether the system change is appropriate and for choosing the optimal patent litigation system. After addressing the endogeneity between the number of patents and the adjustment of the patent court system using patent incentives as an </span>instrumental variable for the number of patents, responding to the need to protect the growing number of patents appears to be the underlying reason for the expansion of the number of patent courts in China until 2014. The number of patents directly contributed to the growth of the number of patent courts as patent cases proliferated. The downsizing of the patent court after 2014 was, in contrast, a targeted reform initiative in response to the decline in the quality of cases heard due to the increase in the number of patent courts. The adjustment of China’s patent court system thus appears to be the result of rational constructions in response to a changing reality.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 106165"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49751661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Market for artificial intelligence in health care and compensation for medical errors 医疗保健中的人工智能市场和医疗失误补偿

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106153

Bertrand Chopard, Olivier Musy

{"title":"Market for artificial intelligence in health care and compensation for medical errors","authors":"Bertrand Chopard, Olivier Musy","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2023.106153","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the market for AI systems that are used to help to diagnose and treat diseases, reducing the risk of medical error. Based on a two-firm vertical product differentiation model, we examine how, in the event of patient harm, the amount of the compensation payment, and the division of this compensation between physicians and AI system producers affects both price competition between firms, and the accuracy (quality) of AI systems. One producer sells products with the best-available accuracy. The other sells a system with strictly lower accuracy at a lower price. Specifically, we show that both producers enjoy a positive market share, so long as some patients are diagnosed by physicians who do not use an AI system. Any transfer in compensation payment from the physician to the AI producer in the case of a diagnostic error will be passed on in full to the physician via the price of the AI system. The quality of the AI diagnosis system is independent of how any compensation payment to the patient is divided between physicians and producers. However, the magnitude of the compensation payment matters. An increase in compensation increases demand for both AI systems. In addition, the higher the compensation paid to the harmed patient, the higher the quality of the low-quality AI system. As the other firm continues to offer the highest accuracy level, any increase in compensation will decrease vertical differentiation, thereby increasing price competition between firms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 106153"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49764924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Variability in punishment, risk preferences and crime deterrence 惩罚、风险偏好和犯罪威慑的可变性

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106140

Mario Menegatti

引用次数: 1

Recourse restrictions and judicial foreclosures: Effects of mortgage law on loan price and collateralization 追索权限制和司法止赎：抵押贷款法对贷款价格和抵押的影响

IF 1.1 3区社会学

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106142

Ana Isabel Sá

引用次数: 0

When more isn’t always better: The ambiguity of fully transparent judicial action and unrestricted publication rules 当更多并不总是更好时：完全透明的司法行动和不受限制的出版规则的模糊性