发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

International Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Ascendant altruism and asset price bubbles 利他主义抬头和资产价格泡沫
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12330
Stefano Bosi, Thai Ha-Huy, Cao-Tung Pham, Ngoc-Sang Pham
{"title":"Ascendant altruism and asset price bubbles","authors":"Stefano Bosi,&nbsp;Thai Ha-Huy,&nbsp;Cao-Tung Pham,&nbsp;Ngoc-Sang Pham","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12330","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12330","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider an overlapping generations economy with altruism toward parents and a long-lived asset that delivers no dividends (pure bubble asset). We explore the role of ascendant altruism on the dynamic properties of equilibrium and rational bubbles in the cases of exogenous and endogenous growth.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"18 4","pages":"532-551"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43730672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 4/2021 期刊信息:International Journal of Economic Theory 4/2021
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2021-11-03 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12285
{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 4/2021","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12285","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"17 4","pages":"343-344"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12285","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91796773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Merger under horizontal and vertical product differentiation 横向和纵向产品差异化下的合并
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2021-10-15 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12329
Neelanjan Sen, Drishti Narula
{"title":"Merger under horizontal and vertical product differentiation","authors":"Neelanjan Sen,&nbsp;Drishti Narula","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12329","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12329","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the possibility of a merger when firms are asymmetric in marginal costs and produce vertically and horizontally differentiated products. The merger of two firms that produce the better-quality products (w.r.t. third firm) is possible, if the quality difference (net of cost) or the horizontal product differentiation between the firms that merge is high. If the quality difference (net of cost) between the merged firms and the non-merged firm increases, then a merger is possible if the quality difference (net of cost) and the horizontal product differentiation of the merged firms are significantly high.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"18 4","pages":"509-531"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48277776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Multi-tier pricing in uniform and non-uniform tax/subsidy systems 统一和非统一税收/补贴制度下的多层定价
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2021-10-14 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12328
Winston W. Chang, Tai-Liang Chen
{"title":"Multi-tier pricing in uniform and non-uniform tax/subsidy systems","authors":"Winston W. Chang,&nbsp;Tai-Liang Chen","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12328","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12328","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the optimal specific tax/subsidy policy for a monopoly under multi-tier pricing. It shows, among other things, that an increase in a specific tax on any tier will raise (reduce) the cumulative output of preceding (succeeding) tiers in the non-uniform scheme. In contrast, increasing the tax under the uniform scheme will reduce the output for all tiers and their cumulative output. Furthermore, the paper derives the optimal policy locus and shows the indeterminacy of optimal tier rates in the non-uniform scheme. The case of linear/nonlinear demand and quadratic cost illuminates numerous interesting features.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"18 4","pages":"486-508"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41295455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of environmental policy on wage inequality 环境政策对工资不平等的影响
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2021-10-13 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12327
Kuo-Hsing Kuo, Shang-Fen Wu, Cheng-Te Lee
{"title":"The impact of environmental policy on wage inequality","authors":"Kuo-Hsing Kuo,&nbsp;Shang-Fen Wu,&nbsp;Cheng-Te Lee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12327","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12327","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consider a small open Harris and Todaro's model. This paper analyzes the impact of the policy of environmental protection on skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that, in the economy with urban unemployment, if the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and pollution in the urban low-skill sector is small (large) enough then a rise in the pollution tax will expand (narrow down) skilled–unskilled wage inequality. In addition, we prove that, in the economy with full employment, a rise in the pollution tax will raise the skilled–unskilled wage inequality, if the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and pollution is larger than that between capital and pollution in the urban low-skill sector.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"18 4","pages":"472-485"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42086543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition 价格与数量竞争中与网络外部性的合谋
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2021-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12326
Kangsik Choi, DongJoon Lee
{"title":"Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition","authors":"Kangsik Choi,&nbsp;DongJoon Lee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12326","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12326","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We compare collusion stability under Bertrand and Cournot duopoly with differentiated network products. Contrast to previous studies, we show that (i) the range of collusion incentive is narrower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition, unless network externalities are sufficiently strong; (ii) collusion in prices (quantities) is more stable than in quantities (prices) if network externalities are strong (weak); and (iii) finally, regardless of the strength of network externalities, collusion under Bertrand competition is more stable for high levels of substitutability than under Cournot competition.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"18 4","pages":"461-471"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46925753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Indeterminacy in a model with production externality and inferiority in consumption 具有生产外部性和消费劣等性的模型中的不确定性
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2021-09-15 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12324
Kazumichi Iwasa, Kazuo Nishimura
{"title":"Indeterminacy in a model with production externality and inferiority in consumption","authors":"Kazumichi Iwasa,&nbsp;Kazuo Nishimura","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12324","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12324","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the dynamic property of a constant returns two-sector model with sector-specific externality. In this study, we consider two types of consumption good, one of which is a pure consumption good and the other is a consumable capital good. Then, we examine the case where households tend to consume more pure consumption goods and consume less consumable capital ones. We show that if a consumable capital good is inferior it is possible that indeterminacy occurs around a steady state without capital intensity reversal between the private and the social levels.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"18 4","pages":"607-623"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/ijet.12324","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"62684034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Pecuniary externalities, bank overleverage, and macroeconomic fragility 货币外部性、银行过度杠杆化和宏观经济脆弱性
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2021-09-15 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12325
Ryo Kato, Takayuki Tsuruga
{"title":"Pecuniary externalities, bank overleverage, and macroeconomic fragility","authors":"Ryo Kato,&nbsp;Takayuki Tsuruga","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12325","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Pecuniary externalities in models with financial friction justify macroprudential policies for preventing excessive risk taking by economic agents. We extend the Diamond and Rajan model of banks with production factors and explore how a pecuniary externality affects a bank's leverage. We show that the laissez-faire banks in our model take on excessive risks compared with the constrained social optimum. Our numerical simulations suggest that the crisis probability is 2–3 percentage points higher in the laissez-faire economy than in the constrained social optimum.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"18 4","pages":"554-577"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/ijet.12325","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137845354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wheels and cycles: Suboptimality and volatility of corrupted economies 车轮与循环:腐败经济的次优性与波动性
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2021-09-15 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12323
Stefano Bosi, David Desmarchelier, Thai Ha-Huy
{"title":"Wheels and cycles: Suboptimality and volatility of corrupted economies","authors":"Stefano Bosi,&nbsp;David Desmarchelier,&nbsp;Thai Ha-Huy","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12323","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12323","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a simple economy where production depends on labor supply and social capital. Networking increases the social capital (“greases the wheel”) but also the corruption level (“sands the wheel”). Corruption is a negative productive externality. We compare the market economy, where the negative externality is not taken into account by individuals, with a centralized economy, where the planner internalizes the negative effect. We highlight the possible existence of cycles in the market economy and optimal cycles in the planned economy. We compare the centralized and the decentralized solutions in the short and long run.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"18 4","pages":"440-460"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/ijet.12323","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44971810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems 偏好揭示游戏与严格多重类型住房市场问题的核心
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2021-09-13 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12321
Di Feng, Bettina Klaus
{"title":"Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems","authors":"Di Feng,&nbsp;Bettina Klaus","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12321","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12321","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider multiple-type housing market problems as introduced by Moulin (1995) and study the relationship between strict strong Nash equilibria and the strict core (two solution concepts that are defined in terms of the absence of weak blocking coalitions). We prove that for lexicographically separable preferences, the set of all strict strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of each preference revelation game that is induced by a strictly core stable mechanism is a subset of the strict core, but not vice versa, that is, there are strict core allocations that cannot be implemented in strict strong Nash equilibrium. This result is extended to a more general set of preference domains that satisfy strict core non-emptiness and a minimal preference domain richness assumption.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"18 1","pages":"61-76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/ijet.12321","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41468473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
首页 上一页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信