{"title":"City formation by dual migration of firms and workers","authors":"Kensuke Ohtake","doi":"10.1111/ijet.70025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70025","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Core–Periphery model in the new economic geography, which considers the single migration of workers driven by real wage inequality among regions, is extended to incorporate the migration of firms driven by real profit inequality among regions. In this dual-migration model, the behavior of solutions is qualitatively similar to that of single-migration models. That is, (1) spatially homogeneous population distributions become destabilized and eventually form several cities where both firms and workers agglomerate; (2) the number of cities decreases as transport costs decrease. These results provide a more general theoretical justification for the use of single-migration models.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"22 4","pages":"355-389"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2026-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149384621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Endogenous environmental corporate social responsibility decisions of firms in mixed triopoly","authors":"Srishti Gupta, Aishwarya Harichandan","doi":"10.1111/ijet.70029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70029","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper develops a mixed triopoly model with a public firm, a private firm, and a mixed firm to examine the joint determination of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR), emission taxation, and ownership structure. Within a five-stage game, firms choose ECSR levels, the government sets the optimal emission tax and degree of privatization, firms undertake pollution abatement, and output competition occurs under Cournot behavior. We characterize equilibrium outcomes under alternative ECSR regimes and subsequently endogenize firms' ECSR choices. The results show that emission taxation and ECSR are complementary instruments, as higher emission taxes induce greater environmental responsibility. We further establish that the environmental effectiveness of ECSR depends on the ownership identity of participating firms and that environmental damage may vary non-monotonically with privatization. In particular, environmental damage exhibits an inverted-U relationship with privatization when the public and mixed firms jointly undertake ECSR. Moreover, we identify a critical privatization threshold beyond which mixed ownership ceases to enhance social welfare. Finally, trilateral ECSR emerges as the unique equilibrium when environmental damages are sufficiently large. The analysis highlights the role of mixed ownership as an environmental governance mechanism and contributes to the literature on ECSR, mixed oligopoly, and environmental regulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"22 4","pages":"451-473"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2026-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149384627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Common ownership with downstream firm's voluntary investment","authors":"Qing Hu, Ryo Masuyama, Tomomichi Mizuno","doi":"10.1111/ijet.70026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70026","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is well known that common ownership lessens competition, which tends to decrease consumer and total surpluses. This study challenges this well-known result by introducing downstream firms' voluntary investment. We consider a vertical market with one upstream firm and two downstream firms, where the downstream firms engage in voluntary investment that can reduce the upstream firm's marginal cost. We show that common ownership may increase consumer and total surpluses if the investment is sufficiently efficient. While our main model focuses on homogeneous goods with quantity competition, our main results are robust under differentiated goods in both quantity and price competition.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"22 4","pages":"390-407"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2026-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149384686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Global sequential equilibrium","authors":"Hanjoon Michael Jung","doi":"10.1111/ijet.70028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70028","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper extends the solution concept of sequential equilibrium (SE) to games with infinite decision points and actions, thereby introducing global sequential equilibrium (GSE). While qualitatively similar to SE, GSE distinctively defines posteriors globally as whole probability distributions across all information sets in each period, rather than separately at each information set as in SE. The following properties of GSE are demonstrated: Its existence under the conditions of a compact set of strategy profiles (in the weak topology) and bounded and continuous utility functions; its equivalence to SE in finite games; its qualification as a Nash equilibrium and, in games with incomplete information, also as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; and its satisfaction of convex structural consistency under the condition of statistical independence of players' types and states. These properties establish GSE as a robust and generalizable extension of SE, with important implications for the analysis of games with infinite types and actions.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"22 4","pages":"408-450"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2026-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149384654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 4/2026","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.70030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70030","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"22 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2026-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.70030","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149384586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 3/2026","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.70027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"22 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2026-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.70027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148784383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does union bargaining power always raise union wages?","authors":"Hiroyuki Nishiyama, Mina Nakano, Mizuki Tsuboi","doi":"10.1111/ijet.70023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70023","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite falling unionization rates, the union wage premium remains a robust empirical regularity. To shed light on this contrasting wage impact of unions, we develop a union wage model with firm heterogeneity and a social insurance system. In the absence of a fiscal sector, greater bargaining power raises union wages and lowers nonunion wages. In contrast, when unemployment benefits adjust endogenously to balance the government budget, greater bargaining power instead lowers union wages and raises nonunion wages. Our results suggest that understanding the wage impact of unions depends critically on the interaction between firm heterogeneity and the social insurance system.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"22 3","pages":"337-350"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2026-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148785241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can collaborative regulation inhibit the sustainable development of social platforms?","authors":"Hongjun Lv","doi":"10.1111/ijet.70021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70021","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Social platforms have triggered global systemic crises in data security and tax governance, with acute contradictions between operational models and regulatory frameworks—urging exploration of sustainable paths via collaborative regulation. This paper constructs a differentiated duopoly model to comparatively analyze, from the perspective of regulatory mechanisms, the impacts of different regulatory approaches on digital services and regulatory strategies of social platforms within a platform ecosystem composed of the government, social platforms, and users. The results show that the equilibrium strategies of both social platforms and the government are contingent upon the marginal value of user personal data obtained. Counterintuitively, government regulation may exhibit heterogeneous impacts on two homogeneous social platforms. Moreover, compared with government regulation, collaborative regulation does not necessarily lead to a win-win situation. These findings provide important theoretical foundations and policy prescriptions for data market regulation and sustainable development in the platform economy.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"22 3","pages":"278-317"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2026-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148783674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal long-run monetary policy in a monopolistic competition model with industry clusters","authors":"Cheng-wei Chang","doi":"10.1111/ijet.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70022","url":null,"abstract":"<p>From the viewpoint of industrial organization, industry clusters are recognized as being crucial to economic development. However, the analysis of monetary policy as portrayed in the existing literature does not seem to consider this feature. This study seeks to make up for this deficiency from the perspective of industrial organization. By considering the feature of industry clusters in a monopolistic competition model, this paper finds that the optimal money growth rate is positively related to the extent of firm cluster congestion, while it is negatively related to the extent of the preference for diversity and the degree of monopoly power.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"22 3","pages":"318-336"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2026-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148783960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Oil price shock, transport service, and wage inequality in an oil-importing country","authors":"Amlan Dutta, Rajat Acharyya","doi":"10.1111/ijet.70020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70020","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We construct a four-sector general equilibrium model, with a transport sector facilitating commodity trade, to examine the impacts of an oil price shock on skilled–unskilled wage inequality in an oil-importing country. An oil price shock increases transport costs, and this in turn triggers resource reallocation through changes in the relative price of exported and imported goods. Even though both the skilled and the unskilled wage move in the same direction, their relative change depends on the pattern of commodity trade and production structures. This inter-sectoral resource allocation channel, as well as the role of commodity trade patterns, remain unexplored in the existing literature.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"22 3","pages":"259-277"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2026-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148784609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}