UtilitasPub Date : 2021-10-04DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000297
Bastian Steuwer
{"title":"Limits to Aggregation and Uncertain Rescues","authors":"Bastian Steuwer","doi":"10.1017/S0953820821000297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000297","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Limited aggregation holds that we are only sometimes, not always, permitted to aggregate. Aggregation is permissible only when the harms and benefits are relevant to one another. But how should limited aggregation be extended to cases in which we are uncertain about what will happen? In this article, I provide a challenge to ex post limited aggregation. I reconstruct a precise version of ex post limited aggregation that relies on the notion of ex post claims. However, building a theory of limited aggregation based on ex post claims leads to a dilemma. This shows that ex post limited aggregation is currently far away from being a well-defined alternative, strengthening the case for ex ante limited aggregation.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"70 - 83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43200357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-09-28DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000285
C. Frugé
{"title":"Guy Fletcher, Dear Prudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 1–223.","authors":"C. Frugé","doi":"10.1017/S0953820821000285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000285","url":null,"abstract":"noteworthy contribution to the literature. Roy Sorensen’s ‘Lying to Mindless Machines’ offers a pioneering discussion of lying to mindless machines (AIs). Sorensen argues that we can lie to machines, but machines cannot lie to us. If he is right about the first claim, and we can lie to mindless machines, DECEPTION must be false: we need not intend to change someone’s mind (since machines have none) in order to lie. Most of the volume’s essays focus on how individual statements can be used to deliberately convey false propositions. Jennifer Saul’s article examines other ways in which falsehoods spread through communication. Sometimes falsehoods are produced by the aggregation of different discourses (Saul calls these aggregate falsehoods). For instance, a journal that disproportionately covers crimes by black people may create the false impression that black people aremore likely to commit crimes. Other times,media propagate falsehoods unintentionally, by mere negligence, because their journalists and editors did not check their sources as carefully as they should have (Saul calls these negligent falsehoods). Although aggregate and negligent falsehoods are not strictly speaking ‘lies’, they are common and can be immensely damaging to the communities that they target. To understand how nefarious stereotypes are created and spread, Saul concludes, researchers need to pay more attention to these neglected forms of disinformation. The volume is divided into four main sections, each dealing with one of the four topics mentioned in the title (lying, knowledge, ethics, politics). Due to space constraints, I have been unable to comment on the sections of knowledge and ethics, which indeed contain some excellent essays. If I have not discussed essays on politics, it is because (perhaps fittingly for a volume that deals with deception), none of the essays grouped under ‘politics’ discusses (or touches upon) the political implications of dishonest communication (with the exception of Saul’s essay). This may be the main weakness of the volume: despite being published in the ‘Engaged Philosophy’ series of Oxford University Press, it offers very little material that fits this label. That said, this is an important collection with several excellent contributions, some of which will contribute to redefining research in this field in the forthcoming years.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"33 1","pages":"505 - 509"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44200747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-09-28DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000273
A. Dietz
{"title":"Collective Reasons and Agent-Relativity","authors":"A. Dietz","doi":"10.1017/S0953820821000273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000273","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Could it be true that even though we as a group ought to do something, you as an individual ought not to do your part? And under what conditions, in particular, could this happen? In this article, I discuss how a certain kind of case, introduced by David Copp, illustrates the possibility that you ought not to do your part even when you would be playing a crucial causal role in the group action. This is because you may have special agent-relative reasons against participating that are not shared by the group as a whole. I defend the claim that these are indeed cases in which you ought not to do your part in what the group ought to do. I then argue that we can expect these cases to produce a troubling kind of rational conflict.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"57 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47519006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000261
Jacob Barrett
{"title":"Subjectivism and Degrees of Well-Being","authors":"Jacob Barrett","doi":"10.1017/S0953820821000261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000261","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In previous work, I have argued that subjectivists about well-being must turn from a preference-satisfaction to a desire-satisfaction theory of well-being in order to avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In a recent paper, Van der Deijl and Brouwer agree, but object that no version of the desire-satisfaction theory can provide a plausible account of how an individual's degree of well-being depends on the satisfaction or frustration of their various desires, at least in cases involving the gain or loss of desires. So subjectivists can avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons only by adopting a substantively implausible view. In this reply, I defend subjectivism by arguing that the totalist desire-satisfaction theory avoids Van der Deijl and Brouwer's objections, and briefly suggest that it may also be able to handle the problem of adaptive desires. I conclude that subjectivists should endorse the totalist desire-satisfaction theory.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"97 - 104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41894550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-08-19DOI: 10.1017/S095382082100025X
J. Wieland
{"title":"Participation and Degrees","authors":"J. Wieland","doi":"10.1017/S095382082100025X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S095382082100025X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What's wrong with joining corona parties? In this article, I defend the idea that reasons to avoid such parties (or collective harms, more generally) come in degrees. I approach this issue from a participation-based perspective. Specifically, I argue that the more people are already joining the party, and the more likely it is that the virus will spread among everyone, the stronger the participation-based reason not to join. In defense of these degrees, I argue that they covary with the expression of certain attitudes.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"39 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43580989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-07-26DOI: 10.1017/S0953820819000566
G. Arrhenius, J. Mosquera
{"title":"Positive Egalitarianism Reconsidered","authors":"G. Arrhenius, J. Mosquera","doi":"10.1017/S0953820819000566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820819000566","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to positive egalitarianism, not only do relations of inequality have negative value, as negative egalitarians claim, but relations of equality also have positive value. The egalitarian value of a population is a function of both pairwise relations of inequality (negative) and pairwise relations of equality (positive). Positive and negative egalitarianism diverge, especially in different-number cases. Hence, an investigation of positive egalitarianism might shed new light on the vexed topic of population ethics and our duties to future generations. We shall here, in light of some recent criticism, further develop the idea of giving positive value to equal relations.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"19 - 38"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0953820819000566","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43362802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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