Analytic Philosophy最新文献_第2页

Comments on Emotion and Virtue by Gopal Sreenivasan 对 Gopal Sreenivasan 所著《情感与美德》的评论

IF 0.6 2区哲学

Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12339

Julia Driver

引用次数: 0

Modeling action: Recasting the causal theory 行动建模：重塑因果理论

IF 0.6 2区哲学

Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12352

Megan Fritts, Frank Cabrera

引用次数: 0

A metapragmatic stereotype‐based account of reclamation 基于陈规定型观念的开垦元论

IF 0.6 2区哲学

Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12345

Nicolás Lo Guercio, Fernando Carranza

引用次数: 0

What physicalism could be 物理主义可能是什么

IF 0.6 2区哲学

Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-05-27 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12346

Michael J. Raven

引用次数: 0

Why future contingents are not all false* 为什么未来的特遣队不全是假的*

IF 0.6 2区哲学

Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-17 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12334

John MacFarlane

引用次数: 0

On the idea that all future tensed contingents are false 关于所有未来张紧式或然条件都是假的这一观点

IF 0.6 2区哲学

Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12335

Anthony Bigg, Kristie Miller

{"title":"On the idea that all future tensed contingents are false","authors":"Anthony Bigg, Kristie Miller","doi":"10.1111/phib.12335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12335","url":null,"abstract":"<h2>1 INTRODUCTION</h2>\u0000<p>In ‘The Open Future’ (2021), Patrick Todd argues that the future is open and that, as a consequence, all future contingents are false (as opposed to the more common view that they are neither true nor false). Very roughly, this latter claim is motivated by the idea that (a) presentism is true, and so future (and indeed past) things1 do not exist, and (b) if future things do not exist, then the only thing that could ground there being future tensed facts, and hence make those future tensed claims true, is the present and the laws of nature. But (c) the present and the laws of nature cannot ground there being future tensed facts because they do not necessitate there being any such fact. Hence, future tensed claims are all false. Todd then goes on to present a semantics for his version of the open future in which all future contingents are false. In what follows, we take up two strands of Todd's view. First, we begin, in Section 2, by outlining Todd's argument that future contingents are all false. We suggest that the considerations that Todd adduces to this conclusion do not support this being so. Then, in Section 3, we consider the semantics that Todd offers and argue that it yields implausible consequences.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139561059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Lucky artists 幸运的艺术家

IF 0.6 2区哲学

Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-22 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12330

Christopher Prodoehl

引用次数: 0

Is distinct location evidence of distinct objects? Multilocation and the problem of parsimony 独特的位置是独特对象的证据吗？多重定位与解析问题

IF 0.6 2区哲学

Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12331

David Harmon

{"title":"Is distinct location evidence of distinct objects? Multilocation and the problem of parsimony","authors":"David Harmon","doi":"10.1111/phib.12331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12331","url":null,"abstract":"For an object to be multilocated is for it to wholly occupy disjoint spatial regions simultaneously. If multilocation is possible, it is possible that a multilocated particle is wholly located at 10<sup>80</sup> distinct locations, such that it constitutes a particle-for-particle duplicate of the actual universe. Such a universe would presumably be perceptually identical to the actual universe. If we take multilocation as possible, we are thus presented with two accounts between which our perceptual evidence cannot adjudicate: one wherein the universe is constituted by many particles and another wherein it is constituted by one radically multilocated particle. Parsimony concerns dictate that the latter is the more rational to accept. Since this is absurd, we should reject that multilocation is possible. Mooney responds to the problem by arguing that distinct location is evidence of non-identity, even if acceptance of the possibility of multilocation entails that this evidence is not decisive. If this is right, then the evidence favors a theory featuring many particles. In this paper, I contend that our commitment to taking distinct location as evidence of nonidentity is motivated by a more fundamental intuition that does not apply in the relevant context.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138692512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Bullshit activities 废话活动

IF 0.6 2区哲学

Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12328

Kenny Easwaran

引用次数: 0

The good and the powers 善良和力量

IF 0.6 2区哲学

Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12326

Michele Paolini Paoletti

{"title":"The good and the powers","authors":"Michele Paolini Paoletti","doi":"10.1111/phib.12326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12326","url":null,"abstract":"Neo-Aristotelian views of goodness hold that the goodness of something is strictly connected with its goal(s). In this article, I shall present a power-based, Neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. I shall claim that there are certain powers (i.e., Goodness-Conferring Powers, or GC-powers in short) that confer goodness upon their bearers and upon the resulting actions. And I shall suggest that GC-powers are strongly teleological tendencies. In Section 1, I shall present the kernel of Neo-Aristotelian conceptions of goodness. In Section 2, I shall introduce strongly teleological powers and tendencies. In Section 3, GC-powers will be characterized. I shall also examine a number of options with regard to their number and features and how to single out their goodness value. In Section 4, I shall focus on good agents and on three distinct ways in which they may be good: tendential goodness, actual goodness, and purely actual goodness. Relatedly, among the actions connected with a certain GC-power, I shall also distinguish between primary and secondary actions and between pure and impure actions. In Section 5, good actions will be examined. Actions may be good in three distinct ways. Indeed, actions may be endowed with primary goodness, secondary goodness and preventative goodness. In Section 6, I shall face the remaining problems.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138509683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0