室友问题中的交换稳定性

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2016-10-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2846382

Azar Abizada

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引用次数: 5

摘要

我们研究单边匹配问题，也被称为室友问题，一群人需要配对才能被分配到特定的房间。我们假设房间的数量是有限的，因此没有人可以独自一人。每个学生对室友都有严格的偏好。这个问题的中心概念是稳定性。我们考虑Alcalde的交换稳定性(Econ Des 1:275-287, 1995)，它不受学生群体相互交换房间/室友的影响。他证明了交换稳定匹配可能并不总是存在，并考虑了特定的偏好域来保证这种匹配的存在。我们定义了保证交换稳定匹配存在的更一般的偏好域。

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Exchange-stability in roommate problems

We study one-sided matching problem, also known as roommate problem, where a group of people need to be paired in order to be assigned to certain rooms. We assume that number of rooms are limited and thus no one can be by himself. Each student has strict preferences over their roommates. Central notion in this problem is stability. We consider exchange-stability of Alcalde (Econ Des 1:275–287, 1995), which is immune to group of students exchanging their rooms/roommates with each other. He shows that exchange-stable matching may not always exist and considers specific domains of preferences to guarantee existence of such matching. We define more general domains of preferences on which exchange-stable matching is guaranteed to exist.

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来源期刊

Review of Economic Design ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

28.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design. Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design