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The structure of semantic norms 语义规范的结构
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-02-06 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12262
Jeffrey Kaplan
{"title":"The structure of semantic norms","authors":"Jeffrey Kaplan","doi":"10.1111/phib.12262","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12262","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The normativity of meaning—introduced by Kripke in 1982, and the subject of active debate since the early 1990s—has been exclusively understood in terms of duty-imposing norms. But there are norms of another type, well-known within the philosophy of law: authority-conferring norms. Philosophers thinking and writing about the normativity of meaning—normativists, anti-normativists, and even Kripke himself—seem to have failed to consider the possibility that semantic norms are authority-conferring. I argue that semantic norms should be understood as having an authority-conferring structure, and show how this allows normativism about meaning to escape the two most popular arguments against it.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 4","pages":"373-391"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43026480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When does self-interest distort moral belief? 什么时候自利扭曲了道德信仰?
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-02-03 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12261
Nicholas Smyth
{"title":"When does self-interest distort moral belief?","authors":"Nicholas Smyth","doi":"10.1111/phib.12261","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12261","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I critically analyze the notion that self-interest distorts moral belief-formation. This belief is widely shared among modern moral epistemologists, and in this paper, I seek to undermine this near consensus. I then offer a principle which can help us to sort cases in which self-interest distorts moral belief from cases in which it does not. As it turns out, we cannot determine whether such distortion has occurred from the armchair; rather, we must inquire into mechanisms of social power and advantage before declaring that some moral position is distorted by self-interest.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 4","pages":"392-408"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42312426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge-first perceptual epistemology: A comment on Littlejohn and Millar 知识优先的知觉认识论:对Littlejohn和Millar的评析
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-23 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12256
David de Bruijn
{"title":"Knowledge-first perceptual epistemology: A comment on Littlejohn and Millar","authors":"David de Bruijn","doi":"10.1111/phib.12256","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12256","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), ordinary perceptual experience <i>ensures</i> an opportunity for perceptual knowledge. In recent years, two distinct models of this idea have been developed. For Duncan Pritchard (<i>Epistemological disjunctivism</i>, 2012, Oxford University Press; <i>Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing</i>, 2012, Princeton University Press), perception provides distinctly powerful <i>reasons</i> for belief. By contrast, Clayton Littlejohn (<i>Journal of Philosophical Research</i>, 41, 201; <i>Knowledge first</i>, 2017, Oxford University Press; <i>Normativity</i>: <i>Epistemic and practical</i>, 2018, Oxford University Press) and Alan Millar (<i>The nature and value of knowledge</i>: <i>Three investigations</i>, 2010, Oxford University Press; <i>Philosophical Issues</i>, 21, 332) argue for a version of ED in terms of a “knowledge first” program, on which perception directly provides <i>knowledge</i>, without relying on antecedent reasons or justification. Specifically, both Littlejohn and Millar argue that “reasons first” ED faces a problematic regress. In this article, I defend “reasons first” ED by arguing that <i>experience</i> provides a type of reason that escapes the regress. I also argue that reasons are a fundamental aspect of ED, especially in its anti-skeptical stance.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 3","pages":"329-345"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48382101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Singular thoughts, singular attitude reports, and acquaintance 奇异的思想，奇异的态度，报告和相识
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12254
Jeonggyu Lee
{"title":"Singular thoughts, singular attitude reports, and acquaintance","authors":"Jeonggyu Lee","doi":"10.1111/phib.12254","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12254","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is widely accepted among philosophers that there is a tension between acquaintance constraints on singular thought and the plausible assumption that the truths of singular attitude reports ensure the subject's having singular thoughts. From this, anti-acquaintance theorists contend that acquaintance constraints must be rejected. As a response, many acquaintance theorists maintain that there is good reason to doubt a strong connection between singular attitude reports and singular thoughts. In this paper, however, I defend the acquaintance theory by arguing that there is in fact no tension at all. I consider three objections regarding singular attitude reports against the acquaintance theory: (i) ultra-liberal singular attitude reports, (ii) the “There is something that <i>S</i> believes to be <i>F</i>” locution, and (iii) infelicities of singular attitude reports. Then, I argue that none of them succeed in showing a genuine tension.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 2","pages":"126-142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43950483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bundle theory and weak discernibility 丛理论与弱可分辨性
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12255
Seungil Lee
{"title":"Bundle theory and weak discernibility","authors":"Seungil Lee","doi":"10.1111/phib.12255","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12255","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Bundle Theory is the view that every concrete particular object is solely constituted by its universals. This theory is often criticized for not accommodating the possibility of symmetrical universes, such as one that contains two indiscernible spheres two meters from each other in otherwise empty space. One bundle theoretic solution to this criticism holds that the fact that the spheres stand in a <i>weakly discerning—</i>i.e., irreflexive and symmetric—relation, such as <i>being two meters from</i>, is sufficient for the numerical diversity of the spheres. For this solution to be effective, however, it should be established that weak discernibility not only necessitates but also <i>explains</i> numerical diversity. In this paper, I argue that the fact that two objects have a certain distance between them does explain why they are non-identical. I also argue that the worry that the weak discernibility approach has some circularity problems is not well-founded.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 3","pages":"197-210"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47831511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-cognitivism about Metaphysical explanation 关于形而上学解释的非认知主义
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12258
Kristie Miller, James Norton
{"title":"Non-cognitivism about Metaphysical explanation","authors":"Kristie Miller,&nbsp;James Norton","doi":"10.1111/phib.12258","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12258","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article introduces a non-cognitivist account of metaphysical explanation according to which the core function of judgements of the form ⌜x <i>because</i> y⌝ is not to state truth-apt beliefs. Instead, their core function is to express attitudes of <i>commitment to</i>, and <i>recommendation of the acceptance of</i> certain norms governing interventional conduct at contexts.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 2","pages":"106-125"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42092894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Humility and metaphysics 谦逊与形而上学
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12259
José L. Zalabardo
{"title":"Humility and metaphysics","authors":"José L. Zalabardo","doi":"10.1111/phib.12259","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12259","url":null,"abstract":"<p>David Lewis has argued that we cannot identify the fundamental properties. It is generally accepted that we can resist Lewis's conclusion if we are prepared to accept a structuralist account of fundamental properties, according to which their causal/nomological role is essential to their identity. I argue, to the contrary, that a structuralist construal of fundamental properties does not sustain a successful independent strategy for resisting Lewis's conclusion. The structuralist can vindicate our ability to identify fundamental properties only if she accepts epistemic principles that suffice for blocking Lewis's conclusion even if fundamental properties are not construed along structuralist lines.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 3","pages":"183-196"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44828765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Motivational determinism 动机决定论
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-07 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12253
Eric Christian Barnes
{"title":"Motivational determinism","authors":"Eric Christian Barnes","doi":"10.1111/phib.12253","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12253","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Physical determinism is a metaphysical thesis about the natural world whose consequences for freedom and moral responsibility have been widely discussed. In this paper, I articulate a different form of determinism, motivational determinism, which claims that all intentional action is causally determined by the prior motivational state of the agent. Motivational determinism was defended in a simple form by Hume, but has been neglected in recent philosophical literature. I show that there are important reasons that support the plausibility of MD. I then compare MD with libertarian and physical deterministic theories of agency and note that MD has various attractive features. I show that MD is much more threatening to moral responsibility than physical determinism. I conclude that MD is an interesting theory of human agency that deserves wide attention.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 3","pages":"211-227"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46671672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Prejudice as the misattribution of salience☆ 偏见是对卓越的错误归因
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-11-08 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12250
Jessie Munton
{"title":"Prejudice as the misattribution of salience☆","authors":"Jessie Munton","doi":"10.1111/phib.12250","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12250","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What does it take to be prejudiced against a particular group? And is prejudice always epistemically problematic, or are there epistemically innocent forms of prejudice? In this paper, I argue that certain important forms of prejudice can be wholly constituted by the differential accessibility of certain pieces of information. These accessibility relations constitute a salience structure. A subject is prejudiced against a particular group when their salience structure is unduly organised around that category. This is significant because it reveals that prejudice does not require the presence of any explicit cognitive or emotive attitude, nor need it manifest in behaviour: it can be solely constituted by the <i>organisation</i> of information, where that information may be accurate and well-founded. Nonetheless, by giving an account of ‘undue organisation’ in epistemic terms, I show that this account is compatible with an understanding of prejudice as a negatively valenced epistemic category.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 1","pages":"1-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42711519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
A familiar dilemma for the subset theory of realization 实现子集理论的常见困境
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-06 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12246
Matthew Rellihan
{"title":"A familiar dilemma for the subset theory of realization","authors":"Matthew Rellihan","doi":"10.1111/phib.12246","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12246","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I argue that the subset theory of property realization cannot account for both the multiple realizability and causal efficacy of mental properties. It avoids the threat of causal exclusion by identifying every power of a realized property with some power of its realizer, but this entails that the different realizers of a multiply realizable property share their causal powers, and this just isn't so. A counterexample is produced as evidence. Thus, in its original form, the theory fails to account for the multiple realizability of mental properties. The theory can be amended to account for multiple realizability, but these amendments undermine its account of mental causation and thereby reintroduce the problem of causal exclusion. The subset theory is thus caught between the horns of a familiar dilemma for physicalist theories of mind.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 1","pages":"68-90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45892483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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