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Linnebo on reference by abstraction Linnebo谈抽象参照
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-28 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12300
Bahram Assadian
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引用次数: 0
Social construction and indeterminacy 社会建构与不确定性
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-28 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12299
Kevin Richardson
{"title":"Social construction and indeterminacy","authors":"Kevin Richardson","doi":"10.1111/phib.12299","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12299","url":null,"abstract":"<p>An increasing number of philosophers argue that indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) in the sense that indeterminacy has its source in the world itself (rather than how the world is represented or known). The standard arguments for metaphysical indeterminacy are centered around the sorites paradox. In this essay, I present a novel argument for metaphysical indeterminacy. I argue that metaphysical indeterminacy follows from the existence of constitutive social construction; there is indeterminacy in the social world because there is indeterminacy in how the social world is constructed.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 1","pages":"37-52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47652158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Meaning change 含义变化
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-28 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12294
Indrek Reiland
{"title":"Meaning change","authors":"Indrek Reiland","doi":"10.1111/phib.12294","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12294","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The linguistic <i>meaning</i> of a word in a language is what fully competent speakers of the language have a grasp of merely in virtue of their semantic competence. The meanings of words sometimes change over time. ‘Meat’ used to mean ‘solid food’, but now means ‘animal flesh eaten as food’. This type of meaning change comes with change of topic, what we are talking about. Many people interested in conceptual engineering have claimed that there is also meaning change where topic is retained. For example, they claim that the meanings of ‘fish’ and ‘pasta’ have undergone such change, and that the meaning of ‘marriage’ would change this way after gay marriages become legal and widely accepted. In this paper, I relate two sets of relatively independent literatures: mainstream philosophy of language and conceptual engineering to argue that on a plausible and widely accepted <i>Minimalist</i> view of meaning that is part and parcel of anti-descriptivism, none of the above sorts of cases involve meaning change with topic retention. I do this by showing how to distinguish minimalism about <i>meaning</i> from the related theses of externalism and anti-individualism about <i>intension</i> and how to separate meaning from intension in a way that allows meaning and topic to remain the same despite changes in intension. The larger lesson is that much like we should not disregard the boundary between the narrowly meaning-related (‘semantics’) and the more broadly communication-related (‘pragmatics’), and we should not disregard the boundary between the former and the more broadly thought-related, conceptual or cognitive (‘cognition’).</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 3","pages":"434-451"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12294","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45624083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cross-temporal grounding 交叉作业时间接地
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-22 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12287
Fabrice Correia, Giovanni Merlo
{"title":"Cross-temporal grounding","authors":"Fabrice Correia,&nbsp;Giovanni Merlo","doi":"10.1111/phib.12287","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12287","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Cross-temporal grounding is a type of grounding whereby present facts about the past (for example that Caesar was alive) are explained in terms of past facts (for example that Caesar is alive) rather than in terms of other present facts. This paper lays the foundations for a theory of cross-temporal grounding. After introducing the general idea of a type of grounding connecting facts to past facts, we offer two arguments that past-directed facts require cross-temporal grounds—the ‘argument from intimacy’ and the ‘argument from past explanation’. We then go on to show that cross-temporal grounding statements can be understood as instances of a type of explanation which is perfectly legitimate and intelligible, even if somewhat unusual. Finally, we explain how the logic of grounding can be extended to accommodate cross-temporal grounding statements.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 3","pages":"333-352"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45214041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On scepticism about personal identity thought experiments 论对个人身份思想实验的怀疑
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-16 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12292
Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Caroline West, Wen Yu
{"title":"On scepticism about personal identity thought experiments","authors":"Andrew J. Latham,&nbsp;Kristie Miller,&nbsp;Caroline West,&nbsp;Wen Yu","doi":"10.1111/phib.12292","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12292","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many philosophers have become sceptical of the use of thought experiments in theorising about personal identity. In large part, this is due to work in experimental philosophy that appears to confirm long-held philosophical suspicions that thought experiments elicit inconsistent judgements about personal identity and hence judgements that are thought to be the product of cognitive biases. If so, these judgements appear to be useless at informing our theories of personal identity. Using the methods of experimental philosophy, we investigate whether people exhibit inconsistent judgements and, if they do, whether these judgements are likely to be the source of cognitive bias or, instead, sensitivity to some relevant factor. We do not find that people's judgements are sensitive to any of the factors we investigate (relevant or irrelevant), nor that people have inconsistent judgements across cases. Rather, people's judgements are best explained by them having a very minimal account of what it takes for a person to survive. Since this pattern of judgements is no reason to think that we are subject to cognitive bias, we see no reason, as things stand, to be sceptical of our judgements.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 3","pages":"406-433"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12292","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44464308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A recently recurring mistake over Russell's theory of descriptions 罗素描述理论最近反复出现的错误
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-18 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12281
Lloyd Humberstone
{"title":"A recently recurring mistake over Russell's theory of descriptions","authors":"Lloyd Humberstone","doi":"10.1111/phib.12281","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12281","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 3","pages":"301-308"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45532779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Truth and imprecision 真理与不精确
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-17 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12286
Josh Armstrong
{"title":"Truth and imprecision","authors":"Josh Armstrong","doi":"10.1111/phib.12286","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12286","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Our ordinary assertions are often imprecise, insofar as the way we represent things as being only approximates how things are in the actual world. The phenomenon of <i>assertoric imprecision</i> raises a challenge to standard accounts of both the norm of assertion and the connection between semantics and the objects of assertion. After clarifying these problems in detail, I develop a framework for resolving them. Specifically, I argue that the phenomenon of assertoric imprecision motivates a rejection of the widely held belief that a semantic theory for a language associates a single semantic value with each of the simple and complex expressions of that language, relative to the contexts in which they occur. Instead, I propose that we adopt a framework I call <i>semantic pluralism</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 3","pages":"309-332"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43637619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is the abstract vs concrete distinction exhaustive & exclusive? Four reasons to be suspicious 抽象和具体的区别是详尽的和排他性的吗?有四个值得怀疑的理由
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-15 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12288
Travis Dumsday
{"title":"Is the abstract vs concrete distinction exhaustive & exclusive? Four reasons to be suspicious","authors":"Travis Dumsday","doi":"10.1111/phib.12288","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12288","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>There is a widespread consensus within analytic metaphysics that the abstract versus concrete distinction, if valid at all, must be thought of as exhaustive and exclusive. I present four arguments designed to cast doubt on this consensus.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 3","pages":"393-405"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44787021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Validity as (material!) truth-preservation in virtue of form 作为(物质的!)形式的真理保存的有效性
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-05 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12248
Tristan Grøtvedt Haze
{"title":"Validity as (material!) truth-preservation in virtue of form","authors":"Tristan Grøtvedt Haze","doi":"10.1111/phib.12248","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12248","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to a standard story, part of what we have in mind when we say that an argument is valid is that it is <i>necessarily truth</i>-<i>preserving</i>: if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true. But—the story continues—that's not enough, since ‘Roses are red, therefore roses are coloured’, for example, while it may be necessarily truth-preserving, is not so in virtue of form. Thus we arrive at a standard contemporary characterisation of validity: an argument is valid when it is NTP in virtue of form. Here I argue that we can and should drop the N; the resulting account is simpler, less problematic, and performs just as well with examples.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 2","pages":"177-181"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42963068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
An instrumentalist explanation of pragmatic encroachment 实用主义侵蚀的工具主义解释
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-11-11 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12283
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
{"title":"An instrumentalist explanation of pragmatic encroachment","authors":"Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen","doi":"10.1111/phib.12283","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12283","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many have found it plausible that practical circumstances can affect whether someone is in a position to know or rationally believe a proposition. For example, whether it is rational for a person to believe that the bank will be open tomorrow can depend not only on the person's evidence but also on how practically important it is for the person not to be wrong about the bank being open tomorrow. This supposed phenomenon is known as “pragmatic encroachment” on knowledge and rational belief. Assuming that the phenomenon is real, I ask what explains it. I argue that a variant of instrumentalism about epistemic reasons offers a natural explanation, that at the same time is able avoid commitment to a more radical form of pragmatism.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 3","pages":"374-392"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44185833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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