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Holistic versus test-only admission 全面录取与仅通过考试录取
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00366-w
Wenhao Zhang
{"title":"Holistic versus test-only admission","authors":"Wenhao Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00366-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00366-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I propose a theoretical framework under which holistic and test-only admission policies can be compared. The framework is based on an extension of the Coate–Loury model (Am Econ Rev 83(5):1220–1240, 1993) by allowing the candidate to signal in some additional attributes: The recruiting institution values the candidate’s competency in two aspects (e.g. academic and leadership skills); standardized test is available only for screening academic skill whereas the candidate can also costly signal about his leadership skill type; the recruiting institution can adopt different admission scores conditional on the presence or absence of the leadership signal (i.e. holistic admission); and the candidate needs to invest in an aspect to be qualified in it. The presence of the signaling stage alters the mechanism by which the two-dimensional investment decision is made compared to the standard Coate–Loury case which corresponds to the signal-blind equilibria interpreted as the outcome under test-only admission, with implication on equilibrium multiplicity and welfare ranking. In particular, we find that the recruiting institution could benefit from the signaling option which leads to a more diversified skill profile but the candidate could be hurt from increased burden from costly investment and signaling even if his admission chance is improved.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142255929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The more the merrier? Disciplinary actions against malpractice 越多越好？对渎职行为的纪律处分
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-09-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00365-x
Limor Hatsor, Artyom Jelnov
{"title":"The more the merrier? Disciplinary actions against malpractice","authors":"Limor Hatsor, Artyom Jelnov","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00365-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00365-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a world of experience goods, two costly ex-post disciplinary actions can be used against malpractice of firms: consumer lawsuits and government investigation. We distinguish between government effectiveness in detecting ‘bad behavior’ vs. ‘good behavior’ of firms—both play a key role in the model. Our results suggest that while an effective government eliminates malpractice completely, the intervention of an ineffective government may backfire, failing to protect the product safety. The reason is that on top of its ineffectiveness, the government may deter consumers from pursuing lawsuits (crowding-out), augmenting the malpractice of firms compared to an equilibrium without government intervention. Additionally, an improvement in government ability to detect ‘bad behavior’ should be complemented by a reduction of lawsuit cost or an improvement in the ability to detect ‘good behavior’ in order to restore consumer incentive to pursue lawsuits.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"232 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142203242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quantifying the social value of a universal COVID-19 vaccine and incentivizing its development 量化通用 COVID-19 疫苗的社会价值并激励其开发
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00363-z
Rachel Glennerster, Thomas Kelly, Claire T. McMahon, Christopher M. Snyder
{"title":"Quantifying the social value of a universal COVID-19 vaccine and incentivizing its development","authors":"Rachel Glennerster, Thomas Kelly, Claire T. McMahon, Christopher M. Snyder","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00363-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00363-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Booster shots for COVID-19 vaccines in the United States have undergone periodic updates to target circulating variants. However, the lengthy process of development, testing, and production has resulted lags between a variant’s initial detection and the corresponding booster's rollout, by which time the booster may no longer match the circulating variant. An innovation with realistic scientific potential—a universal COVID-19 vaccine, effective against existing and future variants—could provide much more value by preempting new variants. Averaged across Monte Carlo simulations, we estimate that, even under conservative assumptions on the arrival rate of variants, a universal COVID-19 vaccine would increase health benefits over variant-specific boosters by more than $900 billion. This social value eclipses the cost of an advance market commitment to incentivize the universal vaccine by several orders of magnitude.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142203243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The political economy of epidemic management 流行病管理的政治经济学
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-08-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00357-x
David McAdams, Troy Day
{"title":"The political economy of epidemic management","authors":"David McAdams, Troy Day","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00357-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00357-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>During an infectious-disease epidemic, a political leader imposes “stay-at-home orders” (limiting activity) or “go-out orders” (mandating activity) whenever preferred by the majority of the citizenry over the no-intervention status quo. We characterize the resulting equilibrium epidemic trajectory in an economic-epidemiological model that allows for asymptomatic infection and social-economic complementarities of activity, assuming that citizens are myopic optimizers. We find that the qualitative features of equilibrium policy dynamics hinge critically on whether the pathogen is transmitted before or after infected people have developed symptoms. If transmission only occurs symptomatically, then the leader never imposes stay-at-home orders on the healthy but may impose go-out orders during some phases of the epidemic. However, if transmission occurs asymptomatically, the leader never imposes go-out orders on the healthy.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"403 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142203245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hidden passing games 隐藏的传球游戏
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00362-0
Elena Quercioli, Lones Smith
{"title":"Hidden passing games","authors":"Elena Quercioli, Lones Smith","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00362-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00362-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We introduce random encounter matching games, where a hidden trait is sometimes unwittingly passed—either private and bad (like counterfeit money), or collective and bad (a disease), or hidden and good (rare coin), or collective and good (information). One optimally expends effort to avoid acquiring bad traits or trying to acquire good ones. The game shifts from strategic complements to substitutes changing from private to collective, or good to bad traits. A unique equilibrium exists in all cases, and coincides for collective bad and private good traits, and collective good and private bad traits. Equilibrium incidence can be a misleading signal of prevalence for bad traits at high prevalence: one cannot infer that counterfeiting is less severe when there is less passed counterfeit money, or prevalence is higher with more infections.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141869307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A vaccine auction 疫苗拍卖
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00359-9
Romans Pancs
{"title":"A vaccine auction","authors":"Romans Pancs","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00359-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00359-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper describes an auction for selling vaccines in a pandemic. The environment borrows from the problem of allocating positions for sponsored links on web pages with search results but recognizes the externalities that one man’s vaccination imposes on another. The auction is the pivot Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism and, so, inherits its properties: efficiency and strategy-proofness. Crucially, the auction is designed to let each bidder bid not only on his own behalf but also on behalf of others. The auction requires neither the bidders nor the auctioneer to forecast the efficacy of the vaccine or the evolution of the pandemic.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141784779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Implications of heterogeneous SIR models for analyses of COVID-19 异质 SIR 模型对 COVID-19 分析的影响
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-07-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00355-z
Glenn Ellison
{"title":"Implications of heterogeneous SIR models for analyses of COVID-19","authors":"Glenn Ellison","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00355-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00355-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper provides a quick survey of results on the classic SIR model and variants allowing for heterogeneity in contact rates. It notes that calibrating the classic model to data generated by a heterogeneous model can lead to forecasts that are biased in several ways and to understatement of the forecast uncertainty. Among the biases are that we may underestimate how quickly herd immunity might be reached, underestimate differences across regions, and have biased estimates of the impact of endogenous and policy-driven social distancing.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141720373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Institutional enforceability 机构的可执行性
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00358-w
Kerim Keskin
{"title":"Institutional enforceability","authors":"Kerim Keskin","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00358-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00358-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We introduce a new coalitional refinement of Nash equilibrium. An <i>institution</i> is defined to include: (i) a collection of active coalitions of players that can make joint deviations from any strategy profile; (ii) a partition of that collection, endowed with a priority order that determines which coalition is more important than another coalition; and (iii) a set-valued function that specifies which coalitions are informed about a joint deviation made by another coalition and can respond to that deviation by making a further deviation. The notion of <i>institutional Nash equilibrium</i> only considers joint deviations under the restrictions set by the institution under consideration. First, we reveal how our new equilibrium refinement is related to the existing coalitional refinements of Nash equilibrium. Second, after defining <i>institutional enforceability</i> as an availability of an equilibrium to be realized as a unique institutional Nash equilibrium for some institution, we characterize the conditions for an institutionally enforceable Nash equilibrium in two-player and three-player games.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141506492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal policing with (and without) criminal search 有（和没有）刑事搜查的最佳警务工作
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00356-y
Carol Gao, Jorge Vásquez
{"title":"Optimal policing with (and without) criminal search","authors":"Carol Gao, Jorge Vásquez","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00356-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00356-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a search-theoretic model, in which a police agency allocates scarce resources across neighborhoods—heterogeneous in “vigilance” and valuables—to minimize crime, while potential criminals decide whether, and if so, when and where to commit a crime. When criminals sequentially search for the best target, the optimal police allocation depends on the difference in vigilance levels across neighborhoods, prioritizing neighborhoods with low vigilance. However, in the absence of criminal search, the optimal allocation depends on the degree of rent inequality among neighborhoods, with a priority placed on neighborhoods with higher rents. We also identify conditions under which policing all neighborhoods equally is optimal. Our findings underscore that an optimal policing design must not only consider neighborhood characteristics but also other factors that may impact criminals’ decision-making, including whether they engage in active search.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141506528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust auctions with affiliated private values 具有附属私人价值的稳健拍卖
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00354-0
Yangwei Song
{"title":"Robust auctions with affiliated private values","authors":"Yangwei Song","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00354-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00354-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study auctions in an affiliated private value framework in which buyers face ambiguity over the distribution of the others’ valuations and make choices that are robust to that ambiguity. We show that, in contrast to the Bayesian case, a first-price auction can generate a higher revenue than a second-price auction in the presence of ambiguity. We also extend this insight to large double auctions. In particular, we propose a pay-as-bid double auction mechanism and demonstrate that given any nontrivial amount of ambiguity, this mechanism implements the efficient trade and is ex-post budget balanced with probability one as the market size grows.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"257 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141172309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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