{"title":"强烈的认知主义弱点","authors":"Nathan Hauthaler","doi":"10.1111/phib.12252","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Marušić & Schwenkler (<i>Analytic Philosophy</i>, 59, 309) offer a simple and elegant defense of s<i>trong cognitivism</i> about intention: the view that an intention <i>to φ is</i> a form of <i>belief that one will φ</i>. I show that their defense fails: however simple and elegant, it fails to account for various aspects about intention and its expression, and faces distinctive challenges of its own, including a dilemma and counterexample. These also undermine Marušić & Schwenkler's claim to a best-explanation type of account and recommend alternatives to strong cognitivism altogether.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 2","pages":"161-176"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strong cognitivist weaknesses\",\"authors\":\"Nathan Hauthaler\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/phib.12252\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Marušić & Schwenkler (<i>Analytic Philosophy</i>, 59, 309) offer a simple and elegant defense of s<i>trong cognitivism</i> about intention: the view that an intention <i>to φ is</i> a form of <i>belief that one will φ</i>. I show that their defense fails: however simple and elegant, it fails to account for various aspects about intention and its expression, and faces distinctive challenges of its own, including a dilemma and counterexample. These also undermine Marušić & Schwenkler's claim to a best-explanation type of account and recommend alternatives to strong cognitivism altogether.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":45646,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Analytic Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"64 2\",\"pages\":\"161-176\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-03-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Analytic Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phib.12252\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Analytic Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phib.12252","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Marušić & Schwenkler (Analytic Philosophy, 59, 309) offer a simple and elegant defense of strong cognitivism about intention: the view that an intention to φ is a form of belief that one will φ. I show that their defense fails: however simple and elegant, it fails to account for various aspects about intention and its expression, and faces distinctive challenges of its own, including a dilemma and counterexample. These also undermine Marušić & Schwenkler's claim to a best-explanation type of account and recommend alternatives to strong cognitivism altogether.
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