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International Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

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Labor market distortion and its impact on wage inequality in the modernization of small-scale agriculture 小规模农业现代化中劳动力市场扭曲及其对工资不平等的影响
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12387
Dianshuang Wang, Xiaochun Li, Zixin Hu, Run Yuan
{"title":"Labor market distortion and its impact on wage inequality in the modernization of small-scale agriculture","authors":"Dianshuang Wang,&nbsp;Xiaochun Li,&nbsp;Zixin Hu,&nbsp;Run Yuan","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12387","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12387","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates the impacts of labor market distortion on wage inequality by considering the modernization of small-scale agriculture. Owing to small-scale operations, agriculture requires an intermediate sector—an agricultural producer service sector—to facilitate the introduction of nonagricultural intermediate inputs and promote modernization. The basic model assumes perfect competition in the service sector and shows that if the elasticity of substitution between labor and services is sufficiently large (small), mitigating distortion widens (reduces) wage inequality between skilled and rural unskilled labor. In the extended model, we introduce a service sector with monopolistic competition and the main results of the basic model almost hold.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 4","pages":"988-1007"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44703575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Fairness and formation rules of coalitions 联盟的公平性与形成规则
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-07-11 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12385
Chiara Donnini, Marialaura Pesce
{"title":"Fairness and formation rules of coalitions","authors":"Chiara Donnini,&nbsp;Marialaura Pesce","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12385","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12385","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we study the problem of a fair redistribution of resources among agents of an exchange economy and how certain limitations imposed on coalition formation may impact the set of allocations judged fair. The study is conducted in atomless economies as well as in the so-called mixed markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 4","pages":"933-960"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44544517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal growth with labor market frictions 劳动力市场摩擦下的最优增长
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-07-04 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12386
Marco Guerrazzi
{"title":"Optimal growth with labor market frictions","authors":"Marco Guerrazzi","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12386","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12386","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I build a capital accumulation model in which labor has to be alternatively employed in the production of goods or in the recruitment of workers. Within this setting, I show that (i) the intensive measure of capital may converge towards its stationary value in a non-monotonic manner, (ii) Pareto-optimal allocations can also be achieved in a decentralized environment in which the wage is indexed to labor market tightness, and (iii) the consistency of the wage that implements efficient allocations with the competitiveness of the market for goods relies on vanishing values of the discount rate.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 4","pages":"961-987"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45751691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effects of trade liberalization on tax avoidance 贸易自由化对避税的影响
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-06-21 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12384
Rui Pan, Dao-Zhi Zeng
{"title":"The effects of trade liberalization on tax avoidance","authors":"Rui Pan,&nbsp;Dao-Zhi Zeng","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12384","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12384","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Does trade liberalization aggravate tax avoidance? We build a three-country model of tax competition consisting of two nonhaven countries and one tax haven in which goods are traded between the nonhavens and firms may shift profits to the tax haven. When the nonhavens cooperate, the reduction in trade costs does not change the degree of tax avoidance. In contrast, when the nonhavens do not cooperate, the equilibrium tax rates become higher, resulting in more tax avoidance. Furthermore, trade liberalization strengthens the tax competition between nonhavens, which further increases the tax-avoidance activities.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 4","pages":"898-932"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47509243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The wage fund theory and gains from trade in a dynamic Ricardian model 动态Ricardian模型中的工资基金理论与贸易收益
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-06-14 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12383
Sugata Marjit, Noritsugu Nakanishi
{"title":"The wage fund theory and gains from trade in a dynamic Ricardian model","authors":"Sugata Marjit,&nbsp;Noritsugu Nakanishi","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12383","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The theory of wage fund as the basic source of financial capital or credit is incorporated into a dynamic Ricardian trade model consisting of three classes of agents: the workers, the capitalist, and the producers of goods. We derive the modified golden rule based on a significantly different mechanism from the standard optimal growth framework. We show that, although international trade in a static setting in the wage fund framework has asymmetric distributional effects on the agents' welfare, those asymmetric impacts are nullified in the dynamic setting. In fact, trade liberalization is Pareto improving along the balanced growth path.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 4","pages":"879-897"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71958601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Location choice with asymmetric data in the Hotelling model Hoteling模型中非对称数据的位置选择
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-06-09 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12382
Shuaicheng Liu
{"title":"Location choice with asymmetric data in the Hotelling model","authors":"Shuaicheng Liu","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12382","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes the location choices of firms in the Hotelling model, in which one firm has consumer data and can practice price discrimination, while the other firm without data can only set uniform price. The equilibrium results show medium differentiation. The location choices of firms can alleviate the inhibition of data asymmetry on competition and increase consumer surplus. And we consider the consumers' transportation costs as an exponential function of distance. When this exponent increases, horizontal differentiation increases, but market prices fall, benefiting consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 4","pages":"855-878"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71948756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size 基于联盟大小的合作博弈的新值
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-06-07 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12381
Surajit Borkotokey, Dhrubajit Choudhury, Rajnish Kumar, Sudipta Sarangi
{"title":"A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size","authors":"Surajit Borkotokey,&nbsp;Dhrubajit Choudhury,&nbsp;Rajnish Kumar,&nbsp;Sudipta Sarangi","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12381","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12381","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose and characterize a new value for TU cooperative games based on egalitarian distribution of worths in smaller coalitions and players' marginal productivity in larger coalitions. This value belongs to the class of Procedural values due to Malawski. Our value is identical with the Shapley value on one extreme and the Equal Division rule on the other extreme. We show that our value is identical with the solidarity value due to Bèal et al. of the dual game. However, by duality, our characterization intuitively improves over the axiomatization of this solidarity value. We also provide a mechanism that implements our value in sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Finally, a generalized version of this value is proposed followed by its characterizations.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 4","pages":"830-854"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47506941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 2/2023 发行信息：《国际经济理论杂志》2/2023
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-05-10 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12350
{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 2/2023","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12350","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 2","pages":"175-176"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12350","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50128243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values 加权优先值族的公理化表征
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12375
Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières, Adriana Navarro-Ramos, Philippe Solal
{"title":"Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values","authors":"Sylvain Béal,&nbsp;Sylvain Ferrières,&nbsp;Adriana Navarro-Ramos,&nbsp;Philippe Solal","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12375","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12375","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We introduce a new family of values for TU-games with a priority structure, which both contains the Priority value recently introduced by Béal et al. and the Weighted Shapley values (Kalai &amp; Samet). Each value of this family is called a Weighted priority value and is constructed as follows. A strictly positive weight is associated with each agent and the agents are partially ordered according to a binary relation. An agent is a priority agent with respect to a coalition if it is maximal in this coalition with respect to the partial order. A Weighted priority value distributes the dividend of each coalition among the priority agents of this coalition in proportion to their weights. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the family of the Weighted Shapley values without the additivity axiom. To this end, we borrow the Priority agent out axiom from Béal et al., which is used to axiomatize the Priority value. We also reuse, in our domain, the principle of Superweak differential marginality introduced by Casajus to axiomatize the Positively weighted Shapley values. We add a new axiom of Independence of null agent position which indicates that the position of a null agent in the partial order does not affect the payoff of the other agents. Together with Efficiency, the above axioms characterize the Weighted Shapley values. We show that this axiomatic characterization holds on the subdomain where the partial order is structured by levels. This entails an alternative characterization of the Weighted Shapley values. Two alternative characterizations are obtained by replacing our principle of Superweak differential marginality by Additivity and invoking other axioms.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 4","pages":"787-816"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42565455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Environmental corporate social responsibility under price competition and the second-mover advantage: An endogenous timing approach 价格竞争和后发优势下的环境企业社会责任:一种内生时机分析方法
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12376
Chul-Hi Park, Sang-Ho Lee
{"title":"Environmental corporate social responsibility under price competition and the second-mover advantage: An endogenous timing approach","authors":"Chul-Hi Park,&nbsp;Sang-Ho Lee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12376","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12376","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider an environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) under price competition in a product differentiated duopoly and formulate an extensive endogenous timing game where firms choose ECSR and subsequently choose prices. We show that a successive sequential-move appears in the equilibrium wherein an ECSR leader adopts a lower degree of ECSR and thereupon chooses a price leader. Therefore, the firm with a low degree of ECSR becomes a price leader while the firm with a high degree of ECSR becomes a price follower but earns higher profits, that is, a second-mover advantage with ECSR-induced higher costs appears.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 4","pages":"817-829"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43170363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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