{"title":"The Tracking Theory of Claim-Rights","authors":"Mark McBride","doi":"10.1111/phib.12247","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12247","url":null,"abstract":"<p>My task here is to articulate my own novel hybrid theory of (claim-)rights, namely, the Tracking Theory of rights. While new, it has historical antecedents. There is nothing (entirely) new under the sun. Its most vivid antecedents come from the fields of epistemology, in particular Robert Nozick's work, and legal philosophy, in particular Gopal Sreenivasan's work. I am happy to stand on the shoulders of giants. Here I want to freshly articulate the theory from the ground up. So the challenge will be to keep the articulation of the Tracking Theory front and centre, but, naturally, indebtedness to Nozick and Sreenivasan will be woven in at multiple junctures. My Tracking Theory will neither stand nor fall with Nozick's. The relation is more subtle. The strategy is to trade on the indubitable subtlety of Nozick's epistemology to capture the structure of a central normative concept.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 3","pages":"256-276"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43451196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Varieties of conceptual analysis","authors":"M. Kölbel","doi":"10.2307/j.ctt211qvj5.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt211qvj5.5","url":null,"abstract":": What exactly does conceptual analysis consist in? Is it empirical or a priori? How does it support philosophical theses, and what kinds of thesis are these? There is no consensus on these questions in contemporary philosophy. This paper aims to defend conceptual analysis by showing that it comprises a number of different methods and by explaining their importance in philosophy. After setting out an initial dilemma for conceptual analysis, the paper outlines a minimal ecumenical account of concepts, as well as an account of concept possession and concept employment. On the basis of these accounts, the paper then argues that there are both empirical and a priori forms of conceptual analysis, and that each can be defended as legitimate methods. The philosophical interest of conceptual analysis, however, resides in relying on all three types of method in the service of answering philosophical concerns. This is illustrated by three sample cases.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42873222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Varieties of conceptual analysis","authors":"Max Kölbel","doi":"10.1111/phib.12249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12249","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What exactly does conceptual analysis consist in? Is it empirical or a priori? How does it support philosophical theses? and What kinds of thesis are these? There is no consensus on these questions in contemporary philosophy. This study aims to defend conceptual analysis by showing that it comprises a number of different methods and by explaining their importance in philosophy. After setting out an initial dilemma for conceptual analysis, the study outlines a minimal ecumenical account of concepts, as well as an account of concept possession and concept employment. On the basis of these accounts, the study then argues that there are both empirical and a priori forms of conceptual analysis, and that each can be defended as legitimate methods. The philosophical interest of conceptual analysis, however, resides in relying on all three types of method in the service of answering philosophical concerns. This is illustrated by three sample cases.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 1","pages":"20-38"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12249","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50143112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Teleological powers","authors":"Michele Paolini Paoletti","doi":"10.1111/phib.12245","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12245","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, I develop a metaphysical account of final causes grounded on contemporary powers metaphysics. After having presented some key elements of an Aristotle-inspired teleology, i.e., the study of final causes within Aristotelian tradition, I introduce powers. Moreover, I present some theses about their nature and features. Afterward, I distinguish between two kinds of powers that are expected to play the roles traditionally attributed to final causes: weakly teleological powers and strongly teleological powers. Weakly teleological powers are those powers that ground the possession of all the other powers of a substance. Strongly teleological powers are those powers that ground the activation of all the other powers of a substance. Within this framework, I then develop some options to deal with human teleology, i.e., with the study of human behavior in light of final causes. Finally, in the last Section, I briefly compare my account with other accounts of teleology and of specific sorts of powers that somehow resemble teleological powers.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"62 4","pages":"336-358"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/phib.12245","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41673293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Practical reasons for belief without stakes☆","authors":"Shawn Hernandez, N. G. Laskowski","doi":"10.1111/phib.12244","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12244","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Pragmatic encroachment can be thought of as the idea that knowledge is in some way sensitive to practical considerations, including practical considerations involving what is at stake in getting things right. Recently, Mark Schroeder defends pragmatic encroachment by showing how it could be true. This paper argues that the view proposed by Schroeder is vulnerable to a simple but important objection. It also argues that the objection can be avoided by claiming that there are even more kinds of practical considerations that can be epistemic reasons than those kinds involving stakes.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"63 1","pages":"16-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/phib.12244","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41305166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against normativism about mental attitudes","authors":"Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini","doi":"10.1111/phib.12243","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12243","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Normativists argue that the mind is essentially normative and any adequate account of our mental attitudes must involve normative terms and judgments. In particular, one brand of Normativism defends the claim that mental attitudes are defined by constitutive norms. Against this, Anti-normativists have offered non-normative accounts of mental states.The goal of this paper is to bolster Anti-normativism by undermining one key argument in favor of Normativism.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"62 3","pages":"295-311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/phib.12243","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45795652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lacking, needing, and wanting","authors":"David Hunter","doi":"10.1111/phib.12242","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12242","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I offer a novel conception of the nature of wanting. According to it, wanting is lacking something one needs. Lacking is not a normative notion but needing is, and that is how goodness figures in to wanting. What a thing needs derives from what it is to be a good thing of its kind. In people, wanting is connected to both knowledge and the will. A person can know that she wants something and can act on that knowledge. When she does, she is acting in light of that want and her want is a reason why she acted. There is a close connection between wanting and our wills, not just because we can sometimes choose how to get what we need, but because our choices can determine what we want. We can't simply choose to want something, but in deciding how to live our lives, who to be, and what to pursue, we are free to settle what we want, at least within limits. These connections to knowledge and the will make human wanting rich and morally relevant, but they don't transform human wanting into something special. Wanting is everywhere just a matter of lacking something one needs.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 2","pages":"143-160"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/phib.12242","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49554165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quotational and other opaque belief reports","authors":"Wayne A. Davis","doi":"10.1111/phib.12239","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12239","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a novel move against Russellianism, Heck (2014) has argued that reports of the form <i>S believes that p</i> are semantically opaque on the grounds that there are no other means in English to report psychologically individuated beliefs, such as those Lois Lane reports using the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent.’ I show that there are several other ways to meet this need. I focus on quotational reports of the form <i>S believes “p</i>,<i>”</i> which philosophers have overlooked or mischaracterized. I argue that reports of this form are no more metalinguistic than those using the complementizer <i>that</i>. In both, the meaning of the report depends on the meaning, not the form, of the complement. Some distinguishing features of non-metalinguistic quotational reports are that their complements force “deictic shift” and have no transparent interpretation. Free direct speech and thought bubbles have the same properties. The “q-ascriptions” McCullagh (2017a) proposed to defend Russellianism against Heck are not in common use and on his account are unsuitably metalinguistic. The fact that quotational belief reports are opaque without being metalinguistic makes the Russellian thesis that the meaning of a name is its referent untenable, thereby undermining Russellianism about belief reports.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"63 4","pages":"213-231"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/phib.12239","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47797952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Paraphrase, categories, and ontology","authors":"Jonah Goldwater","doi":"10.1111/phib.12240","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12240","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The method of paraphrasing away apparent ontological commitments is a familiar tool for trimming one's ontology. Even so, I argue that aiming to avoid commitment via paraphrase is unjustified. The reason is the standard motivations for paraphrase rest on implicit yet faulty principles regarding ontological categories and categorization- or so I argue. These results also provide indirect support for a permissivist approach to ontology.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 1","pages":"39-56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/phib.12240","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43919746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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