Analytic Philosophy最新文献

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Self-Visitation and the Metaphysics of Place, Causation, and Facts 自观与地点、因果和事实的形而上学
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12384
Daniel S. Murphy
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引用次数: 0
A Theory of Sense-Data 感觉数据理论
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-11-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/phib.70000
Andrew Y. Lee
{"title":"A Theory of Sense-Data","authors":"Andrew Y. Lee","doi":"10.1111/phib.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.70000","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I develop and defend a sense-datum theory of perception. My theory follows the spirit of classic sense-datum theories: I argue that what it is to have a perceptual experience is to be acquainted with some <i>sense-data</i>, where sense-data are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, that are common to both perception and hallucination, that constitute the phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences, and that are analogous to pictures inside one's head. But my theory also diverges from conventional sense-datum theories in some key respects: on my view, (1) sense-data are neural states presented first-personally, (2) the sensational qualities of sense-data differ in kind from the sensible qualities of external objects, and (3) sense-data are the vehicles in virtue of which we perceive, rather than the objects that we perceive. I argue that this package of claims is appropriately labeled ‘sense-datum theory’, and that the resultant view ought to be a live contender in contemporary philosophy of perception.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 4","pages":"408-424"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.70000","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149311567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Laws and Reasons Why 规律和原因
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-15 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12391
Julio De Rizzo
{"title":"Laws and Reasons Why","authors":"Julio De Rizzo","doi":"10.1111/phib.12391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12391","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Laws play <i>some</i> role in explanations: at the very least, they somehow <i>connect</i> what is explained, or the <i>explanandum</i>, to what explains, or the <i>explanans</i>. Thus, thermodynamical laws connect the match's being struck and its lightning, so that the former <i>causes</i> the latter; and laws about set formation connect Socrates' existence with {Socrates}'s existence, so that the former <i>grounds</i> the latter. But is there more to the explanatory role of laws? A natural proposal, which finds considerable support in the literature, is that laws simply <i>are</i> reasons why. That is, besides connecting the explanandum with a suitable ground or cause, they take part, together with these, in <i>explaining why</i> the explanandum obtains. In this paper, I present two arguments that show that this proposal cannot hold in general. They each point to one unacceptable consequence: a suspicious infinite extendibility of explanantia; and a failure of the irreflexivity of “because.”</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 4","pages":"354-365"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12391","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149311942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
AI Alignment Versus AI Ethical Treatment: 10 Challenges AI结盟vs AI伦理处理:10个挑战
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12380
Adam Bradley, Bradford Saad
{"title":"AI Alignment Versus AI Ethical Treatment: 10 Challenges","authors":"Adam Bradley,&nbsp;Bradford Saad","doi":"10.1111/phib.12380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12380","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A morally acceptable course of AI development should avoid two dangers: creating unaligned AI systems that pose a threat to humanity and mistreating AI systems that merit moral consideration in their own right. This paper argues these two dangers interact and that if we create AI systems that merit moral consideration, simultaneously avoiding both of these dangers would be extremely challenging. While our argument is straightforward and supported by a wide range of pretheoretical moral judgments, it has far-reaching moral implications for AI development. Although the most obvious way to avoid the tension between alignment and ethical treatment would be to avoid creating AI systems that merit moral consideration, this option may be unrealistic and is perhaps fleeting. So, we conclude by offering some suggestions for other ways of mitigating mistreatment risks associated with alignment.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 4","pages":"309-327"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12380","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149311684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Against Metaphysical Egalitarianism 反对形而上学的平均主义
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12388
Peter W. Finocchiaro
{"title":"Against Metaphysical Egalitarianism","authors":"Peter W. Finocchiaro","doi":"10.1111/phib.12388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12388","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Many philosophers think that a metaphysical theory should be evaluated by the degree to which its ideology accurately represents the fundamental structure of reality. But that position pushes them to make seemingly invidious metaphysical distinctions. For instance: is a metaphysical theory that employs logical conjunction better than one that employs logical disjunction? In this paper, I evaluate a prominent solution to this problem: metaphysical egalitarianism. According to metaphysical egalitarianism, the best theory is the theory that avoids making seemingly invidious metaphysical distinctions by employing both logical conjunction and logical disjunction. I argue that metaphysical egalitarianism should be rejected, primarily because it neglects the disvalue of employing inaccurate ideology.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 4","pages":"297-308"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149311993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contingent Grounding Physicalism 偶然基础物理主义
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-03 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12383
Alex Moran
{"title":"Contingent Grounding Physicalism","authors":"Alex Moran","doi":"10.1111/phib.12383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12383","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is widely held that physicalism is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of zombies, i.e., beings physically just like us yet lacking in phenomenal consciousness. The present paper argues that this orthodoxy is mistaken. As against the received wisdom, physicalism is perfectly compatible with the possibility of zombies and zombie-worlds. Arguments from the possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism do not, therefore, succeed. To establish this, the paper develops a form of physicalism on which the phenomenal facts are metaphysically grounded in the basic physical facts in accordance with metaphysically contingent grounding laws. It also draws out some important morals for the contemporary mind–body debate.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 4","pages":"392-407"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12383","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149311220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Abductivist Interpretation of Frege's Conception of Logic 弗雷格逻辑概念的溯因主义解释
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-10 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12392
Junyeol Kim
{"title":"The Abductivist Interpretation of Frege's Conception of Logic","authors":"Junyeol Kim","doi":"10.1111/phib.12392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12392","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Frege is an abductivist about logic. For him, an acceptable logic must be sufficient—that is, it must be able to explain the relevant data, such as the fact that arithmetical laws are logical truths. Thus, Frege's logicism is an abductive project aimed at establishing the acceptability of his logic, Begriffsschrift. Though he regards logical truths as analytic and a priori, the way he defines analyticity and apriority is fully compatible with the abductive selection of a logic. Frege does admit logical intuition and takes it to play a role in logical investigation, such as in evidence-gathering. However, given that other abductivists also partially recognize such traditional epistemologies for logic, we can legitimately consider Frege an abductivist.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 4","pages":"385-391"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12392","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149311763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dogmatism and Easy Knowledge: Avoiding the Dialectic? 教条主义与易学:回避辩证法?
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12389
Guido Tana
{"title":"Dogmatism and Easy Knowledge: Avoiding the Dialectic?","authors":"Guido Tana","doi":"10.1111/phib.12389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12389","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes and objects to the anti-skeptical strategy endorsed by Epistemological Dogmatism. Dogmatism is a theory of epistemic justification that holds perceptual warrant for our beliefs is immediate, based on experiential seemings. Crucially, it rejects requests for higher-order justification or active defense of the justification one's beliefs enjoy. This allows Dogmatism to endorse a neo-Moorean anti-skeptical strategy. In order to investigate the main element of this strategy, the problem of easy knowledge is introduced. The dogmatic answer to easy knowledge consists in rejecting the skeptical dialectic, labeling skepticism as a disease that should not be engaged with from the start. Countering this strategy via appeal to skeptical or non-dogmatic intuitions would either beg the question against Dogmatism or have little possibility of adjudicating the disagreement. Therefore, a different route is pursued. The Dogmatic point concerning immediate perceptual warrant is provisionally accepted and tested to determine whether it leads to a tenable position. It is argued that adopting the dogmatic standpoint generates a series of problems that cannot be handled without Dogmatism undergoing a significant revision. This revision shows that, far from being able to reject the skeptical dialectic entirely, Dogmatism must necessarily engage with the skeptical Problem of the Criterion.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 4","pages":"328-346"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12389","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149311683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Blind-Sight of Statistical Evidence 统计证据的盲目性
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-04 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12390
Hamid Vahid
{"title":"The Blind-Sight of Statistical Evidence","authors":"Hamid Vahid","doi":"10.1111/phib.12390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12390","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>While it is generally believed that the rationality of belief depends on the adequacy of (individual) evidence on which it is based, it seems that there are certain types of evidence, that is, statistical evidence, which, despite being sufficiently probabilifying, fail to confer justification on the relevant beliefs. In this paper, I will defend a particular solution to this puzzle, namely, the ‘normic support’ view, against some of the objections raised against it. I also appeal to the thesis of phenomenal intentionality to rectify a weakness in the view in question by introducing a necessary condition on when individual evidence can be said to normically support a content. Finally, I offer further reasons for the normic-support view. It is contended that, unlike cases of individual evidence, which are justification-conferring, statistical evidence at best provides us with a capacity to reliably <i>guess</i> whether a particular proposition is true, very much like what a blindsight subject can say about the objects in her blind field when contrasted with someone who is perceptually aware of that visual field.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 4","pages":"347-353"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149311717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bad Practices: Unintended Consequences of Practice-Based Theories of Reference 不良实践:基于实践的参考理论的意外后果
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2025-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12382
Hugo Heagren
{"title":"Bad Practices: Unintended Consequences of Practice-Based Theories of Reference","authors":"Hugo Heagren","doi":"10.1111/phib.12382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12382","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Practice theories are a genus of causal theories of reference. They claim that the semantic referent of an utterance of a name is determined by features of a practice of using that name to speaker-refer to, or coordinate actions around, a certain object. Practices might extend beyond the utterance, so the reference of some utterances is determined by future events. This entails no commitment on when facts about these future events are themselves determined; one might say they are determined as they happen (and are indeterminate beforehand) or that they are determinate at all times (including beforehand). The practice theory entails unacceptable consequences on either view. On the first, some utterances will have their referent determined once after some future events, then determined again, differently after further events: one utterance may have different semantic referents at different times. This entails similar, unacceptable, consequences for truth and epistemic status. On the second, there are cases of systematic and consistent semantic error which are indistinguishable from cases of systematic success. These are common and imperceptible enough that for all we know, this phenomenon may be very widespread, suggesting we should be skeptical of our knowledge of the semantics of our utterances.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 3","pages":"249-261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12382","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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