{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 2/2025","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12402","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"21 2","pages":"163"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12402","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143939555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tourism shocks, skill-biased technological change, and economic growth: A general equilibrium analysis","authors":"Óscar Afonso","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12424","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study extends the Direct Technical Change model to explore how tourism shocks influence sectoral competitiveness, wages, skill premium, technological knowledge, and economic growth. Tourism impacts the economy by reallocating labor from production to services and stimulating R&D, disproportionately benefiting skilled-labor-intensive sectors and fostering innovation. By incorporating labor dynamics and technological absorption, this study bridges gaps in existing literature, offering actionable insights for policymakers to drive sustainable and inclusive growth. Numerical simulations corroborate the theoretical findings, highlighting scenarios where R&D-driven innovation outweighs labor reallocation losses, emphasizing tourism's potential as a catalyst for innovation and long-term economic development.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"21 2","pages":"221-255"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143939295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of modern agricultural development on wage inequality within rural areas","authors":"Xiaochun Li, Yuean Zhou","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12423","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Wage inequality within rural areas refers to the wage inequality between the modern and traditional agricultural sectors. In developing countries, the development of modern agriculture is an important factor affecting this inequality. This paper establishes a general equilibrium model to investigate this impact under the framework of labor transfer. We found that capital subsidy policies for modern agriculture will be conducive to expanding the scale of modern agriculture and narrowing wage inequality within rural areas. Conversely, wage subsidies for modern agriculture would widen wage inequality within rural areas, despite facilitating the transition of traditional agricultural labor into modern agriculture.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"21 2","pages":"201-220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143939214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 1/2025","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12401","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"21 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12401","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143397017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taxing emissions and privatizing a state-owned enterprise under endogenous price-quantity competition","authors":"Lili Xu, Qinghong Zhao, Sang-Ho Lee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12422","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study considers an endogenous competition mode between price and quantity and explores policy interaction between emission tax and privatization when a vertically integrated state-owned enterprise competes with a downstream firm that purchases inputs from an upstream supplier in its supply chain. We find that when the product substitutability is low (high), firms choose Bertrand (price-quantity) competition under a nationalization regime, whereas they choose quantity-price (Cournot) competition under a privatization regime. We demonstrate that an institutional change with privatization and emission tax could switch market competition mode from aggressive Bertrand (price-quantity) to conservative Cournot competition if (unless) the product substitutability is intermediate, which leads to improved (reduced) welfare. Our findings suggest that appropriate coordination between privatization and environmental policies in a vertical relation can enhance welfare in an era of environmental transition.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"21 2","pages":"177-200"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143939245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unraveling of product information with discrete prices","authors":"Hee Yeul Woo","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12420","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a market with discrete prices, the seller provides verifiable information to buyers with privately known tastes, possibly horizontally differentiated. We present a necessary and sufficient condition, called the unraveling criteria, to achieve effective unraveling at every prudent rationalizable outcome, which extends pairwise monotonicity in a more general framework. The unraveling criteria are satisfied if we can rank seller types from the ones with the highest to the ones with the lowest sales at every price, reminiscent of vertical differentiation. We observe that cautiousness, embodied in prudent rationalizability, plays a specific role in achieving effective unraveling.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"21 1","pages":"138-162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143397086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of environmental protection on urbanization","authors":"Shang-Fen Wu, Cheng-Te Lee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12421","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper develops a small open Harris-Todaro model with intersectoral capital mobility and the negative externality of pollution to analyze the effects of the pollution tax on urbanization and <i>GDP</i>. We demonstrate that an increase in the pollution tax leads to a decrease in the level of urbanization. Furthermore, we show that if the ratio of the production value of manufactured goods to <i>GDP</i> is smaller than the ratio of the production value of agricultural goods to <i>GDP</i>, then a rise in the pollution tax results in an increase in <i>GDP</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"21 2","pages":"165-176"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143939597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Biased manager aggressiveness, understated profits, tax pass-through, and tax incidence in a differentiated duopoly","authors":"Leonard F. S. Wang, Di Wu, Vinay Ramani","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12419","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we examine the findings on tax pass-through and tax incidence in a differentiated duopoly when the owner of each firm hires a biased manager. We first show that irrespective of the mode of product market competition, the tax pass-through and tax incidence are higher when owners hire biased managers compared to the case of no delegation. We then consider the issue of tax pass-through and tax incidence when the owners understate the profit to lower the tax liability. Surprisingly, we find that when firms understate their profit, hiring biased managers further amplifies the tax pass-through and tax incidence under an ad valorem tax. However, the results remain the same under specific taxes.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"21 1","pages":"121-137"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 4/2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12380","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 4","pages":"393"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12380","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142664709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Privatization in mixed duopoly with vertical differentiation: Price versus quantity competition","authors":"Yuanzhu Lu, Kangsik Choi","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12418","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we investigate the issue of privatization in a mixed duopoly with vertical differentiation under Cournot and Bertrand competition. The public firm is assumed to produce a lower-quality product with lower production costs. We find that under both Bertrand and Cournot competition, privatization is socially desirable (undesirable) if the quality level of the private firm is sufficiently high (low). However, if the quality of the private firm is intermediate, Bertrand and Cournot competition yields opposite policy implications: privatization is desirable under Bertrand competition while undesirable under Cournot competition. Therefore, under Bertrand competition, privatization is more likely to be welfare-improving than under Cournot competition.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"21 1","pages":"103-120"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}