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Todd on the open future 托德：开放的未来
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12333
Ryan Wasserman
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引用次数: 0
Defending The Open Future: Replies to MacFarlane, Green, Wasserman, and Bigg & Miller 捍卫开放的未来回复麦克法兰、格林、瓦瑟曼和比格与米勒
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12327
Patrick Todd
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引用次数: 0
Virtue and its moral psychology 美德及其道德心理学
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12343
Gopal Sreenivasan
{"title":"Virtue and its moral psychology","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.1111/phib.12343","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12343","url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>Emotion and virtue</i> (2020) defends positions about virtue on two adjacent expanses of philosophical terrain. One is a matter of moral psychology, while the other concerns the theory of virtue. My primary thesis identifies a central role for emotion in the psychological constitution of exemplars of virtue. In this symposium, four outstanding commentators take turns examining some of the theses defended in the book. Roger Crisp and Julia Driver both seek to rehabilitate ‘black box’ theories of virtue, which marginalise the role of emotion. Black box theories are my opponents in moral psychology. Marco Rossi focuses on a core component of my defence, arguing that my distillation of existing theories of emotion is more controversial than I suppose. Finally, Justin D’Arms diagnoses a tension between two Aristotelian ideas he finds at work in my defence. While he is attracted to both ideas, he thinks the tension between them is problematic for my fundamental claim about the role of emotion in virtue. It is a real privilege to have been offered such a rich set of comments to engage.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 3","pages":"472-492"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141548701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reason and reciprocity: A response to Emotion and Virtue 理性与互惠：对《情感与美德》的回应
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12341
Roger Crisp
{"title":"Reason and reciprocity: A response to Emotion and Virtue","authors":"Roger Crisp","doi":"10.1111/phib.12341","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12341","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper is a review of <i>Emotion and Virtue</i>, by Gopal Sreenivasan. Besides providing an overview of the book, it is suggested that the view of the virtues which gives less weight to the emotions remains plausible, as does the thesis of the unity of virtue.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 3","pages":"457-463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12341","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141518558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Varieties of future-contingency 各种未来假设
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12332
Mitchell Green
{"title":"Varieties of future-contingency","authors":"Mitchell Green","doi":"10.1111/phib.12332","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12332","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I here examine some of the main contentions of Todd's “The Open Future”. I argue first that a future contingent need not contain locutions such as “will” or cognates and that once this is recognized a trilemma emerges for Todd, putting pressure on him to relinquish one of the book's main aims. Then after noting (Section II) Todd's response to a puzzle A.N. prior had raised for betting on an open-future style view, I turn (Sections IIIa and IIIb) to his discussion of whether his approach is committed to demanding that ordinary speakers reform their talk about the future. I conclude (Section IV) that the objective of the replacement strategy that Todd recommends could be achieved with less violence to ordinary linguistic practices with the help of a view on which “will” and cognates are polysemous.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 2","pages":"217-225"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141518559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Comments on Emotion and Virtue by Gopal Sreenivasan 对 Gopal Sreenivasan 所著《情感与美德》的评论
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12339
Julia Driver
{"title":"Comments on Emotion and Virtue by Gopal Sreenivasan","authors":"Julia Driver","doi":"10.1111/phib.12339","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12339","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This essay provides a critical discussion of Gopal Sreenivasan's integral account of virtue in his book <i>Emotion and Virtue</i>. This discussion focuses on his account of the paradigm virtue of compassion, arguing that the view does not have most of the advantages Sreenivasan suggests it has when compared to competing models of virtue.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 3","pages":"443-449"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12339","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141518561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Modeling action: Recasting the causal theory 行动建模：重塑因果理论
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12352
Megan Fritts, Frank Cabrera
{"title":"Modeling action: Recasting the causal theory","authors":"Megan Fritts,&nbsp;Frank Cabrera","doi":"10.1111/phib.12352","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12352","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Contemporary action theory is generally concerned with giving theories of action ontology. In this paper, we make the novel proposal that the standard view in action theory—the Causal Theory of Action—should be recast as a “model,” akin to the models constructed and investigated by scientists. Such models often consist in fictional, hypothetical, or idealized structures, which are used to represent a target system indirectly via some resemblance relation. We argue that recasting the Causal Theory as a model can not only accomplish the goals of causal theorists, but also give the theory greater flexibility in responding to common objections.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 4","pages":"622-640"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141548702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
‘Emotions’ in Gopal Sreenivasan's Emotion and Virtue 戈帕尔-斯里尼瓦桑《情感与美德》中的 "情感
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-23 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12342
Mauro Rossi
{"title":"‘Emotions’ in Gopal Sreenivasan's Emotion and Virtue","authors":"Mauro Rossi","doi":"10.1111/phib.12342","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12342","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In his remarkable new book, <i>Emotion and Virtue</i>, Sreenivasan defends the view that, in the case of many virtues, in order for an exemplar of each of these virtues to be a reliable judge of what that virtue requires in specific circumstances, she must possess a particular, morally rectified, emotional trait. In this article, I raise two challenges to “the argument from salience” that Sreenivasan offers in favor of this view. First, I argue that, although Sreenivasan wishes to remain neutral about different philosophical theories of emotions, the success of his argument depends, in fact, on the outcome of the debate about the nature of emotions. Second, I challenge the central claim of Sreenivasan's argument from salience, namely, that the possession of a morally rectified emotional trait, cleverness, and supplementary moral knowledge is sufficient to explain an agent's ability to reliably judge what a given virtue requires in specific circumstances.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 3","pages":"464-471"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141518562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fitting emotions and virtuous judgment 合情合理的判断
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-23 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12340
Justin D'Arms
{"title":"Fitting emotions and virtuous judgment","authors":"Justin D'Arms","doi":"10.1111/phib.12340","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12340","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I discuss a tension between two broadly Aristotelian ideas about the role of emotions in virtue and consider its implications for the original and attractive theory of virtuous judgment that Gopal Sreenivasan develops in Emotion and Virtue. One is the idea that a virtuous person has fitting emotions. The other idea is that the virtuous person has emotions that point her toward performing a virtuous action. I explain the tension between these ideas, and how it arises with respect to both of Sreenivasan's central examples of virtue: compassion and courage.I suggest that this tension generates some interesting and systemic respects in which a virtuous agent's virtuous emotional responses hamper her attempts to judge what is the virtuous thing to do. This makes me less sanguine than I take Sreenivasan to be about the contributions of emotion to the virtuous agent's reliability in passing his “Central Test of Virtue.”</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 3","pages":"450-456"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12340","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141518560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lessons from the void: What Boltzmann brains teach 虚空的教训：玻尔兹曼的大脑教给我们什么
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-16 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12353
Bradford Saad
{"title":"Lessons from the void: What Boltzmann brains teach","authors":"Bradford Saad","doi":"10.1111/phib.12353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12353","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Some physical theories predict that almost all brains in the universe are <i>Boltzmann brains</i>, that is, short-lived disembodied brains that are accidentally assembled as a result of thermodynamic or quantum fluctuations. Physicists and philosophers of physics widely regard this proliferation as unacceptable, and so take its prediction as a basis for rejecting these theories. But the putatively unacceptable consequences of this prediction follow only given certain philosophical assumptions. This paper develops a strategy for shielding physical theorizing from the threat of Boltzmann brains. The strategy appeals to a form of phenomenal externalism about the physical basis of consciousness. Given that form of phenomenal externalism, the proliferation of Boltzmann brains turns out to be benign. While the strategy faces a psychophysical fine-tuning problem, it both alleviates cosmological fine-tuning concerns that attend physics-based solutions to Boltzmann brain problems and pays explanatory dividends in connection with time's arrow.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 4","pages":"594-621"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12353","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145572293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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