{"title":"‘Emotions’ in Gopal Sreenivasan's Emotion and Virtue","authors":"Mauro Rossi","doi":"10.1111/phib.12342","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12342","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In his remarkable new book, <i>Emotion and Virtue</i>, Sreenivasan defends the view that, in the case of many virtues, in order for an exemplar of each of these virtues to be a reliable judge of what that virtue requires in specific circumstances, she must possess a particular, morally rectified, emotional trait. In this article, I raise two challenges to “the argument from salience” that Sreenivasan offers in favor of this view. First, I argue that, although Sreenivasan wishes to remain neutral about different philosophical theories of emotions, the success of his argument depends, in fact, on the outcome of the debate about the nature of emotions. Second, I challenge the central claim of Sreenivasan's argument from salience, namely, that the possession of a morally rectified emotional trait, cleverness, and supplementary moral knowledge is sufficient to explain an agent's ability to reliably judge what a given virtue requires in specific circumstances.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 3","pages":"464-471"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141518562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fitting emotions and virtuous judgment","authors":"Justin D'Arms","doi":"10.1111/phib.12340","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12340","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I discuss a tension between two broadly Aristotelian ideas about the role of emotions in virtue and consider its implications for the original and attractive theory of virtuous judgment that Gopal Sreenivasan develops in Emotion and Virtue. One is the idea that a virtuous person has fitting emotions. The other idea is that the virtuous person has emotions that point her toward performing a virtuous action. I explain the tension between these ideas, and how it arises with respect to both of Sreenivasan's central examples of virtue: compassion and courage.I suggest that this tension generates some interesting and systemic respects in which a virtuous agent's virtuous emotional responses hamper her attempts to judge what is the virtuous thing to do. This makes me less sanguine than I take Sreenivasan to be about the contributions of emotion to the virtuous agent's reliability in passing his “Central Test of Virtue.”</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 3","pages":"450-456"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12340","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141518560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A metapragmatic stereotype‐based account of reclamation","authors":"Nicolás Lo Guercio, Fernando Carranza","doi":"10.1111/phib.12345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12345","url":null,"abstract":"Group‐based slurs are words that express derogatory attitudes toward some group demarcated by a property that has historically caused social antagonism, for example, gender or ethnicity, among others. Reclamation, in turn, is the process whereby a slur starts being used non‐derogatorily by members of the target group to express a positive attitude. Some content‐based theories of slurs (which pin the derogatory force of such terms on their conventional meaning) account for reclamation by arguing that it involves a change in meaning so that reclaimed slurs are ambiguous. But these theories face a challenge, namely to account for the difference between reclaimed slurs and run‐of‐the‐mill ambiguous terms, whose felicitous uses do not seem to be restricted to in‐group speakers. In this article, we argue that the Reclamation Worry is not a problem for content‐based theories of slurs by advancing an account of reclamation that is compatible with such views. As we shall argue, such a theory must rely on the sociolinguistic dimension of such terms.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141189387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What physicalism could be","authors":"Michael J. Raven","doi":"10.1111/phib.12346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12346","url":null,"abstract":"The physicalist credo is that the world is physical. But some phenomena, such as minds, morals, and mathematics, appear to be nonphysical. While an uncompromising physicalism would reject these, a conciliatory physicalism need not if it can account for them in terms of an underlying physical basis. Any such account must refer to the nonphysical. But will not this unavoidable reference to the nonphysical conflict with the physicalist credo? This essay aims to clarify this problem and introduce a novel solution that relies on a distinction between “circumstantial” facts that are based in the circumstances and “acircumstantial” facts that are not. This is used in two ways. First, physicalism is restricted to circumstantial facts: Only they must have a physical basis that does not refer to the nonphysical. Second, facts accounting for the nonphysical are not restricted to the circumstantial: They may refer to the nonphysical if they are acircumstantial. Facts about how the physical accounts for the nonphysical therefore do not conflict with the physicalist's credo. This provides a credible answer to what physicalism could be.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141189253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why future contingents are not all false*","authors":"John MacFarlane","doi":"10.1111/phib.12334","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12334","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Patrick Todd argues for a modified Peircean view on which all future contingents are false. According to Todd, this is the only view that makes sense if we fully embrace an open future, rejecting the idea of actual future history. I argue that supervaluational accounts, on which future contingents are neither true nor false, are fully consistent with the metaphysics of an open future. I suggest that it is Todd's failure to distinguish semantic and postsemantic levels that leads him to suppose otherwise. I also show how one can resist Todd's argument (with Brian Rabern) that the conceptual possibility of omniscience requires us to reject Retro-closure (<span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>ϕ</mi>\u0000 <mo>→</mo>\u0000 <msub>\u0000 <mtext>Was</mtext>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </msub>\u0000 <msub>\u0000 <mtext>Will</mtext>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </msub>\u0000 <mi>ϕ</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </semantics></math>).</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 2","pages":"226-240"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139515507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the idea that all future tensed contingents are false","authors":"Anthony Bigg, Kristie Miller","doi":"10.1111/phib.12335","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12335","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In ‘The Open Future’ (2021), Patrick Todd argues that the future is open and that, as a consequence, all future contingents are false (as opposed to the more common view that they are neither true nor false). Very roughly, this latter claim is motivated by the idea that (a) presentism is true, and so future (and indeed past) things1 do not exist, and (b) if future things do not exist, then the only thing that could ground there being future tensed facts, and hence make those future tensed claims true, is the present and the laws of nature. But (c) the present and the laws of nature cannot ground there being future tensed facts because they do not necessitate there being any such fact. Hence, future tensed claims are all false. Todd then goes on to present a semantics for his version of the open future in which all future contingents are false. In what follows, we take up two strands of Todd's view. First, we begin, in Section 2, by outlining Todd's argument that future contingents are all false. We suggest that the considerations that Todd adduces to this conclusion do not support this being so. Then, in Section 3, we consider the semantics that Todd offers and argue that it yields implausible consequences.</p><p>Let us begin with a recap of why Todd thinks that future contingents are all false. We start with some assumptions about our world. In particular, we begin with the assumption that (a) presentism is true and (b) causal indeterminism is true. Thus, we assume that future states of affairs do not exist and that the present state of the world, in conjunction with the laws of nature, does not entail what will be the case at any future time.2 Next, Todd articulates a core intuition that grounds much of what comes later in the book. The idea is that the present and the laws <i>produce</i> the future, and given this, they are what ground there being future tensed facts, if such facts there be (Todd, <span>2021</span>: 18–19). Thus, if the laws are indeterministic, then there can be no future tensed facts. This is because the existence of any such facts would be intolerably arbitrary, as these facts would not be necessitated by what is supposed to ground them.3 And the existence of facts that are not strictly required by their would-be explanans, Todd calls ‘mysterious and bizarre’ (ibid. 19). Hence, since there are no such facts, the future is open. Moreover, since there are no such facts, we should conclude that future tensed contingents are false. What it would be for there to be true future tensed contingents is for there to be future tensed facts, and there are none of these. It is the fact that the present and the laws <i>can</i> bring about a sea battle tomorrow that, according to Todd, entails that the proposition <<i>It will be the case that there is no sea battle tomorrow</i>> is false. Mutatis mutandis, the present and the laws, jointly, likewise have the power to bring it about that there is <i>no</i> sea battle tomorrow. And","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 2","pages":"209-216"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12335","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139561059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lucky artists","authors":"Christopher Prodoehl","doi":"10.1111/phib.12330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12330","url":null,"abstract":"Imagine an artist creating new work, a painter applying paint to canvas with a brush, for example. Assuming she acts intentionally, is she responsible for the work she creates? Is she responsible, in particular, for whatever value her finished work has? In the first part of the paper, I formulate an argument for the claim she is not; I call this the Luck Argument. According to that argument, an important aspect of the work's value is due to luck, so not something for which the artist is responsible. I then go on to challenge the Luck Argument. I suggest that intentional control is not the only type of control artists exercise over their bodily activity. There is another type, which I call receptive control. The concept of receptive control makes it possible to challenge a crucial premise in the Luck Argument.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"50 31","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138946395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is distinct location evidence of distinct objects? Multilocation and the problem of parsimony","authors":"David Harmon","doi":"10.1111/phib.12331","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12331","url":null,"abstract":"<p>For an object to be multilocated is for it to wholly occupy disjoint spatial regions simultaneously. If multilocation is possible, it is possible that a multilocated particle is wholly located at 10<sup>80</sup> distinct locations, such that it constitutes a particle-for-particle duplicate of the actual universe. Such a universe would presumably be perceptually identical to the actual universe. If we take multilocation as possible, we are thus presented with two accounts between which our perceptual evidence cannot adjudicate: one wherein the universe is constituted by many particles and another wherein it is constituted by one radically multilocated particle. Parsimony concerns dictate that the latter is the more rational to accept. Since this is absurd, we should reject that multilocation is possible. Mooney responds to the problem by arguing that distinct location is evidence of non-identity, even if acceptance of the possibility of multilocation entails that this evidence is not decisive. If this is right, then the evidence favors a theory featuring many particles. In this paper, I contend that our commitment to taking distinct location as evidence of nonidentity is motivated by a more fundamental intuition that does not apply in the relevant context.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 3","pages":"394-401"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12331","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138692512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bullshit activities","authors":"Kenny Easwaran","doi":"10.1111/phib.12328","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12328","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Frankfurt gave an account of “bullshit” as a statement made without regard to truth or falsity. Austin argued that a large amount of language consists of speech acts aimed at goals other than truth or falsity. We don't want our account of bullshit to include all performatives. I develop a modification of Frankfurt's account that makes interesting and useful categorizations of various speech acts as bullshit or not and show that this account generalizes to many other kinds of act as well. I show that this illuminates some of Graeber's classification of “bullshit jobs,” though it doesn't fully agree with it.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 3","pages":"306-328"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12328","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138509641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The good and the powers","authors":"Michele Paolini Paoletti","doi":"10.1111/phib.12326","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12326","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Neo-Aristotelian views of goodness hold that the goodness of something is strictly connected with its goal(s). In this article, I shall present a power-based, Neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. I shall claim that there are certain powers (i.e., Goodness-Conferring Powers, or GC-powers in short) that confer goodness upon their bearers and upon the resulting actions. And I shall suggest that GC-powers are strongly teleological tendencies. In Section 1, I shall present the kernel of Neo-Aristotelian conceptions of goodness. In Section 2, I shall introduce strongly teleological powers and tendencies. In Section 3, GC-powers will be characterized. I shall also examine a number of options with regard to their number and features and how to single out their goodness value. In Section 4, I shall focus on good agents and on three distinct ways in which they may be good: tendential goodness, actual goodness, and purely actual goodness. Relatedly, among the actions connected with a certain GC-power, I shall also distinguish between primary and secondary actions and between pure and impure actions. In Section 5, good actions will be examined. Actions may be good in three distinct ways. Indeed, actions may be endowed with primary goodness, secondary goodness and preventative goodness. In Section 6, I shall face the remaining problems.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 3","pages":"402-431"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12326","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138509683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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