{"title":"Flow and presentness in experience","authors":"Giuliano Torrengo, Daniele Cassaghi","doi":"10.1111/phib.12264","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12264","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the contemporary landscape about temporal experience, debates concerning the “hard question” of the experience of the flow—as opposed to debates concerning more qualitative aspects of temporality, such as change, movement, succession and duration—are gaining more and more attention. The overall dialectics can be thought of in terms of a debate between the realists (who take the phenomenology of the flow of time seriously, and propose various account of it) and deflationists (who take our description of temporal phenomenology as “flowy” to be spurious, and propose various explanation of this spuriousness). In this paper we look inside the realist side. We distinguish primitivist realism, according to which the feeling of time flowing is an irreducible <i>sui generis</i> phenomenology, and various forms of reductionist realism, according to which the experience of the flow is ultimately explainable in terms of a more basic phenomenology. We present reasons to be sceptical against the various reductionist proposals. The conclusion is thus disjunctive: either primitivism or deflationism is the correct account of the purported experience of the flow of time.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 2","pages":"109-130"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12264","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42828542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consequentializing agent-centered restrictions: A Kantsequentialist approach","authors":"Douglas W. Portmore","doi":"10.1111/phib.12270","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12270","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There is, on a given moral view, an agent-centered restriction against performing acts of a certain type if that view prohibits agents from performing an instance of that act-type even to prevent two or more others from each performing a morally comparable instance of that act-type. The fact that commonsense morality includes agent-centered restrictions is often seen as a decisive objection to act-consequentialism. Despite this, I’ll argue that agent-centered restrictions are more plausibly accommodated within an act-consequentialist framework than within the more standard side-constraint framework. For I’ll argue that when we combine agent-relative act-consequentialism with a Kantian theory of value, we arrive at a version of consequentialism—namely, <i>Kantsequentialism</i>—that has several advantages over the side-constraint approach. What's more, I’ll show that this version of consequentialism avoids the disadvantages that critics of consequentializing have presumed that such a theory must have.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 4","pages":"443-467"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45521790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Perception as controlled hallucination","authors":"Justin Tiehen","doi":"10.1111/phib.12268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12268","url":null,"abstract":"<p>“Perception is controlled hallucination,” according to proponents of predictive processing accounts of vision. I say they are right that something like this is a consequence of their view but wrong in how they have pursued the idea. The focus of my counterproposal is the causal theory of perception, which I develop in terms of a productive concept of causation. Cases of what otherwise seem like successful perception are instead mere veridical hallucination if predictive processing accounts are correct, I argue, because of the role played within such accounts by absences, which cannot enter into productive causal relations. I offer two arguments in support of the productive theory of perception. The first is loosely Kantian, focusing on the role that receptivity and spontaneity play in perception. The second focuses on what perception and hallucination have in common. I conclude with a series of objections and replies.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 4","pages":"355-372"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92313186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who are “we”?: Animalism and conjoined twins","authors":"Robert Francescotti","doi":"10.1111/phib.12269","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12269","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Various cases of conjoined twinning have been presented as problems for the animalist view that we are animals. In some actual and possible cases of human <i>dicephalus</i> that have been discussed in the literature, it is arguable that there are two persons but only one human animal. It is also tempting to believe that there are two persons and one animal in possible instances of <i>craniopagus parasiticus</i> that have been described. Here it is argued that the animalist can admit that these are cases in which human persons are not animals, without forfeiting the title “animalist.” It is also shown that this is not only an option but also a well-motivated and plausible option for the animalist. Seeing this requires getting clear on what the word “we” should be thought to include in the animalist's claim that we are animals. Here animalism is defended against twinning objections by figuring out how to view the scope of the animalist's identity claim.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 4","pages":"422-442"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12269","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48833728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Freedom and the open future","authors":"Yishai Cohen","doi":"10.1111/phib.12267","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12267","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I draw upon Helen Steward's concept of agential settling to argue that freedom requires an ability to change the truth-value of tenseless future contingents over time from false to true and that this ability requires a metaphysically open future.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 3","pages":"228-255"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43561508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The coherence objection to dream scepticism","authors":"Krasimira Filcheva","doi":"10.1111/phib.12266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12266","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The dream sceptic argues that our ordinary beliefs are not justified because we cannot know that we have not always been dreaming. This is the <i>Always Dreaming Hypothesis (ADH)</i>. I develop the traditional coherence objection to dream scepticism and argue that the coherence objection can be reformulated in a way that makes it both plausible and defensible. Considerations about the incoherence of dreams can be given probabilistic expression in a way that shows <i>ADH</i> to be highly improbable. Given the evidence of coherence, <i>ADH</i> can be rationally rejected. Even if <i>ADH</i> is augmented with causal information sufficient to account for the coherence and order of conscious experience, the resulting dream scepticism would then reduce to a BIV-type scepticism and thus fail to possess independent sceptical force.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 4","pages":"409-421"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92295679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strong cognitivist weaknesses","authors":"Nathan Hauthaler","doi":"10.1111/phib.12252","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12252","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Marušić & Schwenkler (<i>Analytic Philosophy</i>, 59, 309) offer a simple and elegant defense of s<i>trong cognitivism</i> about intention: the view that an intention <i>to φ is</i> a form of <i>belief that one will φ</i>. I show that their defense fails: however simple and elegant, it fails to account for various aspects about intention and its expression, and faces distinctive challenges of its own, including a dilemma and counterexample. These also undermine Marušić & Schwenkler's claim to a best-explanation type of account and recommend alternatives to strong cognitivism altogether.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 2","pages":"161-176"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41310705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Narrow content and parameter proliferation","authors":"Ori Simchen","doi":"10.1111/phib.12237","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12237","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A centerpiece of Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne's <i>Narrow Content</i> (OUP 2018) is the parameter proliferation argument. The authors consider a series of cleverly constructed cases of pairs of corresponding thoughts of qualitatively identical twins and argue that divergence in truth value for such thoughts forces the internalist to admit novel alethic parameters for semantic evaluation that are not independently motivated. I argue that the internalist will resist this argument by denying that such pairs of thoughts diverge in truth value. I then argue that the construal of content presupposed by the argument should be rejected or amended by the internalist on independent grounds. I end in a more diagnostic vein by considering why parameter proliferation might have seemed pressing for internalism to begin with.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"63 3","pages":"204-212"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44852018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Imprecision in the ethics of rescue","authors":"Michael Rabenberg","doi":"10.1111/phib.12260","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12260","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Suppose you can save one group of people or a larger group of different people, but you cannot save both groups. Are you morally required, <i>ceteris paribus</i>, to save the larger group? Some say, “No.” Far more say, without qualification, “Yes.” But some say, “It depends on the sizes of the groups.” In this paper, I argue that an attractive moral principle that seems on its face to support the second answer in fact supports a version of the third. In the process, I defend some revisionary claims about how the lives and deaths of different people compare evaluatively to one another. The most important of these for my purposes is the claim that <i>the deaths of different people are on a par, other things being equal</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 3","pages":"277-317"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48568349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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