抽象和具体的区别是详尽的和排他性的吗?有四个值得怀疑的理由

IF 0.6 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-15 DOI:10.1111/phib.12288

Travis Dumsday

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引用次数: 0

摘要

分析形而上学内部有一种广泛的共识，即抽象与具体的区分如果成立的话，就必须被认为是详尽无遗和排他性的。我提出四个论点，旨在对这一共识表示怀疑。

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Is the abstract vs concrete distinction exhaustive & exclusive? Four reasons to be suspicious

There is a widespread consensus within analytic metaphysics that the abstract versus concrete distinction, if valid at all, must be thought of as exhaustive and exclusive. I present four arguments designed to cast doubt on this consensus.

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来源期刊

Analytic Philosophy PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.10

自引率

0.00%

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