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A Hundred Thousand Darlingtons: Self-Respect, Moral Judgement, and the Right to an Equal Democratic Say 《十万个达林顿：自尊、道德判断与平等民主发言权
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2025-04-24 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12372
Shruta Swarup
{"title":"A Hundred Thousand Darlingtons: Self-Respect, Moral Judgement, and the Right to an Equal Democratic Say","authors":"Shruta Swarup","doi":"10.1111/phib.12372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12372","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I defend the non-instrumentalist thesis that every adult member of a political society has a <i>pro tanto</i> fundamental moral right to an equal democratic say in determining the content of the laws to which she is subject. I begin by giving an account of an important kind of servility that has received only glancing notice in philosophical discussion. This servility consists in the willingness to subordinate one's capacity for moral judgement (as distinct from one's interests, desires, or will) to another's. I argue that, barring special circumstances, an adult person who willingly acquiesces to a lesser political liberty displays this type of servility. An adult cannot normally self-respectfully acquiesce to a less than equal democratic say. But, I argue, a condition for a political society to be just is that its members can self-respectfully acquiesce to the status it accords them. Thus, it is a <i>pro tanto</i> intrinsic requirement of justice that all adult members of a political society be granted an equal democratic say. There is a <i>pro tanto</i> fundamental moral <i>right</i> to an equal democratic say.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 3","pages":"201-216"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12372","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In Defense of Pragmatism 为实用主义辩护
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2025-06-02 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12381
Guowei Lai
{"title":"In Defense of Pragmatism","authors":"Guowei Lai","doi":"10.1111/phib.12381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12381","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In the ethics of belief debate, pragmatism is the thesis that practical considerations can be reasons for belief. By contrast, evidentialism is the thesis that only evidence can provide reasons for belief. Intuitions about specific cases seem to lend support to pragmatism. However, many evidentialists explain away these intuitive judgments by claiming that (a) there can be practical reasons to bring about a belief, and (b) in these cases one should bring about such beliefs. I argue that (a) and (b) are double-edged responses: if either of these claims is true, pragmatism is also true. Based on the assumption that either (a) or (b) is true, I provide three new arguments for pragmatism. I also consider evidentialist variants of the above response holding that practical considerations are reasons to intend, want, or try to bring about the belief that p. I argue that these variants are equally problematic.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 3","pages":"217-223"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
From Moral Supervenience to Moral Contingentism (In One Easy Step!) 从道德监督到道德偶然性（简单一步！）
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12378
Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier
{"title":"From Moral Supervenience to Moral Contingentism (In One Easy Step!)","authors":"Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier","doi":"10.1111/phib.12378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12378","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to the Divide &amp; Conquer (DC) strategy (Fogal and Risberg 2020) for explaining moral supervenience, the modal covariation between moral and natural properties can be partly explained by appeal to pure moral principles. Bhogal (2022) has recently argued that DC fails. A pure moral principle like Act Utilitarianism (AU) cannot explain moral supervenience because AU is not a difference-maker for moral supervenience. There is nothing special about AU which explains why moral properties supervene on natural properties; other moral principles would also explain moral supervenience. On the other hand, if the proponent of DC appeals to some general feature of pure moral principles (like the fact that they have a “bridge-law” structure) then there is a question of what explains that feature. In this paper I do two things. First, I explore a possible extension of the DC-strategy against Bhogal's objection: I consider whether pure moral principles have the right features to explain moral supervenience by showing how these features follow from plausible assumptions about the underlying metaphysics of moral principles. Secondly, I show how this extended version of the DC-strategy can be used as a novel argument for moral contingentism.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 3","pages":"224-237"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12378","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In Defense of Pragmatism 为实用主义辩护
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2025-06-02 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12381
Guowei Lai
{"title":"In Defense of Pragmatism","authors":"Guowei Lai","doi":"10.1111/phib.12381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12381","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In the ethics of belief debate, pragmatism is the thesis that practical considerations can be reasons for belief. By contrast, evidentialism is the thesis that only evidence can provide reasons for belief. Intuitions about specific cases seem to lend support to pragmatism. However, many evidentialists explain away these intuitive judgments by claiming that (a) there can be practical reasons to bring about a belief, and (b) in these cases one should bring about such beliefs. I argue that (a) and (b) are double-edged responses: if either of these claims is true, pragmatism is also true. Based on the assumption that either (a) or (b) is true, I provide three new arguments for pragmatism. I also consider evidentialist variants of the above response holding that practical considerations are reasons to intend, want, or try to bring about the belief that p. I argue that these variants are equally problematic.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 3","pages":"217-223"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Concept of Categoricity 范畴的概念
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2025-07-20 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12385
Sungho Choi
{"title":"The Concept of Categoricity","authors":"Sungho Choi","doi":"10.1111/phib.12385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12385","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite the fact that the concept of categoricity is ubiquitous in contemporary metaphysics, it is hard to find a suitable characterization of categoricity. I hold that the absence of such a characterization is responsible for much confusion and debate regarding categorical properties and their relationship to dispositions. With this in the background, this paper aims to make clear the intuitive ground for our concept of categoricity by taking cues from Locke's view of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The key thesis, which I call “the BIC proposal,” is that in case of paradigmatically categorical properties Q, the conscious content of our mental image of x's instantiating Q includes that x exhibits a certain distinctive manifestation actually or occurrently in the sense explained below. I believe that this is a promising formulation of the popular thought that x's instantiating a categorical property concerns what x <i>actually</i> or <i>occurrently</i> is like or does <i>without</i> any external stimuli. It is thus hoped to improve our understanding of categoricity and pave the way for more informed discussions about topics surrounding categorical properties.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 3","pages":"268-275"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12385","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Flaw in Sider's Vagueness Argument for Perdurantism: Endurantism Endures 锡德关于持久论的模糊论证的缺陷：持久论是持久的
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2025-07-04 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12386
Harold W. Noonan
{"title":"A Flaw in Sider's Vagueness Argument for Perdurantism: Endurantism Endures","authors":"Harold W. Noonan","doi":"10.1111/phib.12386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12386","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Sider's vagueness argument for perdurantism (2001: 126ff.) has long been seen as one of the most powerful, or perhaps the most powerful, in the perdurantist's arsenal. In its absence, the case against endurantism is significantly weakened. Despite its age, there is still no generally agreed view on its worth. I shall show that this argument fails. It is an extension of a modification Sider gives of David Lewis's argument for unrestricted mereological composition. I shall first set out Lewis's argument for unrestricted mereological composition, Sider's modification, and the problem with it. I will then turn to Sider's extension of the argument into an argument for perdurantism and show that it suffers from the same problem. As I shall explain, though Sider's modification of Lewis's argument for unrestricted mereological composition fails, this is not a crushing blow for proponents of that thesis, since Lewis's original argument is still available, which is valid and plausibly sound. But there is no available retreat for the perdurantist to a Lewisian form of Sider's argument for perdurantism.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 3","pages":"262-267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12386","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Time, Sociality, Institutions: The Core Capacity Conjecture 时间、社会性、制度：核心能力猜想
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2025-07-23 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12387
Michael E. Bratman
{"title":"Time, Sociality, Institutions: The Core Capacity Conjecture","authors":"Michael E. Bratman","doi":"10.1111/phib.12387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12387","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our human agency involves multiple and inter-related forms of mind-shaped practical organization. We act over time in ways that exhibit striking forms of cross-temporal organization. We act together in ways that exhibit stunning forms of small-scale social organization. Our social lives are shaped by a background of social rules. And much of what we do is embedded in and shaped by organized, rule-guided institutions. These multiple forms of mind-shaped practical organization, temporal and social, are deep and pervasive features of our lives. They should be a main target of philosophical reflection on our agency. I argue that a key idea in such an organizational and social turn in the philosophy of action is that we are planning agents. Our planning agency involves a fundamental form of practical thinking that underlies our mind-shaped practical organization over time. And the <i>core capacity conjecture</i> is that these planning structures also—and in part thereby—underlie basic forms of our human social organization.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 3","pages":"283-294"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Representationalism and the Spatial Representational Contents of Afterimage Experiences 再现主义与后像体验的空间再现性内容
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12379
René Jagnow
{"title":"Representationalism and the Spatial Representational Contents of Afterimage Experiences","authors":"René Jagnow","doi":"10.1111/phib.12379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12379","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Experiences of afterimages have often been cited as counterexamples to representationalism about vision, that is, as counterexamples to the thesis that the phenomenal character of a visual experience is completely determined by its representational content. In this paper, I discuss a possible counterexample to representationalism that is based on the phenomenological observation made, for example, by Ned Block, that at least some afterimages do not look real. After first clarifying what a possible counterexample based on this observation would have to look like, I formulate and defend a representationalist response.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 3","pages":"238-248"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12379","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-04-29
{"title":"","authors":"","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 2","pages":"i-iv"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148097621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2026-04-29
{"title":"","authors":"","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"67 2","pages":"i-iv"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148097622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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