Analytic Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Familiar properties and phenomenal properties","authors":"Thomas Raleigh","doi":"10.1111/phib.12285","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12285","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Sometimes when we describe our own sensory experiences, we seem to attribute to experience itself the same sorts of familiar properties—such as shape or colour—as we attribute to everyday physical objects. But how literally should we understand such descriptions? Can there really be phenomenal elements or aspects to an experience which are, for example quite literally square? This paper examines how these questions connect to a wide range of different commitments and theories about the metaphysics of mind. In particular, I consider whether there may be phenomenological reasons to accept or reject the idea that there are elements or aspects of conscious experience itself which instantiate familiar spatial properties. I also explore how some general theses about the nature of empirical properties can motivate different answers to these questions.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 2","pages":"274-300"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46970339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Neo-Humean rationality and two types of principles","authors":"Caj Strandberg","doi":"10.1111/phib.12280","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12280","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that there cannot be any objective moral reasons, i.e. moral reasons that are independent of actual desires. In this paper, I argue that there is a version of this theory that is compatible with the existence of objective moral reasons. The key is to distinguish between (i) the process of rational deliberation that starts off in an agent's actual desires, and (ii) the rational principle that an agent employs in such a process. I maintain that it is the latter which explains why it is rational for an agent to have a certain desire, not the former. As a result, there might be two types of principles. The second type of principle leaves room for objective moral reasons.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 2","pages":"256-273"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12280","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48857041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Deceiving versus manipulating: An evidence-based definition of deception","authors":"Don Fallis","doi":"10.1111/phib.12282","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12282","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What distinguishes <i>deception</i> from <i>manipulation</i>? Cohen (<i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i>, 96, 483 and 2018) proposes a new answer and explores its ethical implications. Appealing to new cases of “non-deceptive manipulation” that involve intentionally causing a false belief, he offers a new definition of deception in terms of <i>communication</i> that rules out these counterexamples to the traditional definition. And, he leverages this definition in support of the claim that deception “carries heavier moral weight” than manipulation. In this paper, I argue that these cases of “non-deceptive manipulation” are even more prevalent than Cohen suggests—especially in the digital world. Thus, if his moral claim were correct, a lot of what is happening on the internet these days would constitute moral improvement over old-fashioned deception. Fortunately, we are not forced to accept this counterintuitive conclusion. Cohen's definition must be rejected because it incorrectly rules out clear instances of deception. In this paper, I defend a definition of deception in terms of <i>evidence</i> that does correctly distinguish between deception and non-deceptive manipulation. Moreover, it does not support Cohen's claim that deception is morally worse than other forms of manipulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 2","pages":"223-240"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47295927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Consistent desires and climate change","authors":"Daniel Coren","doi":"10.1111/phib.12284","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12284","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Philosophers have described the human perspective on climate change as a perfect moral storm. I take a new angle on that storm: I argue that our relevant desires feature a particularly problematic case of seemingly consistent but genuinely inconsistent desires. We have, first, non-indexical desires such as a desire to (make the sacrifices necessary to) stop polluting our environment at some point. We have, second, indexical desires such as a desire not to (make the sacrifices necessary to) stop polluting our environment this year. Our indexical and non-indexical desires are inconsistent. Such inconsistency is obvious in most short-term, individual cases such as when we need to make a dentist appointment. But when it comes to climate change, that inconsistency is masked by factors such as longevity and bitter divisions. This is, unfortunately, why humanity may continue putting off the collective action required to address climate change.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 2","pages":"241-255"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44214823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Epistemic obligations and free speech","authors":"Boyd Millar","doi":"10.1111/phib.12279","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12279","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Philosophical discussions of free speech often focus on moral considerations such as the harm that certain forms of expression might cause. However, in addition to our moral obligations, we also have a distinct set of <i>epistemic</i> obligations—and even when a false belief doesn't harm anyone, it constitutes an epistemically bad outcome. Moreover, the existing psychological evidence suggests that human beings are vulnerable to the influence of a wide variety of false claims via a wide variety of psychological mechanisms. Taken together, these facts suggest that there is a purely epistemic justification for restricting the distribution of misinformation: Because each of us has an individual epistemic obligation to avoid unnecessary exposure to misinformation, and because avoiding such exposure is simply too difficult when acting alone, we all have a shared epistemic obligation to establish laws or regulations restricting the widespread distribution of misinformation.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 2","pages":"203-222"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46947883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Against the very idea of a perceptual belief","authors":"Grace Helton,&nbsp;Bence Nanay","doi":"10.1111/phib.12277","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12277","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The aim of this paper is to argue that there is no unproblematic way of delineating perceptual beliefs from non-perceptual beliefs. The concept of perceptual belief is one of the central concepts not only of philosophy of perception but also of epistemology in a broad foundationalist tradition. Philosophers of perception talk about perceptual belief as the interface between perception and cognition and foundationalist epistemologists understand perceptual justification as a relation between perceptual states and perceptual beliefs. I consider three ways of cashing out the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual beliefs (semantic, justificatory, and etiological) and argue that none of them works. Finally, I explore the possibility of understanding perceptual justification without relying on the concept of perceptual beliefs.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 2","pages":"93-105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12277","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47022040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Against the inside out argument1","authors":"Amy Seymour","doi":"10.1111/phib.12275","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12275","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Bailey (2021) offers a clever argument for the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility based on the nature of intrinsic intentions. The argument is mistaken on two counts. First, it is invalid. Second, even setting that first point aside, the argument proves too much: we would be blameworthy in paradigm cases of non-blameworthiness. I conclude that we cannot reason from intentions to responsibility solely from the “inside out”—our possessing a blameworthy intention cannot tell us whether this intention is also blameworthy in deterministic worlds.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 2","pages":"187-202"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63598999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wittgenstein on necessity: ‘Are you not really an idealist in disguise?’","authors":"Sam W. A. Couldrick","doi":"10.1111/phib.12273","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12273","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Wittgenstein characterises ‘necessary truths’ as rules of representation that do not answer to reality. The invocation of rules of representation has led many to compare his work with Kant's. This comparison is illuminating, but it can also be misleading. Some go as far as casting Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a specie of transcendental idealism, an interpretation that continues to gather support despite scholars pointing to its limitations. To understand the temptation of this interpretation, attention must be paid to a distinction Bernard Williams (1981) makes, echoing Kant, between empirical and transcendental idealism. Williams claims that the move to transcendental idealism is an effort to block empirical idealism. The latter, in this context, amounts to a scepticism regarding necessity and a denial of its objectivity. To show what is wrong with the transcendental interpretation, it is important to challenge the mistaken presumption that Wittgenstein's philosophy would otherwise lead to empirical idealism. The fundamental mistake common to both attributions is that they misunderstand the relation that obtains between our rules of representation and the contingent facts that condition those rules of representation. Once this relation has been clarified, Wittgenstein's philosophy can be understood as providing a genuine alternative to realism and idealism.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 2","pages":"162-186"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12273","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45869506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The null hypothesis for fiction and logical indiscipline","authors":"John Collins","doi":"10.1111/phib.12274","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12274","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;The literature on the semantics of fiction is long-standing and voluminous. The null hypothesis, however, is rarely seriously entertained. Such a hypothesis simply denies that the fiction/non-fiction distinction is a semantic one, and so just like other statements, fictive ones of all kinds might be true or false depending on how the world is, and their truth conditions involve no ontological exotica or bespoke semantic machinery for their specification. As far as language goes, we might say, there just is no fiction. The present paper attempts nothing as ambitious as a full articulation and defence of this position; still less a refutation of the extant alternatives that are the focus of contemporary discussion. Much of the work in this regard, however, has been done in various ways by Ludlow (&lt;span&gt;2006&lt;/span&gt;), Azzouni (&lt;span&gt;2010&lt;/span&gt;), Friend (&lt;span&gt;2012&lt;/span&gt;), Crane (&lt;span&gt;2013&lt;/span&gt;), and Collins (&lt;span&gt;2021a&lt;/span&gt;). Instead, my aim is to raise and dispel what might seem conclusive evidence against the null hypothesis. If nothing else, then, I'd like the null hypothesis to be rendered as a genuine null hypothesis from which we need a reason to depart.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The problem to be addressed is one of logical indiscipline, that is, if fiction is treated as on all fours with non-fiction, then inconsistency quickly follows in the shape of patently false conclusions appearing to follow from accepted premises, and contradictions being formulated by the conjunction of truths. A kind of sceptical solution will be presented: the relevant inferences break down outside of fiction, so the null hypothesis is not to blame; a naïve view of the extent of natural language's discipline is the problem. That said, we still need to differentiate fiction from non-fiction, if we are not to be confused, but this is not a semantic achievement. Before all of that, the following section will set out some preliminary semantic assumptions and the section after will present a general clarification and partial defence of the null hypothesis.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Firstly, I shall assume throughout that an adequate semantic theory for a language will assign truth conditions to each sentence of the language in a compositional manner; perforce, the semantics for each lexical item and phrase will specify how the expression contributes to the truth conditions of its potential host sentences. I shall leave in abeyance how such an assignment might best be realised, what general ontology the assignment assumes, and what might guide the compositional assignment (whether, say, the semantics interprets an independently specified syntactic structure or some intermediate translation such as a formal logical language). In short, my considerations do not depend either upon an endorsement of any contentious semantic view that might be deemed independently implausible or a rejection of any semantic bells and whistles that might accompany truth-conditional semantics; my claim is simply that, per the","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 2","pages":"131-144"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12274","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42284494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How to choose normative concepts","authors":"Ting Cho Lau","doi":"10.1111/phib.12276","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12276","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Matti Eklund (2017) has argued that ardent realists face a serious dilemma. Ardent realists believe that there is a mind-independent fact as to which normative concepts we are to use. Eklund claims that the ardent realist cannot explain why this is so without plumping in favor of their own normative concepts or changing the topic. The paper first advances the discussion by clarifying two ways of understanding the question of which normative concepts to choose: a theoretical question about which concepts have the abstract property of <i>being normatively privileged</i> and a further practical question of which concepts we are to choose even granting some concepts are thus privileged. I argue that the ardent realist's best bet for answering the theoretical question while avoiding Eklund's dilemma is to provide a real definition of this property. I point out the difficulties for providing such a definition. I then argue that even with an answer to the theoretical question, the ardent realist faces a further dilemma in answering the practical question. In sum, though I see no knock-down argument against ardent realism, it may nonetheless die a death by a thousand cuts. I close by considering a deeper reason for why ardent realism is so difficult to defend: every argument starts somewhere. It is unclear how there can be an Archimedean point that makes no reference to any normative concepts that can nonetheless be employed to convince everyone to adopt ours. I then briefly propose two options for someone still inclined towards realism: either (i) accept that our normative concepts are normatively privileged without attempting to explain why this is so, or (ii) be less ardent and accept a perspective-dependent account of normativity.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 2","pages":"145-161"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45484547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}