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Trivially Satisfied Desires: A Problem for Desire-Satisfaction Theories of Well-Being 平凡满足的欲望:幸福的欲望满足理论的一个问题
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-08-09 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000183
Luca Hemmerich
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引用次数: 0
Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires 幸福和不稳定欲望的问题
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-08-07 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000171
Atus Mariqueo-Russell
{"title":"Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires","authors":"Atus Mariqueo-Russell","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000171","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper considers a new problem for desire theories of well-being. The problem claims that these theories are implausible because they misvalue the effects of fleeting desires, long-standing desires, and fluctuations in desire strength on well-being. I begin by investigating a version of the desire theory of well-being, simple concurrentism, that fails to capture intuitions in these cases. I then argue that desire theories of well-being that are suitably stability-adjusted can avoid this problem. These theories claim that the average strength of a desire, and the length of time that it is held, both influence the extent to which its fulfilment or frustration affects well-being. I end by considering whether value-fulfilment theories of well-being have a more attractive response to this problem. I find that these theories have significant downsides that make them unappealing alternatives.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43658962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Benatar and Beyond: Rethinking the Consequences of Asymmetry Benatar和Beyond:重新思考不对称的后果
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-08-04 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000146
Kai Draper
{"title":"Benatar and Beyond: Rethinking the Consequences of Asymmetry","authors":"Kai Draper","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000146","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 David Benatar's asymmetry argument in defense of anti-natalism is unconvincing, but not, as most of his critics would have it, because the alleged asymmetry on which it is based does not exist. Rather, the problem is that the existence of that asymmetry does not warrant the conclusion that it is better never to have been. This paper explains Benatar's mistake and identifies the correct conclusions to draw from the axiological asymmetry he identifies. It also sheds light on certain puzzles in population ethics.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42427654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Principle, Pragmatism, and Piecework in On Liberty 《论自由》中的原则、实用主义与拼凑
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-07-27 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000158
Dale E. Miller
{"title":"Principle, Pragmatism, and Piecework in On Liberty","authors":"Dale E. Miller","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000158","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In a well-known passage in chapter V of On Liberty, J. S. Mill notes that while economic competition is generally socially beneficial and should be permitted, this “Free Trade” doctrine does not follow from the liberty or harm principle because “trade is a social act.” In a largely overlooked passage in chapter IV of the same essay, however, Mill contends that for society to coercively prohibit the practice of piecework – paying workers by the unit rather than by the hour or day – does violate this principle. In this short note, I demonstrate that Mill's reasoning in these two passages is contradictory.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49670094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
James E. Crimmins, Utilitarianism in the Early American Republic (New York: Routledge, 2022), pp. 280. 詹姆斯·e·克里明斯，《美国共和国早期的功利主义》(纽约:劳特利奇出版社，2022)，第280页。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-07-24 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000122
C. Riley
{"title":"James E. Crimmins, Utilitarianism in the Early American Republic (New York: Routledge, 2022), pp. 280.","authors":"C. Riley","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000122","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47029692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Douglas Portmore, Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xvii + 324. 道格拉斯·波特莫尔，《选择最好的:应该和选择》(牛津:牛津大学出版社，2019)，第17页+ 324页。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-07-13 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000110
C. Tucker
{"title":"Douglas Portmore, Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xvii + 324.","authors":"C. Tucker","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000110","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42776809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
David Boonin, Dead Wrong: The Ethics of Posthumous Harm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xii + 209. David Boonin，《大错特错：后遗症的伦理学》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2019），第xii+209页。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-07-11 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000134
R. Chan
{"title":"David Boonin, Dead Wrong: The Ethics of Posthumous Harm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xii + 209.","authors":"R. Chan","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000134","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45338071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Counterfactual Argument Against Abortion 反对堕胎的反事实论点
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-06-22 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000092
Ryan Kulesa
{"title":"The Counterfactual Argument Against Abortion","authors":"Ryan Kulesa","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000092","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, I present a novel argument against abortion. In short, what makes it wrong to kill someone is that they are a counterfactual person; counterfactual persons are individuals such that, were they not killed, they would have been persons. My view accommodates two intuitions which many views concerning the wrongness of killing fail to account for: embryo rescue cases and the impermissibility of infanticide. The view avoids embryo rescue cases because embryos in the rescue scenarios are not counterfactual people: they are not counterfactual people because it is false to say that, were they not killed, they would have been persons. As a result, it does not follow from my account that there is a prohibition against allowing embryos to die. On the other hand, infants are counterfactual people: an infant is an individual such that, were she not killed, she would have been a person.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47781390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Concurrent Awareness Desire Satisfactionism 同时意识-欲望-满足主义
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-05-31 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000080
P. Forrester
{"title":"Concurrent Awareness Desire Satisfactionism","authors":"P. Forrester","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000080","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Desire satisfactionists are united by their belief that what makes someone well-off is the satisfaction of their desires. But this commitment obscures a number of underlying differences, since there are several theoretical choice points on the way to making this commitment precise. This article is about two of the most important choice points. The first concerns an epistemic requirement on well-being. Suppose that one's desire that P is satisfied. Must one also know (or believe, or justifiably believe) that one's desire that P is satisfied in order to benefit from P? If so, there is an epistemic requirement on well-being. The second concerns the time at which one benefits. Well-being is a temporal phenomenon: given that one benefits from the satisfaction of one's desire that P, when does one benefit? Perhaps one benefits at the times at which one desires P, or the times at which P obtains, or both. I defend a view I call “concurrent awareness desire satisfactionism”: one benefits only at times at which both one desires P and P obtains (concurrence) and one benefits only if one is aware that one's desire is satisfied (awareness). I motivate this view by showing how it gives us solutions to many of the canonical problems facing desire satisfactionism. Then I put the two parts of the view together and explore some of its further implications. Ultimately, I conclude that well-being is an organic unity composed of a desiderative component, an epistemic component, and a worldly component, none of which are valuable on their own, but which are valuable when they are related in the right way.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48732895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem 做伤害:对Klocksiem的回复
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-05-29 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000079
Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, Olle Risberg
{"title":"Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem","authors":"Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, Olle Risberg","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000079","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent article in this journal, Justin Klocksiem proposes a novel response to the widely discussed failure to benefit problem for the counterfactual comparative account of harm (CCA). According to Klocksiem, proponents of CCA can deal with this problem by distinguishing between facts about there being harm and facts about an agent's having done harm. In this reply, we raise three sets of problems for Klocksiem's approach.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45828272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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