发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

International Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Towards a welfare model of trade and multinational firms with oligopolistic competition 建立寡头竞争的贸易和跨国公司福利模型
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12393
Bingxue Wang
{"title":"Towards a welfare model of trade and multinational firms with oligopolistic competition","authors":"Bingxue Wang","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12393","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12393","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper constructs a general equilibrium model in a world with two-symmetric countries. It explains welfare gains from international trade and horizontal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the economy with firm heterogeneity and variable markups stemming from oligopolistic competition. My model shows that the pro-competitive effects of trade and horizontal FDI happen because trade openness induces an increase in product market competition that reduces markups and toughens selection, increasing aggregate productivity. The most significant contribution of the paper is that multinational firms, via horizontal FDI, produce the most significant welfare gains through the toughest selection and lowest markups.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"120-155"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12393","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139439124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Submodularity and supermodularity in contest games 竞赛博弈中的亚模块性和超模块性
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-01-04 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12395
Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin, Çağrı Sağlam
{"title":"Submodularity and supermodularity in contest games","authors":"Emin Karagözoğlu,&nbsp;Kerim Keskin,&nbsp;Çağrı Sağlam","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12395","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12395","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper presents various examples of two-player submodular or supermodular contest games. Emphasizing the three main elements of a contest model, our examples revolve around situations where (i) contest success function allows for a draw, (ii) winning prize is not exogenously given but rather jointly produced, or (iii) individual effort cost also depends on the rival's effort. We then illustrate how submodularity and supermodularity can be used to study the existence of equilibrium, the order structure of the equilibrium set, and monotone comparative statics in such contest game examples.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 2","pages":"182-198"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139375616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Treating symmetric buyers asymmetrically 以非对称方式对待对称买家
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-29 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12394
Shraman Banerjee
{"title":"Treating symmetric buyers asymmetrically","authors":"Shraman Banerjee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12394","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12394","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate a finite-horizon dynamic pricing problem of a seller under limited commitment. Even when the buyers are ex ante symmetric to the seller, the seller can charge different prices to different buyers. We show that under the class of posted-price mechanisms this asymmetric treatment of symmetric buyers strictly revenue-dominates symmetric treatment. The seller implements this by using a priority-based deterministic tie-breaking rule instead of using a random tie-breaking rule. The effect of asymmetric treatment on revenue increment increases monotonically as we increase the time horizon of the game.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 2","pages":"159-181"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139065833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A theoretical analysis on two-sided duopoly platforms and tax regimes 关于双面双头垄断平台和税收制度的理论分析
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12392
Sangita Poddar, Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee), Swapnendu Banerjee
{"title":"A theoretical analysis on two-sided duopoly platforms and tax regimes","authors":"Sangita Poddar,&nbsp;Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee),&nbsp;Swapnendu Banerjee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12392","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12392","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the effects of three forms of taxation—a tax levied on the platform's revenue, an ad valorem tax on consumers' access fees and tax imposed on per-transaction fees of sellers, in vertically differentiated two-sided duopoly platforms with cross-side network effects. The level of informative advertising which increases the probability of finding sellers by buyers, declines with taxes for each platform. Analytical comparison between tax regimes has been made. Additionally, for an increased degree of cross-group externality, platforms raise the level of informative advertising irrespective of tax structures.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"88-119"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 4/2023 发行信息：《国际经济理论杂志》4/2023
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12354
{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 4/2023","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12354","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 4","pages":"765-766"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71936933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Irresolute choice behavior 果断的选择行为
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12391
Edi Karni
{"title":"Irresolute choice behavior","authors":"Edi Karni","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12391","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12391","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper proposes a model of irresolute choice rationalizing random choice behavior and examines its applications to decision making under certainty, uncertainty, and risk. Depending on the context, the representations feature canonical signal spaces. Decisions are governed by random draws of signals generating stochastic choice functions. Application to portfolio selection and experimental testing are discussed.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"70-87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135216022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Free entry in mixed oligopoly leads to insufficient privatization? 混合寡头垄断中的自由进入导致私有化不足？
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-08-23 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12390
Leonard F. S. Wang, Yoshihiro Tomaru, Chan Zhou
{"title":"Free entry in mixed oligopoly leads to insufficient privatization?","authors":"Leonard F. S. Wang,&nbsp;Yoshihiro Tomaru,&nbsp;Chan Zhou","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12390","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12390","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates privatization policy in mixed oligopoly when partial privatization changes a technological difference between semi-public and private firms. It shows that when the degree of privatization is partial, privatization is insufficient. Furthermore, privatization is more likely to be insufficient as the market becomes more competitive. If the cost efficiency gain is captured by decreasing the degree of privatization, privatization is insufficient regardless of whether entry by private firms is restricted or free.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"56-69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48217439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Population control, technology, and economic growth 人口控制、技术和经济增长
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12389
Xianjuan Chen, Yi Zhou
{"title":"Population control, technology, and economic growth","authors":"Xianjuan Chen,&nbsp;Yi Zhou","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12389","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12389","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the effects of China's population control policy on its economic transitions and long-run equilibrium theoretically and quantitatively. The model-predicted technological progress is assumed to be driven by population size and education level. With population control, the total number of children decreases; however, the average education level increases. Since the overall effect on technological progress is ambiguous, we performed a quantitative analysis of the model. The results demonstrate that population, technological progress, and income per capita move in endogenous cycles. The impact of China's population control policy depends on the timing of its implementation.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"28-55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41757772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 3/2023 发行信息：《国际经济理论杂志》3/2023
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-08-21 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12352
{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 3/2023","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12352","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 3","pages":"423-424"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12352","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50139506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pollution control and multinational firms 污染控制和跨国公司
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
International Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-08-04 DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12388
Jiancai Pi, Xinyi Liu
{"title":"Pollution control and multinational firms","authors":"Jiancai Pi,&nbsp;Xinyi Liu","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12388","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12388","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes how pollution control in the recipient developing country affects the flow of multinational capital owned by multinational firms in the source developed country. We find that when pollution control in a developing country becomes stricter, then the amount of multinational capital flowing into the developing country will certainly or conditionally decrease. Through further welfare analysis, we hope to provide some policy suggestions that will allow the government to guarantee the welfare of the labor force while it implements stricter pollution control.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"3-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42150208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信