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Review of Economic Design最新文献

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On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results 论议价的公理化理论:近期研究结果综述
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-12-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00319-1
W. Thomson
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引用次数: 2
Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies 交换经济中具有本地效率和不受策略限制的分配机制
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00324-4
Takeshi Momi
{"title":"Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies","authors":"Takeshi Momi","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00324-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00324-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44194117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources 外部选择中立分配离散资源
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00321-7
M. Pycia, M. Utku Ünver
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引用次数: 4
Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria 递归委托均衡的极限定理
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-11-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00323-5
Semih Koray, M. Sertel
{"title":"Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria","authors":"Semih Koray, M. Sertel","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00323-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00323-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"26 1","pages":"679-696"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42116137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Religious affiliations of Chinese people and prosocial behavior: evidence from field experiments 中国人的宗教信仰与亲社会行为:来自实地实验的证据
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-11-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00317-3
Weiwei Xia, Xiaohan Guo, Jun Luo, Hang Ye, Yefeng Chen, Shu Chen, Weisen Xia
{"title":"Religious affiliations of Chinese people and prosocial behavior: evidence from field experiments","authors":"Weiwei Xia, Xiaohan Guo, Jun Luo, Hang Ye, Yefeng Chen, Shu Chen, Weisen Xia","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00317-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00317-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"473 - 504"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42184247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Contests with entry fees: theory and evidence 竞赛与报名费:理论和证据
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-11-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00318-2
J. Duffy, Alexander Matros, Zehra Valencia
{"title":"Contests with entry fees: theory and evidence","authors":"J. Duffy, Alexander Matros, Zehra Valencia","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00318-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00318-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45623137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Trade of a common value good 有共同价值的商品的贸易
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-11-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00322-6
Steven R. Williams
{"title":"Trade of a common value good","authors":"Steven R. Williams","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00322-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00322-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When traders have private information about a common value good, adverse selection alone is insufficient to prevent trade of the good and estimation of the common value based upon the traders’ private information. We explore sufficient conditions for nonexistence of trading mechanisms in which trade of a common good occurs, along with cases in which such mechanisms exist.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"7 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects 多件物品保留价格的维克里拍卖的特征
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-11-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00320-8
R. Basu, Conan Mukherjee
{"title":"Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects","authors":"R. Basu, Conan Mukherjee","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00320-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00320-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49114681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
And the first runner-up is...: comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests 亚军是…:比较多赢家图洛克竞赛的获胜者选拔程序
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-11-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00315-5
Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Theodore L. Turocy
{"title":"And the first runner-up is...: comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests","authors":"Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Theodore L. Turocy","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00315-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00315-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We characterise the strategic equivalence among <i>k</i>-winner contests using simultaneous and sequential winner selection. We test this prediction of strategic equivalence using a series of laboratory experiments, contrasting 1-winner contests with 2-winner contests, varying in the latter whether the outcome is revealed sequentially or in a single stage. We find that in the long run, average bidding levels are similar across strategically-equivalent contests. However, adaptation in 2-winner contests is slower and less systematic, which is consistent with the property that simultaneous winner selection results in outcomes that are more random than in the 1-winner case.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"7 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Designing randomized response surveys to support honest answers to stigmatizing questions 设计随机反应调查，以支持对污名化问题的诚实回答
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-10-31 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00314-6
James C. D. Fisher, Timothy Flannery
{"title":"Designing randomized response surveys to support honest answers to stigmatizing questions","authors":"James C. D. Fisher, Timothy Flannery","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00314-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00314-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"635 - 667"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42612481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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