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Utilitas最新文献

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Reciprocity, Inequality, and Unsuccessful Rescues 互惠、不平等和不成功的救援
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000298
Romy Eskens
{"title":"Reciprocity, Inequality, and Unsuccessful Rescues","authors":"Romy Eskens","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000298","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Forced choices between rescuing imperilled persons are subject to a presumption of equality. Unless we can point to a morally relevant difference between these persons' imperilments, each should get an equal chance of rescue. Sometimes, this presumption is overturned. For example, when one imperilled person has wrongfully caused the forced choice, most think that <span>this</span> person (rather than an innocent person) should bear the harm. The converse scenario, in which a forced choice resulted from the supererogatory action of one of the imperilled people, has received little attention in distributive ethics. I argue that, sometimes, we need not offer equal chances in these cases either. When the supererogatory act places the initially imperilled person under a reciprocal duty to bear risks for the supererogatory agent's sake in the forced choice, we may fulfil this duty for them if they are unable to do it themselves, by favouring the supererogatory agent.</p>","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138824034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intersubstrate Welfare Comparisons: Important, Difficult, and Potentially Tractable 基质间福利比较:重要、困难和潜在的可处理性
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-11-22 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000286
Bob Fischer, Jeff Sebo
{"title":"Intersubstrate Welfare Comparisons: Important, Difficult, and Potentially Tractable","authors":"Bob Fischer, Jeff Sebo","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000286","url":null,"abstract":"In the future, when we compare the welfare of a being of one substrate (say, a human) with the welfare of another (say, an artificial intelligence system), we will be making an intersubstrate welfare comparison. In this paper, we argue that intersubstrate welfare comparisons are important, difficult, and potentially tractable. The world might soon contain a vast number of sentient or otherwise significant beings of different substrates, and moral agents will need to be able to compare their welfare levels. However, this work will be difficult, because we lack the same kinds of commonalities across substrates that we have within them. Fortunately, we might be able to make at least some intersubstrate welfare comparisons responsibly in spite of these issues. We make the case for cautious optimism and call for more research.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138534300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Less Bad Theory of the Procreation Asymmetry and the Non-Identity Problem 生育不对称与非同一性问题的一个不太坏的理论
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000250
Jonas H. Aaron
{"title":"A Less Bad Theory of the Procreation Asymmetry and the Non-Identity Problem","authors":"Jonas H. Aaron","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000250","url":null,"abstract":"This paper offers a unified explanation for the procreation asymmetry and the non-identity thesis – two of the most intractable puzzles in population ethics. According to the procreation asymmetry, there are moral reasons not to create lives that are not worth living but no moral reasons to create lives that are worth living. I explain the procreation asymmetry by arguing that there are moral reasons to prevent the bad, but no moral reasons to promote the good. Various explanations for the procreation asymmetry have failed to explain the non-identity thesis: if one could create a person with a good life or a different person with a better life, one has a moral reason to create the better life. I argue that reflections on the misfortune of unfulfilled potential allow us to circumvent the non-identity problem.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138543343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Must We Always Pursue Economic Growth? 我们必须始终追求经济增长吗?
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-11-15 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000262
Jeffrey Carroll
{"title":"Must We Always Pursue Economic Growth?","authors":"Jeffrey Carroll","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000262","url":null,"abstract":"Must we always pursue economic growth? Kogelmann answers yes. Not only should poor countries pursue growth, but rich countries should as well. Kogelmann aims to provide a <jats:italic>wealth-insensitive argument</jats:italic> – one demonstrating all countries should pursue growth regardless of their wealth. His central argument – the no halting growth (NHG) argument – says no country experiencing growth should stop it, because doing so requires undermining the conditions causing it and those conditions are independently morally desirable, so they should not be undermined. For countries not growing, he may argue that they have an obligation to implement the conditions that cause growth because they are independently morally desirable. Call this the implementation argument. I contend that neither argument is wealth-insensitive as each fails to establish an obligation to pursue growth. I attempt to diagnose how this could be and propose that it is a product of attempting to answer three questions about growth simultaneously.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138534297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fit and Well-Being 健康和幸福
2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-10-26 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000237
Teresa Bruno-Niño
{"title":"Fit and Well-Being","authors":"Teresa Bruno-Niño","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000237","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I argue for Fit, a prudential version of the claim that attitudes must fit their objects, the claim that there is an extra benefit when one's reactions fit their objects. I argue that Fit has surprising and powerful consequences for theories of well-being. Classic versions of the objective list theory, hedonism, desire views, and loving-the-good theories do not accommodate Fit. Suitable modifications change some of the views substantially. Modified views give reactions a robust role as sources of well-being, and they accept that objects call for some attitudes but not others. I argue that objective list theories and loving-the-good theories require the most minimal changes to accommodate Fit, so we have a pro tanto reason to favor these views over alternatives.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134908068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
For the Greater Individual and Social Good: Justifying Age-Differentiated Paternalism 为了更大的个人和社会利益:为年龄差异的家长作风辩护
2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000249
Viki Møller Lyngby Pedersen
{"title":"For the Greater Individual and Social Good: Justifying Age-Differentiated Paternalism","authors":"Viki Møller Lyngby Pedersen","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000249","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What justifies differences in the acceptance of paternalism towards competent minors and older people? I propose two arguments. The first argument draws on the widely accepted view that paternalism is easier to justify the more good it promotes for the paternalizee. It argues that paternalism targeting young people generally promotes more good for the people interfered with than similar paternalism targeting older people. While promoting people's interests or well-being is essential to the justification of paternalism, the first argument has certain unfair implications in that it disfavours paternalism towards the worse off. The second argument caters to such fairness concerns. It argues that priority or inequality aversion supports age-differentiated paternalism because young people, who act imprudently and thereby risk their interests or well-being, are worse off than older people who act in similar ways. I suggest that both arguments are pertinent in evaluating specific paternalistic acts and policies.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135216233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Egyptians, Aliens, and Okies: Against the Sum of Averages 埃及人、外星人和俄克拉荷马人:反对平均值的总和
2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-09-29 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000225
Christian Tarsney, Michael Geruso, Dean Spears
{"title":"Egyptians, Aliens, and Okies: Against the Sum of Averages","authors":"Christian Tarsney, Michael Geruso, Dean Spears","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000225","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Grill (2023) defends the sum of averages view (SAV), on which the value of a population is found by summing the average welfare of each generation or birth cohort. A major advantage of SAV, according to Grill, is that it escapes the Egyptology objection to average utilitarianism. But, we argue, SAV escapes only the most literal understanding of this objection, since it still allows the value of adding a life to depend on facts about other, intuitively irrelevant lives. Moreover, SAV has a decisive drawback not shared with either average or total utilitarianism: it can evaluate an outcome in which every individual is worse off as better overall, even when exactly the same people exist in both outcomes. These problems, we argue, afflict not only Grill's view but any view that uses a sum of subpopulation averages, apart from the limiting cases of average and total utilitarianism.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135199393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
John Peter DiIulio, Completely Free: The Moral and Political Vision of John Stuart Mill (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022), pp. xiii + 305. 约翰·彼得·迪留里奥，《完全自由:约翰·斯图亚特·密尔的道德与政治视野》(普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社，2022年)，第xiii + 305页。
2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-09-11 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000213
Chad Van Schoelandt
{"title":"John Peter DiIulio, <i>Completely Free: The Moral and Political Vision of John Stuart Mill</i> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022), pp. xiii + 305.","authors":"Chad Van Schoelandt","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000213","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135938656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In Defence of Pigou–Dalton for Chances 为庇古-道尔顿辩护
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI: 10.1017/s095382082300016x
H. Stefánsson
{"title":"In Defence of Pigou–Dalton for Chances","authors":"H. Stefánsson","doi":"10.1017/s095382082300016x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s095382082300016x","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I defend a weak version of the Pigou–Dalton principle for chances. The principle says that it is better to increase the survival chance of a person who is more likely to die rather than a person who is less likely to die, assuming that the two people do not differ in any other morally relevant respect. The principle justifies plausible moral judgements that standard ex post views, such as prioritarianism and rank-dependent egalitarianism, cannot accommodate. However, the principle can be justified by the same reasoning that has recently been used to defend the core axiom of ex post prioritarianism and egalitarianism, namely, Pigou–Dalton for well-being. The arguably biggest challenge for proponents of Pigou–Dalton for chances is that it violates state dominance for social prospects. However, I argue that we have independent reason for rejecting state dominance for social prospects, since it prevents a social planner from properly respecting people's preferences.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46940343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Michael Pelczar, Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. xiii + 210. Michael Pelczar，《现象学：机会与经验的形而上学》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2023年），第xiii+210页。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000195
J. Riley
{"title":"Michael Pelczar, Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. xiii + 210.","authors":"J. Riley","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000195","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48306310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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