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Review of Economic Design最新文献

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Kalai and Muller’s possibility theorem: a simplified integer programming version Kalai和Muller的可能性定理:一个简化的整数规划版本
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2018-08-24 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-018-0214-3
F. Busetto, G. Codognato, Simone Tonin
{"title":"Kalai and Muller’s possibility theorem: a simplified integer programming version","authors":"F. Busetto, G. Codognato, Simone Tonin","doi":"10.1007/s10058-018-0214-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0214-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"22 1","pages":"149 - 157"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10058-018-0214-3","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52121123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency 双边不可观察投资、议价和效率
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2018-08-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-018-0213-4
Erol Akçay, Adam Meirowitz, Kristopher W. Ramsay
{"title":"Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency","authors":"Erol Akçay, Adam Meirowitz, Kristopher W. Ramsay","doi":"10.1007/s10058-018-0213-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0213-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"17 1","pages":"123 - 147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2018-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10058-018-0213-4","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52120812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle 南洋理工大学破产问题:一致性及相关调整原则
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2017-11-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3066684
B. Dietzenbacher, P. Borm, A. Estévez-Fernández
{"title":"NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle","authors":"B. Dietzenbacher, P. Borm, A. Estévez-Fernández","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3066684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3066684","url":null,"abstract":"This paper axiomatically studies bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility by focusing on generalizations of consistency and the contested garment principle. On the one hand, we discuss several consistency notions and introduce the class of parametric bankruptcy rules which contains the proportional rule, the constrained relative equal awards rule, and the constrained relative equal losses rule. On the other hand, we introduce the class of adjusted bankruptcy rules and characterize the relative adjustment principle by truncation invariance, minimal rights first, and a weak form of relative symmetry.","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"24 6","pages":"101-122"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2017-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41303312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy 层级内的权力转移
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2017-09-16 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1535568
Pinghan Liang
{"title":"Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy","authors":"Pinghan Liang","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1535568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1535568","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies delegation and communication in a model of three-tier hierarchy. There is an uninformed principal, and uninformed intermediary, and an informed agent. Under delegation the principal chooses an interval of actions to delegate to the intermediary, and the intermediary chooses a sub-interval from that interval to delegate to the agent. Under communication, the agent communicates with the intermediary, after which the intermediary communicates with the principal. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under delegation and communication. We show that under delegation the principal can appoint a more biased individual to be the intermediary, and a less biased individual to be the agent. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the principal can prefer to communicate with the subordinates rather than delegate decision rights to them if the intermediary and the agent have opposing biased.","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"21 1","pages":"273-290"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2017-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42585132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice 论择校中平权行动的福利效应
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2017-06-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0200-1
Yun Liu
{"title":"On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice","authors":"Yun Liu","doi":"10.1007/s10058-017-0200-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-017-0200-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"21 1","pages":"121 - 151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10058-017-0200-1","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47590603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism 波士顿机制下的优先驱动行为
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2017-02-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0197-5
David Cantala, J. Pereyra
{"title":"Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism","authors":"David Cantala, J. Pereyra","doi":"10.1007/s10058-017-0197-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-017-0197-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"21 1","pages":"49 - 63"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2017-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10058-017-0197-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52120567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges Nash在有限范围内实现社会选择规则
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2016-12-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-016-0195-z
M. Sanver
{"title":"Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges","authors":"M. Sanver","doi":"10.1007/s10058-016-0195-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0195-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"21 1","pages":"65 - 72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2016-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10058-016-0195-z","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46320295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Exchange-stability in roommate problems 室友问题中的交换稳定性
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2016-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2846382
Azar Abizada
{"title":"Exchange-stability in roommate problems","authors":"Azar Abizada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2846382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2846382","url":null,"abstract":"We study one-sided matching problem, also known as roommate problem, where a group of people need to be paired in order to be assigned to certain rooms. We assume that number of rooms are limited and thus no one can be by himself. Each student has strict preferences over their roommates. Central notion in this problem is stability. We consider exchange-stability of Alcalde (Econ Des 1:275–287, 1995), which is immune to group of students exchanging their rooms/roommates with each other. He shows that exchange-stable matching may not always exist and considers specific domains of preferences to guarantee existence of such matching. We define more general domains of preferences on which exchange-stable matching is guaranteed to exist.","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"23 1","pages":"3-12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68383918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
New axioms for immediate acceptance 立即接受的新公理
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2016-09-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-016-0194-0
Yajing Chen
{"title":"New axioms for immediate acceptance","authors":"Yajing Chen","doi":"10.1007/s10058-016-0194-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0194-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"32 1","pages":"329 - 337"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2016-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10058-016-0194-0","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52120432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets 多边转让市场中纵向不受银团影响的竞争性价格
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2016-09-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-016-0193-1
O. Tejada, M. Álvarez-Mozos
{"title":"Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets","authors":"O. Tejada, M. Álvarez-Mozos","doi":"10.1007/s10058-016-0193-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0193-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"20 1","pages":"289 - 327"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2016-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10058-016-0193-1","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52119993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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