UtilitasPub Date : 2022-02-10DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000012
Ryan Doody
{"title":"Don't Go Chasing Waterfalls: Against Hayward's “Utility Cascades”","authors":"Ryan Doody","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his article “Utility Cascades”, Max Khan Hayward argues that act-utilitarians should sometimes either ignore evidence about the effectiveness of their actions or fail to apportion their support to an action's effectiveness. His conclusions are said to have particular significance for the effective altruism movement, which centers seeking and being guided by evidence. Hayward's argument is that act-utilitarians are vulnerable to succumbing to “utility cascades”, that these cascades function to frustrate the ultimate goals of act-utilitarians, and that one apposite way to avoid them is by “ostriching”: ignoring relevant evidence. If true, this conclusion would have remarkable consequences for act-utilitarianism and the effective altruism movement. However, Hayward is mistaken – albeit in an interesting way and with broader significance for moral philosophy. His argument trades on a subtle mischaracterization of act-utilitarianism. Act-utilitarians are not especially vulnerable to utility cascades (or at least not objectionably so), and they shouldn't ostrich.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"225 - 232"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47779403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2022-02-08DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000418
Henrik Andersson, J. Werkmäster
{"title":"Normative Resilience","authors":"Henrik Andersson, J. Werkmäster","doi":"10.1017/S0953820821000418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000418","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article discusses the phenomenon of normative resilience, with a focus on evaluative resilience. An object can become more or less valuable. In addition to this change in an object's value, the object's value can become more or less resilient. If it is less resilient, it cannot withstand as much evaluative change without its degree of value changing, as compared to an object with more resilient value. The article consists of three parts. First, examples of resilience are presented to give the reader an intuitive understanding of the phenomenon, Second, the Fitting Attitudes Analysis of value is invoked to provide a formal account of evaluative resilience. Third, the theoretical and practical advantages of acknowledging the existence of evaluative resilience are brought to light.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"195 - 208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41854349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2022-02-02DOI: 10.1017/S095382082100042X
Oskari Sivula
{"title":"The Cosmic Significance of Directed Panspermia: Should Humanity Spread Life to Other Solar Systems?","authors":"Oskari Sivula","doi":"10.1017/S095382082100042X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S095382082100042X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The possibility of seeding other planets with life poses a tricky dilemma. On the one hand, directed panspermia might be extremely good, while, on the other, it might be extremely bad depending on what factors are taken into consideration. Therefore, we need to understand better what is ethically at stake with planetary seeding. I map out possible conditions under which humanity should spread life to other solar systems. I identify two key variables that affect the desirability of propagating life throughout the galaxy. The first is axiological and depends on which value theory in environmental ethics is correct. The second is empirical and depends on whether life is common or not in our region of the universe. I also consider two ethical objections to an interplanetary life-seeding mission: the risk of interfering with indigenous life and the risk of increasing suffering in our galaxy.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"178 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47613391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-12-17DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000303
J. Gustafsson
{"title":"Ex-Ante Prioritarianism Violates Sequential Ex-Ante Pareto","authors":"J. Gustafsson","doi":"10.1017/S0953820821000303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000303","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Prioritarianism is a variant of utilitarianism. It differs from utilitarianism in that benefiting individuals matters more the worse off these individuals are. On this view, there are two standard ways of handling risky prospects: Ex-Post Prioritarianism adjusts for prioritizing the worse off in final outcomes and then values prospects by the expectation of the sum total of those adjusted values, whereas Ex-Ante Prioritarianism adjusts for prioritizing the worse off on each individual's expectation and then values prospects by the sum total of those adjusted expectations. A standard objection to Ex-Post Prioritarianism is that it violates Ex-Ante Pareto, that is, it prescribes choices that worsen the expectations for everyone. In this article, I argue that Ex-Ante Prioritarianism suffers from much the same problem: it violates a sequential version of Ex-Ante Pareto, that is, it prescribes sequences of choices that worsen the expectations for everyone.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"167 - 177"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42974928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-12-06DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000352
Anna Folland
{"title":"The Harm Principle and the Nature of Harm","authors":"Anna Folland","doi":"10.1017/S0953820821000352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000352","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article defends the Harm Principle, commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill, against recent criticism. Some philosophers think that this principle should be rejected, because of severe difficulties with finding an account of harm to plug into it. I examine the criticism and find it unforceful. Finally, I identify a faulty assumption behind this type of criticism, namely that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there is a full-blown, and problem-free, account of harm, which proponents of the principle can refer to.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"139 - 153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47988488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-12-06DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000406
Karl Ekendahl, Jens Johansson
{"title":"Does Abortion Harm the Fetus?","authors":"Karl Ekendahl, Jens Johansson","doi":"10.1017/S0953820821000406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000406","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any well-being level.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"154 - 166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47210379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-12-02DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000339
Christoph Schmidt-Petri, M. Schefczyk, Lilly Osburg
{"title":"Who Authored On Liberty? Stylometric Evidence on Harriet Taylor Mill's Contribution","authors":"Christoph Schmidt-Petri, M. Schefczyk, Lilly Osburg","doi":"10.1017/S0953820821000339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000339","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is well known that John Stuart Mill (JSM) repeatedly acknowledges Harriet Taylor Mill's (HTM) substantial contribution to On Liberty. After her death, however, he decides to publish the book under his name only. Are we justified in continuing this practice, initiated by JSM, of refusing unequivocal co-authorship status to HTM? Drawing on stylometric analyses, we make a preliminary case that JSM did not write On Liberty all by himself and that HTM had a hand in formulating it. Drawing on plausible standards for authorship ascription, we further point out that authorship status requires, in addition to a substantial contribution, the approval by all contributors. We discuss potential reasons to assume that HTM did not approve the published version of On Liberty and would have objected to including her name on the title page.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"120 - 138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44011744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1017/S095382082100039X
Elizabeth Finneron-Burns
{"title":"Human Extinction and Moral Worthwhileness","authors":"Elizabeth Finneron-Burns","doi":"10.1017/S095382082100039X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S095382082100039X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article I make two main critiques of Kaczmarek and Beard's article ‘Human Extinction and Our Obligations to the Past’. First, I argue that there is an ambiguity in what it means to realise the benefits of a sacrifice and that this ambiguity affects the persuasiveness of the authors’ arguments and responses to various objections to their view. Second, I argue that their core argument against human extinction depends on an unsupported assumption about the existence and importance of existential benefits.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"105 - 112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49330987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-11-17DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000340
Lukas Tank
{"title":"Climate Change and Non-Identity","authors":"Lukas Tank","doi":"10.1017/S0953820821000340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000340","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What is the practical relevance of the Non-Identity Problem (NIP) for our climate change-related duties? Climate change and the NIP are often discussed together, but there is surprisingly little work on the practical relevance of the NIP for the ethics of climate change. The central claim of this article is that the NIP makes a relatively minor difference to our climate change-related duties even if we pursue what has become known as the ‘bite the bullet’ strategy: endorse a person-affecting view threatened by the NIP and not modify it in such a way as to evade the NIP. In particular I will argue that a harm-based view can justify the big-picture call for action emerging from the field of climate ethics. The key to reaching this conclusion is pointing out the consequences of our climate change-related decisions for people whose existence does not depend on these very decisions.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"84 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49193274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
UtilitasPub Date : 2021-11-17DOI: 10.1017/s0953820821000364
D. O’Brien
{"title":"T. M. Scanlon, Why Does Inequality Matter? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 192.","authors":"D. O’Brien","doi":"10.1017/s0953820821000364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820821000364","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"113 - 118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43441088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}