International Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

{"title":"The Janus model of money demand","authors":"João Ricardo Faria,&nbsp;Peter McAdam","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12400","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12400","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We derive a new theoretical model of money demand, which reflects backward- and forward-looking preferences in consumption and utility. The former aspect is captured by standard habit formation, and the latter by anticipation of future consumption preferences. By introducing both of these into the Ramsey–Sidrauski framework, we unveil a new highly general model of money demand. We discuss the model in light of the apparent breakdown of money-demand functions and diminished policy relevance of monetary aggregates.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 3","pages":"334-351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140937036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Carbon tariffs and environmental policy: Taxes versus standards","authors":"Tsaur-Chin Wu,&nbsp;Chin-Ho Lin,&nbsp;Chia-Jen Chang","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12399","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12399","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper compares different environmental policies under free-trade and carbon tariffs. Our findings are as follows. First, taxes and standards of exporting countries become laxer under carbon tariffs than free trade. Next, if an importing country adopts free trade, its welfare is relatively lower (higher) under taxes when the marginal pollution damage is smaller (greater). Conversely, if an importing country implements a carbon tariff policy, its welfare is relatively higher under taxes. Last, the importing country's free-trade (carbon tariff) policy leads the exporting country to have lower (higher) welfare under taxes than standards.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 3","pages":"269-302"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140560369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Industrial technological progress, technology spillover, and the environment in a dual agricultural economy","authors":"Yunyun Wu,&nbsp;Xiaochun Li","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12398","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12398","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Developing nations typically prioritize economic growth. Thus, industrial technological progress frequently leads to production expansion and subsequent environmental degradation. This paper, however, proposes that in a dual agricultural economy, the progress in industrial production technology does not necessarily degrade the environment when considering technology spillover. Utilizing a general equilibrium model, we conclude that, at the beginning of modern agricultural development, increasing technology spillover rate adversely affects the environment and social welfare. Yet, after the popularization of modern agriculture, increasing this rate can enhance environmental and welfare conditions. Under specific conditions, industrial technological progress might promote environmental and welfare benefits.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 2","pages":"243-266"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140226067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wars of attrition with spending constraints","authors":"Sung-Ha Hwang,&nbsp;Youngwoo Koh","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12397","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12397","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study wars of attrition with spending constraints. Specifically, there are two players with different values of the prize and costs of continuing wars, and they are endowed with limited budgets that can be used during the war. Two players compete by choosing the time at which they intend to give up within the constraints. We find the constrained mixed strategy equilibrium for this model and provide a full characterization of equilibrium depending on whether each player's constraint is binding or nonbinding.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 2","pages":"227-242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139779649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Local farsightedness in network formation","authors":"Pierre de Callataÿ, A. Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12396","url":null,"abstract":"We propose the concept of local‐ farsighted consistent network for analyzing network formation games where players only consider a limited number of feasible networks. A network is said to be local‐ farsightedly consistent if, for any network within the distance‐ neighborhood of , either is not defeated by , or defeats . We show that if the utility function is (componentwise) egalitarian or satisfies reversibility or excludes externalities across components, then local‐ farsightedness is more likely to be a good proxy for what would happen when players have full knowledge of all feasible networks.","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"31 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139779645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Local farsightedness in network formation","authors":"Pierre de Callataÿ,&nbsp;Ana Mauleon,&nbsp;Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12396","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12396","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose the concept of local-<span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>k</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $k$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> farsighted consistent network for analyzing network formation games where players only consider a limited number of feasible networks. A network <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> is said to be local-<span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>k</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $k$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> farsightedly consistent if, for any network <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mo>′</mo>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g^{prime} $</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> within the distance-<span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>k</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $k$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> neighborhood of <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>, either <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> is not defeated by <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mo>′</mo>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g^{prime} $</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>, or <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> defeats <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 ","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 2","pages":"199-226"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139839533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wars of attrition with spending constraints","authors":"Sung‐Ha Hwang, Youngwoo Koh","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12397","url":null,"abstract":"We study wars of attrition with spending constraints. Specifically, there are two players with different values of the prize and costs of continuing wars, and they are endowed with limited budgets that can be used during the war. Two players compete by choosing the time at which they intend to give up within the constraints. We find the constrained mixed strategy equilibrium for this model and provide a full characterization of equilibrium depending on whether each player's constraint is binding or nonbinding.","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"198 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139839537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 1/2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12377","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12377","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139676454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Towards a welfare model of trade and multinational firms with oligopolistic competition","authors":"Bingxue Wang","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12393","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12393","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper constructs a general equilibrium model in a world with two-symmetric countries. It explains welfare gains from international trade and horizontal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the economy with firm heterogeneity and variable markups stemming from oligopolistic competition. My model shows that the pro-competitive effects of trade and horizontal FDI happen because trade openness induces an increase in product market competition that reduces markups and toughens selection, increasing aggregate productivity. The most significant contribution of the paper is that multinational firms, via horizontal FDI, produce the most significant welfare gains through the toughest selection and lowest markups.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"120-155"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12393","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139439124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Submodularity and supermodularity in contest games","authors":"Emin Karagözoğlu,&nbsp;Kerim Keskin,&nbsp;Çağrı Sağlam","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12395","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12395","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper presents various examples of two-player submodular or supermodular contest games. Emphasizing the three main elements of a contest model, our examples revolve around situations where (i) contest success function allows for a draw, (ii) winning prize is not exogenously given but rather jointly produced, or (iii) individual effort cost also depends on the rival's effort. We then illustrate how submodularity and supermodularity can be used to study the existence of equilibrium, the order structure of the equilibrium set, and monotone comparative statics in such contest game examples.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 2","pages":"182-198"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139375616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}