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Classic Hedonism Reconsidered 经典享乐主义再思考
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000086
Vivian Feldblyum
{"title":"Classic Hedonism Reconsidered","authors":"Vivian Feldblyum","doi":"10.1017/s0953820824000086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820824000086","url":null,"abstract":"Few views have seen a more precipitous fall from grace than hedonism, which once occupied a central position in the history of ethics. Recently, there have been efforts to revive interest in the view, including well-motivated pleas for contemporary ethicists to at least take the view seriously. In this article, I argue for the seriousness of hedonism on metaethical grounds. Taking J.S. Mill's argument for hedonism as a test case, I show that historically, classic hedonism was grounded metaethically via a commitment to two positions: empiricist epistemology and the view that pleasure occurs in sensation. Together, these two positions provided principled grounds for various iterations of classic hedonism. Moreover, these two positions are still serious options in both contemporary epistemology and the contemporary literature on the nature of pleasure. Insofar as a contemporary ethicist takes those two views seriously, they ought to take classic hedonism seriously as well.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142190638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Partial Aggregation for Prioritarians 优先者的部分聚合
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000074
Makan Nojoumian
{"title":"Partial Aggregation for Prioritarians","authors":"Makan Nojoumian","doi":"10.1017/s0953820824000074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820824000074","url":null,"abstract":"Prioritarianism is a family of views comparing distributions of well-being. What unites prioritarians is the thought that when deciding whether a distribution is overall better than another, the worse off have priority. There are different ways of making this idea more precise. However, some of these views have extreme aggregative implications and others have extreme anti-aggregative implications. This raises the question: can prioritarians accommodate partial aggregation (aggregating in some but not all cases) and avoid both extremes? In this paper, I explore and focus on a neglected anti-aggregation condition. I identify a family of views I call ‘bounded prioritarianism’ that meet this condition by placing an upper bound on the moral significance of benefits. I argue that anyone sympathetic to partial aggregation ought to opt for a version of bounded prioritarianism.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142190639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Posthumous Harm and Changing Desires 遗害与欲望的变化
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000062
Andrea S. Asker
{"title":"Posthumous Harm and Changing Desires","authors":"Andrea S. Asker","doi":"10.1017/s0953820824000062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820824000062","url":null,"abstract":"The desire-satisfactionist defense of the existence of posthumous harm faces the problem of changing desires. The problem is that, in some cases where desires change before the time of their objects, the principle underlying the desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm yields implausible results. In his prominent desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm, David Boonin proposes a solution to this problem. First, I argue that there are two relevantly different versions of the problem of changing desires, and that Boonin's proposed solution addresses only one of them. Second, I argue that modifying the underlying principle is a better approach to overcoming the problem of changing desires since it addresses both versions of the problem. I defend this approach against objections by showing that the problems raised are problems for the principle as a general theory of harm, not for the principle as part of the desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"202 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140827888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does the Patterned View Avoid the Ideal Worlds Objection? 模式化观点是否避免了理想世界异议？
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2024-04-26 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000037
Benedict Rumbold
{"title":"Does the Patterned View Avoid the Ideal Worlds Objection?","authors":"Benedict Rumbold","doi":"10.1017/s0953820824000037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820824000037","url":null,"abstract":"Can we formulate a moral theory that captures the moral significance of patterns of group behaviour we cannot affect through our own action while at the same time avoiding the so-called ‘Ideal Worlds’ objection? In a recent article, Caleb Perl has argued that we can. Specifically, Perl claims that one view that does so is his Patterned View: roughly, you ought to act only in accordance with that set of sufficiently general rules that has optimal moral value (Perl 2021: 98). The Patterned View undoubtedly constitutes a welcome contribution to our existing set of moral theories. However, does it avoid the Ideal Worlds objection? In this article, I argue ‘no’.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140800485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intergenerational Justice and Freedom from Deprivation 代际公正与免于匮乏
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2024-04-12 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000049
Dick Timmer
{"title":"Intergenerational Justice and Freedom from Deprivation","authors":"Dick Timmer","doi":"10.1017/s0953820824000049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820824000049","url":null,"abstract":"Almost everyone believes that freedom from deprivation should have significant weight in specifying what justice between generations requires. Some theorists hold that it should always trump other distributive concerns. Other theorists hold that it should have some but not lexical priority. I argue instead that freedom from deprivation should have lexical priority in some cases, yet weighted priority in others. More specifically, I defend semi-strong sufficientarianism. This view posits a deprivation threshold at which people are free from deprivation, and an affluence threshold at which people can live an affluent life, even though their lives may be even further improved beyond that point. I argue that freedom from deprivation in one generation lexically outweighs providing affluence in another generation; in all other cases, freedom from deprivation does not have lexical priority.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140594564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lives, Limbs, and Liver Spots: The Threshold Approach to Limited Aggregation 生命、肢体和肝斑：有限聚集的阈值法
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2024-03-18 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000013
S. Matthew Liao, James Edgar Lim
{"title":"Lives, Limbs, and Liver Spots: The Threshold Approach to Limited Aggregation","authors":"S. Matthew Liao, James Edgar Lim","doi":"10.1017/s0953820824000013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820824000013","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Limited Aggregation is the view that when there are competing moral claims that demand our attention, we should sometimes satisfy the largest aggregate of claims, depending on the strength of the claims in question. In recent years, philosophers such as Patrick Tomlin and Alastair Norcross have argued that Limited Aggregation violates a number of rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency. Current versions of Limited Aggregation are what may be called Comparative Approaches because they involve assessing the relative strengths of various claims. In this paper, we offer a non-comparative version of Limited Aggregation, what we call the Threshold Approach. It states that there is a non-relative threshold that separates various claims. We demonstrate that the Threshold Approach does not violate rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency, and we show that potential concerns regarding such a view are surmountable.</p>","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140149342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robin Attfield, Applied Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2023), pp. vi + 218. Robin Attfield, Applied Ethics：导论》（剑桥，政治出版社，2023 年），第 vi + 218 页。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2024-01-04 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000304
Workineh Kelbessa
{"title":"Robin Attfield, Applied Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2023), pp. vi + 218.","authors":"Workineh Kelbessa","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000304","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"39 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139385035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Good and the Wrong of Hypocritical Blaming 虚伪指责的好与坏
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000274
Kartik Upadhyaya
{"title":"The Good and the Wrong of Hypocritical Blaming","authors":"Kartik Upadhyaya","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000274","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Provided we blame others accurately, is blaming them morally right even if we are guilty of similar wrongdoing ourselves? On the one hand, hypocrisy seems to render blame morally wrong, and unjustified; but on the other, even hypocritical blaming seems better than silence. I develop an account of the wrongness of hypocritical blaming which resolves this apparent dilemma. When holding others accountable for their moral failings, we ought to be willing to reason, together with them, about our own, similar failings. Hypocrisy undermines this process of <span>mutual deliberation</span>. Thus, even if better than silence, hypocritical blaming is second-best, and that is why it is wrong.</p>","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138824026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reciprocity, Inequality, and Unsuccessful Rescues 互惠、不平等和不成功的救援
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000298
Romy Eskens
{"title":"Reciprocity, Inequality, and Unsuccessful Rescues","authors":"Romy Eskens","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000298","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Forced choices between rescuing imperilled persons are subject to a presumption of equality. Unless we can point to a morally relevant difference between these persons' imperilments, each should get an equal chance of rescue. Sometimes, this presumption is overturned. For example, when one imperilled person has wrongfully caused the forced choice, most think that <span>this</span> person (rather than an innocent person) should bear the harm. The converse scenario, in which a forced choice resulted from the supererogatory action of one of the imperilled people, has received little attention in distributive ethics. I argue that, sometimes, we need not offer equal chances in these cases either. When the supererogatory act places the initially imperilled person under a reciprocal duty to bear risks for the supererogatory agent's sake in the forced choice, we may fulfil this duty for them if they are unable to do it themselves, by favouring the supererogatory agent.</p>","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138824034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intersubstrate Welfare Comparisons: Important, Difficult, and Potentially Tractable 基质间福利比较:重要、困难和潜在的可处理性
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-11-22 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000286
Bob Fischer, Jeff Sebo
{"title":"Intersubstrate Welfare Comparisons: Important, Difficult, and Potentially Tractable","authors":"Bob Fischer, Jeff Sebo","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000286","url":null,"abstract":"In the future, when we compare the welfare of a being of one substrate (say, a human) with the welfare of another (say, an artificial intelligence system), we will be making an intersubstrate welfare comparison. In this paper, we argue that intersubstrate welfare comparisons are important, difficult, and potentially tractable. The world might soon contain a vast number of sentient or otherwise significant beings of different substrates, and moral agents will need to be able to compare their welfare levels. However, this work will be difficult, because we lack the same kinds of commonalities across substrates that we have within them. Fortunately, we might be able to make at least some intersubstrate welfare comparisons responsibly in spite of these issues. We make the case for cautious optimism and call for more research.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138534300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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