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Categorial versus naturalized epistemology 分类认识论与归化认识论
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12356
Nick Zangwill
{"title":"Categorial versus naturalized epistemology","authors":"Nick Zangwill","doi":"10.1111/phib.12356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12356","url":null,"abstract":"How do we know what kinds of things constitute knowledge or justified belief? Naturalized epistemology is committed to denying a priori insight into the kinds of kinds that are and are not knowledge or justification makers. By contrast, it is argued here that knowledge of these matters is a priori knowledge of a special kind. Such knowledge may be called “categorial.” The dialectical give and take between categorial and naturalized epistemology is pursued, before endorsing an argument that breaks the standoff in favor of categorial epistemology. In particular, an argument is given for a certain kind of mathematical skepticism that is entirely a priori. The skeptical argument turns on categorial claims about actuality. Responses are considered before defending a method of categorial dumbfounding in certain circumstances. This yields a positive argument for the categoriality of fundamental epistemic principles. The categorial rationalist conclusions are embraced and some consequences noted.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142259340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Naked statistical evidence and verdictive justice 赤裸裸的统计证据和判决司法
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12355
Sherrilyn Roush
{"title":"Naked statistical evidence and verdictive justice","authors":"Sherrilyn Roush","doi":"10.1111/phib.12355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12355","url":null,"abstract":"What is it for the verdict of a criminal trial to be just? It is widely agreed that a Guilty verdict is just only if the defendant did the relevant deed, and only if his rights were not violated in the process of apprehending, charging, and convicting him. I argue that more is required: he must be found Guilty <jats:italic>because</jats:italic> he is guilty, and not solely for other reasons. The conviction must be based on the guilt. I argue that many rules of evidence and procedural rules designed to protect a defendant's rights also encourage fulfillment of this basing condition and that the condition helps to explain how an erroneous conviction involving no misconduct can nevertheless be a moral wrong. I argue that the condition also gives an explanation (among others) of why a naked statistic is insufficient for a just conviction.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142226059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bringing the deep self back to the racecourse: Rethinking accountability and the deep self 让深度自我回归赛场：重新思考问责制和深层自我
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-07-17 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12354
Ke Zhang
{"title":"Bringing the deep self back to the racecourse: Rethinking accountability and the deep self","authors":"Ke Zhang","doi":"10.1111/phib.12354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12354","url":null,"abstract":"Deep self views of moral responsibility suggest that an agent fully satisfies the freedom condition for responsibility if and only if her actions or omissions issue from, and so express, her deep self. This analysis generates both false negatives and false positives regarding people's responsibility, and counterexamples proliferate. I defend a novel version of the deep self view by offering a necessary condition for accountability while retaining the core of deep self views. Indeed, an agent may be blameworthy for her wrongdoing without it issuing from, and so expressing, her deep self. And yet, I argue that she must have a deep self for which she is responsible. This is achieved by paying closer attention to history than standard views have. Focusing on history then reveals a less discussed problem for standard views: the ahistorical features of them make them less equipped to explain cases of blameworthiness that is undermined.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"36 Suppl 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141744716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Todd on the open future 托德：开放的未来
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-27 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12333
Ryan Wasserman
{"title":"Todd on the open future","authors":"Ryan Wasserman","doi":"10.1111/phib.12333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12333","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141548699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Defending The Open Future: Replies to MacFarlane, Green, Wasserman, and Bigg & Miller 捍卫开放的未来回复麦克法兰、格林、瓦瑟曼和比格与米勒
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-27 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12327
Patrick Todd
{"title":"Defending The Open Future: Replies to MacFarlane, Green, Wasserman, and Bigg & Miller","authors":"Patrick Todd","doi":"10.1111/phib.12327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12327","url":null,"abstract":"In this symposium piece, I reply to the diverse and wide‐ranging set of objections to my book (<jats:italic>The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False</jats:italic>) set forth by MacFarlane, Green, Wasserman, and Bigg &amp; Miller.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"363 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141548700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Varieties of future‐contingency 各种未来假设
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12332
Mitchell Green
{"title":"Varieties of future‐contingency","authors":"Mitchell Green","doi":"10.1111/phib.12332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12332","url":null,"abstract":"I here examine some of the main contentions of Todd's “The Open Future”. I argue first that a future contingent need not contain locutions such as “will” or cognates and that once this is recognized a trilemma emerges for Todd, putting pressure on him to relinquish one of the book's main aims. Then after noting (Section II) Todd's response to a puzzle A.N. prior had raised for betting on an open‐future style view, I turn (Sections IIIa and IIIb) to his discussion of whether his approach is committed to demanding that ordinary speakers reform their talk about the future. I conclude (Section IV) that the objective of the replacement strategy that Todd recommends could be achieved with less violence to ordinary linguistic practices with the help of a view on which “will” and cognates are polysemous.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"234 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141518559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Virtue and its moral psychology 美德及其道德心理学
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12343
Gopal Sreenivasan
{"title":"Virtue and its moral psychology","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.1111/phib.12343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12343","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:italic>Emotion and virtue</jats:italic> (2020) defends positions about virtue on two adjacent expanses of philosophical terrain. One is a matter of moral psychology, while the other concerns the theory of virtue. My primary thesis identifies a central role for emotion in the psychological constitution of exemplars of virtue. In this symposium, four outstanding commentators take turns examining some of the theses defended in the book. Roger Crisp and Julia Driver both seek to rehabilitate ‘black box’ theories of virtue, which marginalise the role of emotion. Black box theories are my opponents in moral psychology. Marco Rossi focuses on a core component of my defence, arguing that my distillation of existing theories of emotion is more controversial than I suppose. Finally, Justin D’Arms diagnoses a tension between two Aristotelian ideas he finds at work in my defence. While he is attracted to both ideas, he thinks the tension between them is problematic for my fundamental claim about the role of emotion in virtue. It is a real privilege to have been offered such a rich set of comments to engage.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141548701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reason and reciprocity: A response to Emotion and Virtue 理性与互惠：对《情感与美德》的回应
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12341
Roger Crisp
{"title":"Reason and reciprocity: A response to Emotion and Virtue","authors":"Roger Crisp","doi":"10.1111/phib.12341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12341","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a review of <jats:italic>Emotion and Virtue</jats:italic>, by Gopal Sreenivasan. Besides providing an overview of the book, it is suggested that the view of the virtues which gives less weight to the emotions remains plausible, as does the thesis of the unity of virtue.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141518558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fitting emotions and virtuous judgment 合情合理的判断
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12340
Justin D'Arms
{"title":"Fitting emotions and virtuous judgment","authors":"Justin D'Arms","doi":"10.1111/phib.12340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12340","url":null,"abstract":"I discuss a tension between two broadly Aristotelian ideas about the role of emotions in virtue and consider its implications for the original and attractive theory of virtuous judgment that Gopal Sreenivasan develops in Emotion and Virtue. One is the idea that a virtuous person has fitting emotions. The other idea is that the virtuous person has emotions that point her toward performing a virtuous action. I explain the tension between these ideas, and how it arises with respect to both of Sreenivasan's central examples of virtue: compassion and courage.I suggest that this tension generates some interesting and systemic respects in which a virtuous agent's virtuous emotional responses hamper her attempts to judge what is the virtuous thing to do. This makes me less sanguine than I take Sreenivasan to be about the contributions of emotion to the virtuous agent's reliability in passing his “Central Test of Virtue.”","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"151 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141518560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
‘Emotions’ in Gopal Sreenivasan's Emotion and Virtue 戈帕尔-斯里尼瓦桑《情感与美德》中的 "情感
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12342
Mauro Rossi
{"title":"‘Emotions’ in Gopal Sreenivasan's Emotion and Virtue","authors":"Mauro Rossi","doi":"10.1111/phib.12342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12342","url":null,"abstract":"In his remarkable new book, <jats:italic>Emotion and Virtue</jats:italic>, Sreenivasan defends the view that, in the case of many virtues, in order for an exemplar of each of these virtues to be a reliable judge of what that virtue requires in specific circumstances, she must possess a particular, morally rectified, emotional trait. In this article, I raise two challenges to “the argument from salience” that Sreenivasan offers in favor of this view. First, I argue that, although Sreenivasan wishes to remain neutral about different philosophical theories of emotions, the success of his argument depends, in fact, on the outcome of the debate about the nature of emotions. Second, I challenge the central claim of Sreenivasan's argument from salience, namely, that the possession of a morally rectified emotional trait, cleverness, and supplementary moral knowledge is sufficient to explain an agent's ability to reliably judge what a given virtue requires in specific circumstances.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"209 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141518562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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