透明度是福是祸？问责制与敲诈性腐败之间的赛马实验

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-29 DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2024.106189

Christoph Engel , Eyal Zamir

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引用次数: 0

摘要

如果向公民披露是哪位公职人员处理了她的案件，这就形成了问责制。如果官员滥用职权，公民可以向上级部门举报，上级部门可以进行干预。但透明度也使公民有可能向官员施压，使其做出对自己有利的决定。我们将这种互动关系建模为一个连续博弈，并定义了哪种行为效应需要在哪种效应中占主导地位。我们对博弈进行了实验测试。在我们的实验参数范围内，透明度明显优于匿名性。如果滥用主权有可能不受控制，那么总的来说，偶尔对尽职官员的报复造成的社会成本较小。

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Is transparency a blessing or a curse? An experimental horse race between accountability and extortionary corruption

If it is disclosed to a citizen which public official handles her case, this creates accountability. If the official abuses her authority, the citizen can report this misconduct to higher authority, which can intervene. But transparency also makes it possible for a citizen to pressure an official to decide in her favor. We model this interaction as a sequential game, and define which behavioral effects are required for either effect to dominate. We test the game experimentally. Within the parameters of our experiment, transparency clearly trumps anonymity. If the abuse of sovereign authority risks going unchecked, the occasional retaliation against dutiful officials is, on balance, the smaller social cost.

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来源期刊

International Review of Law and Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

18.20%

发文量

审稿时长

48 days

期刊介绍： The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.