Virtue and its moral psychology

Emotion and virtue (2020) defends positions about virtue on two adjacent expanses of philosophical terrain. One is a matter of moral psychology, while the other concerns the theory of virtue. My primary thesis identifies a central role for emotion in the psychological constitution of exemplars of virtue. In this symposium, four outstanding commentators take turns examining some of the theses defended in the book. Roger Crisp and Julia Driver both seek to rehabilitate ‘black box’ theories of virtue, which marginalise the role of emotion. Black box theories are my opponents in moral psychology. Marco Rossi focuses on a core component of my defence, arguing that my distillation of existing theories of emotion is more controversial than I suppose. Finally, Justin D’Arms diagnoses a tension between two Aristotelian ideas he finds at work in my defence. While he is attracted to both ideas, he thinks the tension between them is problematic for my fundamental claim about the role of emotion in virtue. It is a real privilege to have been offered such a rich set of comments to engage.